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PREFACE 
 
 
In every economy, there are companies that are facing financial problems. Some of these 
firms can be even large corporations that account for a significant share of economic output 
and employment.  
Going into financial crisis is quite a typical phenomenon for firms operating in a competitive 
environment. Furthermore, recent financial crisis and riskier corporate processes have made 
such phenomenon even more common and widespread. 
Recognizing the crisis signals and intervene promptly is the best way to restore the normal 
going concern situation. However, this can be difficult because of the complex environment 
and business in which most firms operate.  
When there is the necessity to evaluate distressed or declining firms, we should also consider 
that their future chances of survival are not fully predictable. Moreover, although thousands of 
valuation models and adaptations exist, there is growing evidence that these traditional meth-
ods fail to provide an accurate picture in certain scenarios characterized by volatile conditions 
and future uncertainty.  In fact, most of the valuation techniques are built for healthy firms 
with stable growth prospects which do not work accurately when a firm is expected to shrink 
over time or where distress is imminent.  
One of the initial issues that should be addressed in distressed firms valuation is whether the 
firm's value should be derived as a liquidation value or a going concern value. Generally, the 
appropriate method depends on the facts relevant to each specific case.  
In addition, difficulties to value declining and distressed firms derive also from the risk the 
firms become unable to fulfill debt payments.  This can create conflict of interests among debt 
holders, shareholders and managers, particularly through the measures that debt holders take 
to protect their interests. In fact, when companies are close to defaulting on their debt, share-
holders will prefer to take out any cash rather than invest it in value creating opportunities. 
Shareholders may also prefer to invest in high-risk investments with short-term payoffs rather 
than in low-risk investments with long-term payoffs, even though the latter could generate 
more value.  
Moreover, Gilson (1995) shows that corporate crisis situation can give rise to some distortions 
in the valuation process because of additional two reasons. The first reason concerns the fact 
that during a corporate crisis the amount and the quality of information available for an accu-
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rate valuation is limited, considering also the low interest of analysts. The second reason, in-
stead, is linked with the distorted use of corporate information by those with economic inter-
ests in the company to achieve their strategic purposes. For example, underestimating the en-
terprise value could benefit management and shareholders when they receive shares or op-
tions of the firm during a restructuring plan. At the same time underestimation of the firm's 
value could also benefit senior claimants who receive shares in exchange of debt. On the con-
trary, overestimating the enterprise value could benefit small shareholders and unsecured 
creditors.  
The presence of all these elements together makes difficult the distressed firms valuation de-
pending on uncertain results obtained from the different possible options used to manage the 
financial crisis. 
Despite all these difficulties, an accurate valuation is particularly important for firms in de-
cline and distress. Decisions about the future of the company and strategies such as refinanc-
ing, the sale of certain divisions or the whole company, raising new equity or the evaluation 
of liquidation are all dependent on accurate initial valuation. For this reason, the field has 
benefited from growing interest in practice as an alternative investment for actors such as 
hedge funds and private equity investors.  
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CHAPTER 1 - Corporate crisis status 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Corporate crisis has always been considered one of the most important topics in corporate fi-
nance. Given the recent financial crisis, this phenomenon has became even more important 
both in literature and practice. The reason is related with the negative effects of the global re-
cession on the international capital markets, which has inevitably made the corporate crisis 
phenomenon a subject of topical interest. In recent years, the increasing dynamics of markets 
and the greater competition among firms at the global level have been reflected in a higher 
level of corporate risk. On the other side, the likelihood of entering in a regressive path is part 
of the risk that characterized the life cycle of every firm operating in a complex economic en-
vironment. For this reason a crisis situation can be considered an expected phenomenon in the 
firm's life cycle, irrespective of the negative macroeconomics events.  
A firm which faces a pathologic status during its life cycle most of times has to deal with a 
solvency situation. In these cases, the incapacity of the firm to meet contractual obligations 
gives rise to conflict of interests among creditors, management and shareholders. Further-
more, when a firm is in trouble the amount and the quality of information available for the 
valuation purposes is generally quite limited and it is often used improperly to meet the stra-
tegic objectives of individuals who are interested in the value of the firm. The presence of all 
these considerations together with the corporate complexity contributes to create distortions in 
valuation process. It is exactly from these considerations which derives the content of this the-
sis. 
The aim of this chapter is to give a better understanding of what corporate crisis stand for and 
the difference between decline and distress. Then, we will analyze the main causes and the 
evolutionary stages of a corporate crisis. The causes of a corporate crisis will be classified 
considering their objective and subjective nature, the impact on the firm's economic and fi-
nancial equilibrium and their internal or external matrix. With regard to the developmental 
stages of a crisis, the events that characterize the transition from potential to reversible crisis 
and, finally, to irreversible crisis are often difficult to distinguish. However, only after causes 
and evolutionary stages have been identified it is possible to diagnose the crisis status in order 
to promptly undertake the best strategy to manage and solve the crisis. 
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The chapter will conclude considering the main challenges related with the valuation of dis-
tressed and declining firms. In particular, the thesis will consider practical problems of tradi-
tional valuation models, uncertainty linked to strategic and structural factors and the analysts' 
optimism. Finally, distressed firm valuation cannot ignore the probability of default and the 
consideration of some issues about its calculation, direct and indirect distress costs as well as 
the concept and the calculation of distress liquidation value.  
 
 
1.2. Corporate crisis concept and definition 
Corporate crisis concept has extensively involved corporate finance literature since long time. 
As specified in the previous paragraph, corporate crisis is strictly linked with the dynamic 
evolution of a company that operate in a complex competitive environment and it is character-
ized by an alternation of successful and unsuccessful phases. So, a crisis can be considered ei-
ther as a pathological status of a company characterized by uncertainty and malfunction or as 
a physiological status related to the dynamic evolution, which necessarily affect the firm's life 
cycle. 
In both cases, a corporate crisis is a complex phenomenon and can be observed under differ-
ent perspectives. Buttignon (2008) defines the crisis condition as a situation in which the 
business activity destroys economic value both for shareholders and other stakeholders. In 
this case, the firm is unable to fulfill existing debt obligations by using cash flows generated 
by the business activity or by issuing new debt.  
Fazzini (2009), instead, identifies a corporate crisis as a pathological status in a specified pe-
riod of the business life cycle, which occurs when there is a situation of financial imbalance 
that persists overtime and makes it difficult to restore the correct going concern situation. 
Similarly, Aldrighetti and Savaris (2008) consider a corporate crisis by making reference to a 
deterioration process of the corporate financial conditions which occur through an alteration 
of the economic and financial situation.  
Anyway, whatever definition of corporate crisis we adopt it is sensible to distinguish a decline 
from a distress situation. In fact, not all declining firms are distressed nor all distressed firms 
are in decline, but in many cases distress and decline go hand in hand.  
Generally, there are different stages in each of these conditions. The effects range from simple 
financial issues, such as cyclical liquidity problems, to severe and close-to-bankruptcy cases 
(Grant, 2010). The following paragraphs attempt to identify the major characteristics of firms 
in decline and distress that will be analyzed in this thesis. 
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1.2.1. Decline 
Generally, companies in their growth stage constantly try to innovate to continue growing and 
to avoid becoming a mature company, while mature companies try to stretch their maturity as 
long as possible to avoid entering the declining stage.  
The reasons for decline are numerous and normally decline is triggered by various factors oc-
curring at the same time. A firm's decline normally begins with changing industry conditions 
such as the emergence of substitutes and technological innovation. In many cases, human fac-
tors, such as managerial errors, represent the causes for failing to innovate in new products 
and failing to anticipate the change in the market and in consumer behavior (Grant, 2010). In 
addition, external factors such as a bearish economy and depressed capital markets can aggra-
vate the situation. All these factors will eventually affect the company's sales. Consequently, 
the drop in sales will result in both poor profit margins and falling cash flows.  
Although not necessarily applicable to all cases, some of the main factors that accompany de-
cline are the following (Damodaran, 2009). 
1. Stagnant or declining revenues. One of the main signs of decline is the inability of the 
company to increase revenues over an extended period of time, even if market conditions 
are generally positive. 
2. Shrinking or negative margins. In many cases the inability to increase revenues will re-
sult in declining or negative profit margins. This is a result of a loss of bargaining power 
and a reduction in the pricing level to prevent revenues from falling further. 
3. Big payouts (dividends and stock buybacks). Declining firms have few growth invest-
ments opportunities, existing assets that may generate positive cash flows and asset di-
vestitures that result in cash inflows. For this reason, if these firms do not have large debt 
payments to fulfill, they can use cash flows to pay out large dividends, sometimes ex-
ceeding their earnings, and also buy back stocks. 
4. Asset divestitures. As debt burden of declining companies increases there is a strong 
pressure to divest assets to meet upcoming debt obligations. In addition, since the assets 
are not at their optimal use, a logical step is to sell these assets. 
5. Financial leverage. With declining revenues and falling profit margins, a declining com-
pany faces great challenges to meet its liabilities. In addition, due to the higher risk, it is 
usually difficult for the firm to refinance its debt because the cost of borrowing capital 
will usually increase. 
6. Liquidity Constraints. The reduction in revenues, combined with an increase in the net 
working capital level, will result in lower free cash flows and therefore reduce the liquidi-
ty of the firm. 
~ 16 ~ 
 
As previously mentioned, there are several stages in a decline process. The first stage of de-
cline is normally triggered by strategic issues. Since mature companies normally have a 
healthy cash position, at the beginning the company still has multiple options to act on the 
above mentioned issues. However, as these issues become more severe they increasingly af-
fect the company's ability to take action. So, if the firm does not act promptly the main prob-
lems become financial, such as liquidity and leverage issues. 
In general, the response to decline is both of strategic and financial nature. However, the 
longer the firm is in decline, the more financial the response will be (Grant, 2010). 
 
 
1.2.2. Distress 
Distress comes to light when a firm is unable to recover from decline after a certain period of 
time. Overall, there are two different types of distress: economic and financial distress. A 
company in economic distress will eventually, if nothing changes, end up in financial distress. 
While a mature company still derives a significant part of its value from growth investments, 
a declining company obtains almost no value from its new investments. In many cases the 
company actually loses value from their growth investments due to investment return rate be-
low the cost of capital of the company. In that case, the company's net present value as a go-
ing concern is lower than the total value of its assets. This means that the business is no long-
er viable or, as defined by the academic literature, it has become economically distressed. In 
this situation, assets are not at their highest value in use and it would be more beneficial for 
the company to close down its operations and divest its assets (Crystal and Mokal, 2006) 
(Damodaran, 2009). 
This situation should not to be confused with financial distress. A firm that is financially dis-
tressed could be even profitable, but the distress comes from insolvency, i.e. illiquidity. In this 
case the firm encounters difficulties in meeting liabilities such as interest payments or other 
contractual obligations when they arise. Financial distress can have serious consequences, 
which are normally categorized as direct and indirect costs of distress. We will focus on the 
features of these costs in the paragraphs 1.6.2.  
When firms are unable to meet their debt payments they are normally forced to liquidate their 
assets at bargain prices and use the proceeds to pay off debt. In this scenario it is very unlikely 
that there is any value left for the equity holders.  
However, distress costs go beyond those costs associated with liquidation. The image of dis-
tress can seriously damage the firm's operations since employees, suppliers and lenders are 
more cautious in their relationship with the firm. 
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In fact, firms in distress situation have much higher employees turnover, lose more customers 
and face higher restrictions from suppliers than healthy firms. These indirect costs has a se-
vere impact on the firm's value.  
 
 
1.3. Causes of corporate crisis 
The timely identification of a corporate crisis status represents the first success factor for the 
definition and achievement of restoration strategies. Indeed, at the source of a corporate crisis 
there are a series of internal and external factors that operate jointly and determine a reduction 
in the competitive advantage of the company.  
According to Buttignon (2008), the corporate crisis is the result of several phenomena, inter-
connected each other, that create vicious circles. Given the complexity of this phenomenon 
and its mechanisms, it is particularly difficult to determine what are the causes of a corporate 
crisis.  
From a classification point of view, the causes of a corporate crisis fall into two categories: 
objective and subjective causes. Objective causes are those linked to financial and economic 
imbalances which can damage operating and economic going concern conditions of the firm. 
Subjective causes are those attributable to the firm's human capital. In this case, human behav-
iors can be seen as a unique source of success or failure. When adopting such approach, crit-
ics are first moved against management that is accused to be responsible of the firm's poor 
performance (for example, inefficient control of resources, wrong financial or distribution 
policies and strategic investment mistakes). Later, critics are moved against shareholders and 
debt holders for their poor availability to finance the company or to give warranties to credi-
tors, excessive dividend payout, wrong management choice or inefficient organization. This 
approach, however, does not allow to investigate exhaustively the causes of the crisis because 
it does not considers external events which cannot be controlled by human capital of the firm. 
Analyzing the phenomenon from an objective point of view allows to identify the causes of a 
corporate crisis not only due to inefficiencies and human behaviors but also originated by ex-
ternal phenomena not controllable by management, such as a reduction in the global aggre-
gate demand, price increase of raw materials or price competition on final products. 
Based on this approach, we can distinguish five types of crisis which often present simultane-
ously (Damodaran, 2009). 
1. Crisis due to inefficiency. It takes place when one or more firms in the same industry 
operate at returns lower than those of competitors. Generally, the crisis of inefficiency 
affect the operations area because of the obsolete technology and tools or poor use of 
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labor force. The diagnosis can be made comparing some efficiency indexes (such as 
number of hours worked per unit of output, the productive speed of particular machin-
eries, the utilization rate of operations) with those of competitors. Inefficiency can also 
relate to commercial area, for discrepancies between cost and performance of market-
ing campaigns, or to the administrative and organization system, for lack of adequate 
instruments in strategic planning and control. Finally, inefficiencies can involve the fi-
nancial area. In this case cost of capital of the firm is greater than that of competitors. 
This comes from lower bargaining power of the firm against the credit system, incom-
petence of CFO (Chief Financial Officer) and greater risk perceived for the business 
activity. 
2. Crisis due to overcapacity/rigidity. In this case, crisis is related to an excess of produc-
tive capacity together with an adaptation rigidity due to the greater amount of fixed 
costs related to the business. The most frequent situations for this type of crisis are: 
 A durable demand reduction for the entire industry: this occur when there is a 
change in consumers' behavior and needs, cheaper competitive products are 
launched in the market, high exit barriers and the search of even higher economies 
of scale increases the weight of fixed costs in the firm's structure. 
 A durable demand reduction due to market share shrinking: in this case the crisis 
affects the individual firm for its internal weaknesses and not the entire industry. 
 Sales growth rate is lower than that expected when fixed investments are made. 
 Cost increase is not offset by corresponding price increase, for example during pe-
riods of high inflation rate. 
3. Crisis due to product deterioration. This crisis is originated by a gross margin contrac-
tion which makes it difficult to cover fixed costs leaving an insufficient level of profit. 
The causes might be related either to a loss in the product competitiveness or the entry 
of a new competitor or the achievement of maturity or decline stage in the product  
lifecycle. 
4. Crisis due to a lack of innovation and planning. In this specific case, the firm is unable 
to adjust its activity to the external market conditions and changing environment. This 
is particularly visible on companies which focus their attention only on short term per-
formance without planning future activities with a long run perspective. Lack of inno-
vation takes place when the firm is unable to introduce new ideas, develop new prod-
ucts, search new markets or new ways to encourage customer loyalty. Ideed,  it would 
be difficult for firms to maintain positive results overtime without the study of new 
growth opportunities. 
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5. Crisis due to financial imbalances. This occurs when there is a serious lack of share-
holders' equity, high levels of debt (especially with a short term maturity) or insuffi-
cient liquidity reserves. The result is a poor bargaining  power of the firm against cred-
it institutions and difficulty to meet payment terms. This financial situation gives rise 
to interest payments higher than those of competitors, which can generate income 
losses and low competitiveness. 
Often a financial imbalance is a consequence of other types of crisis and it contributes to 
worsen the economic difficulties of the firm as well as to accelerate the transition from a de-
cline to distress condition. 
Given the complexity and extent of corporate crisis phenomenon, in literature there are sever-
al classifications about causes and typologies of crisis, which can be obtained by observing 
this phenomenon under different perspectives. Even though every attempt to classify corpo-
rate crisis is not exhaustive because it involves several events, one possible classification can 
be the following. 
1. External matrix crisis. In this case, the crisis involves the entire industry or the specif-
ic sector in which the company operates. In particular we can have: 
 Economic crisis linked to factors such as fall in demand, high unemployment or 
price increase of raw materials. 
 Ecologic crisis due to phenomena which damage the environment and, as a con-
sequence, the business activity in which the firm operates. 
 Catastrophic crisis due to accidental events which damage the economy of a spe-
cific geographical area in which the firm operates. 
2. Internal matrix crisis. In this case, the crisis is attributable to the strategic or organiza-
tional mistakes made by the firm's management. More precisely: 
 Strategic mistakes in the definition of the investment portfolio. 
 Wrong choices in the positioning, market segments or market niches to serve. 
 Dimension crisis due to excess or lack of resources. 
 Efficiency crisis due to imbalances between costs incurred and performance ob-
tained. 
 
1.4. Developmental stages of the crisis 
In the last paragraph we focused on the context in which the corporate crisis develops and the 
possible causes. Now our analysis focuses on the developmental stages of the crisis path. 
For this purpose we report the following chart proposed by Buttignon (2008) in which we can 
observe the relationships existing among operating cash flows, enterprise value, debt value 
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and liquidation value in the three different stages of the crisis path: potential crisis, reversible 
crisis and irreversible crisis. 
 
Figure 1.1. - A firm crisis path (Buttignon, 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the first stage, the crisis occurs through a reduction in the operating cash flows, especially 
those expected. As a consequence, enterprise value starts to reduce. This is particularly visible 
for listed firms when the share price starts a negative trend. Debt value is increasing, based on 
the assumption that, since the operating cash flows decline, the firm is forced to obtain other 
sources of financing.  
During the transition from potential to reversible crisis, the enterprise value of the firm, even 
if decreasing, is perceived to be higher than the debt value. However, if this situation is not 
solved promptly, it produces negative effects on the firm's trust and reputation, accelerating 
value decrease, especially for the reduction of intangible assets value and a more difficult and 
costly restructuring process. As soon as the crisis starts to be perceived externally, indirect 
costs of distress arise. These come to light from the reaction of employees, customers, suppli-
ers and financiers. Firms in difficulty often show a progressive increase in the personnel turn-
over and a reduction of specific competencies, since the most qualified human capital leaves 
the firm in search of more stable employment. In this way, firm loses bargaining power with 
suppliers and financiers who impose more strictly conditions. Moreover, sales start to de-
Potential  
Crisis 
Reversible 
Crisis 
Irriversible 
Crisis 
Going concern value 
Face value of debt 
Liquidation value 
Free cash flow 
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crease as some customers prefer to buy from competitors who are better able to guarantee fu-
ture assistance on sale and service continuance. The deterioration of financial conditions can 
lead the management to undertake overinvestment or underinvestment policies, owing to the 
conflict of interests between the shareholders and creditors. 
The critical point of a corporate crisis is reached when the firm's enterprise value is equal to 
debt value. At that moment, the crisis can no longer be considered potential. Face value of 
debt increases because of the recourse of new debt instruments and it moves away from its 
economic value which, on the contrary, becomes even closer to enterprise value. So, firm's 
capital structure plays a fundamental role both on manifestation and on the crisis manage-
ment. Given specific operating conditions, the greater is debt amount and closer the critical 
point of the crisis will be. Buttignon (2008) argued that the presence of debt with pricing or 
reimbursement conditions independent (at least partially) from operating dynamics, such as 
long term debt,  increases strategic and financial flexibility. The advantage consists in the 
possibility to recover corporate efficiency conditions without the involvement of creditors. 
However, since manifestation of the crisis is not perceived externally, this situation can create 
problems because it encourages intervention delays and opportunistic behaviors by sharehold-
ers.  
The liquidation value assumes a decreasing trajectory for the effects of external manifesta-
tions of the crisis and the less bargaining power of the firm. The more the firm's assets are 
specific and the lower the liquidation value will be.  
The crisis is irreversible when the going concern value of the firm becomes lower than liqui-
dation value. Under this situation, liquidation of the firm becomes the most economically 
convenient choice even if some hybrid solutions (such as a total or partial spin-off) can be 
considered. 
 
 
1.5. Strategies for declining and distressed companies 
When there is a decline or distress situation, firms have to choose the most appropriate strate-
gy to restore the normal going concern condition. This choice depends on the economic situa-
tion of the firm, i.e. if the firm is expected to be economically viable in the future. Anyway, 
the choice of possible strategies can give rise to conflicts between the equity holders and the 
debt holders due to the fundamental misalignment of interest (Koller et al., 2010). Indeed, 
when debt exceeds equity, the equity holders normally do not receive any payoff in the event 
of liquidation. In that case they will try to engage in risky investments in order to return to 
profitability. Increased risk, however, is not in the interest of the debt holders who may insist 
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in various types of restrictive covenants and monitor management actions in order to protect 
their interests.  
In any case, declining and distressed companies draft a restructuring plan in order to analyze 
whether they can return to financial health. The restructuring plan normally includes a full 
valuation of the firm. Based on the outcome of this analysis, the firm has, among others, the 
following possibilities: liquidation, divestment or restructuring. 
If the company is expected to be no longer viable, the conventional strategy recommended is 
to either liquidate all the firm's assets (divest) or to generate the maximum cash flow from ex-
isting investments without reinvesting (harvest) (Afflerbach, 2014). Again, the choice be-
tween these two options is dependent on several factors. If the firm is able to extract any value 
from the existing assets, then it will normally harvest. On the other hand, if the industry is in-
herently unprofitable then the better choice will be to liquidate. 
However, the choice is not always in the hands of the firm. If the distress is severe, then there 
is the risk that the liquidation will be forced through litigation. In general, this strategy as-
sumes that the firm is unprofitable. If potential profits exist, then other strategies may be at-
tractive (Grant, 2010). If the firm is to be liquidated, the value will normally be estimated us-
ing the liquidation approach. 
The divestment of some, or even all, assets of the company can be a viable strategy in a dis-
tress and decline situation. Partial divestments form a fundamental part of a company's re-
structuring efforts, aimed at repositioning the firm in the market. In addition, divestment is a 
common measure to alleviate the financial condition of the firm and/or to finance restructur-
ing costs. Another option is the sale or a merger with a strategic investor. The goal in this sit-
uation, apart from the usual motivations for mergers and acquisitions, is to regain competi-
tiveness through the exploitation of synergies. 
If the company, or at least parts of the company, are still economically viable, then restructur-
ing the company is a good strategy in order to return to financial health. In many cases the 
shareholders prefer this option over liquidation. However, depending on the risk involved, 
this option is not in the interest of the debt holders. In general, if the restructuring efforts are 
successful in the first five years then the firm is highly likely to continue to exist in the future. 
Hence, the risk of bankruptcy vanishes with the increasing success of turnaround. 
The choice among these alternatives is dependent on the financial situation of the firm. In the 
worst case scenario, when the firm is almost in bankruptcy, liquidation is forced by debt hold-
ers through litigation. With an improving financial situation the firm can opt for other alterna-
tives. 
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This thesis will focus primarily on valuation surrounding restructuring efforts. The main idea 
is to value accurately decline and distressed firms so that the decision-making between di-
vestment, liquidation and restructuring can be improved. 
 
 
1.6. Critical valuation aspects for firms in trouble 
The main problems that analysts face in the valuation of firms in difficulty derive from the 
characteristics that these firms present as consequence of distress. In fact, traditional valuation 
models are build up for the value calculation of firms in normal going concern conditions 
with positive growth rates and prospects for business continuity. When these methodologies 
are applied to firms characterized by decreasing revenues, declining operating margins and 
high levels of debt, the estimates of value determined using these methods can significantly 
differ from the real intrinsic value of the firm. The reason is that the assumptions underlying 
traditional valuation models are compromised when a firm faces a decline or distress condi-
tion. This restricts the application of such models if they are not adequately adjusted or modi-
fied to take into account the effects and the consequences of distress. In fact, Gilson (2000) 
showed that estimates of value determined using traditional methods are particularly volatile, 
such that the ratio between the market value and the value of equity estimated using these 
techniques can varies from 20% to 300%. In the same way, Damodaran (2009) showed that 
the application of Discounted Cash Flow model (DCF) as well as multiple valuation to firms 
in decline or distress can encounter several difficulties and conduct to results that might be far 
from reality. 
When analysts apply DCF, they assume implicitly that the intrinsic value of the firm is equal 
to the present value of free cash flows that the firm is able to generate during its entire life cy-
cle. However, the application of this method to distressed firms can face the following signifi-
cant issues (Damodaran, 2009). 
1. Existing assets. In many declining firms, existing assets, even if profitable, earn less 
than the cost of capital. This yields a value that is less than the capital invested in the 
firm. If existing assets earn less than the cost of capital, the logical response is to sell 
or divest these assets and hope that the best buyer will pay a high price for them. From 
a valuation perspective, divestitures of assets create discontinuities in past data making 
forecasts more difficult. Moreover, estimating future proceeds from asset divestitures 
can be very difficult because the cash obtainable from a divestiture depends on many 
factors, such as how much an asset is specific, the bargaining power of the firm or the 
need of a timely divestiture. 
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2. Growth assets. Declining firms derive little value from growth assets and the valuation 
of these assets should therefore not have a significant impact on value. While this is 
generally true, there is the possibility that some declining firms are in denial about 
their status and continue to invest in new assets, as they had growth potential. If these 
assets earn less than the cost of capital, the value obtained by adding new assets will 
be negative and reinvestment will lower the value of the firm. 
3. Discount rates. Corporate crisis affects in different ways the cost of capital at which 
we discount future cash flows to determine the enterprise value of the firm. First, large 
dividends and buybacks that characterize declining firms can have an effect on the 
overall value of equity and on the debt ratios we use in the computation of discount 
rates. In particular, returning large amounts of cash to stockholders will reduce the 
market value of equity. If debt is not repaid proportionately, debt ratio will increase, 
affecting costs of debt, equity and capital. 
Second, the presence of distress can have significant effects on both the cost of equity 
and debt. In particular, the cost of debt will increase as default risk increases. So, some 
rated firms will see their ratings drop to junk status (BB, B or lower). Moreover, if op-
erating earnings drop below interest expenses, the tax benefits of debt will also dissi-
pate. In addition, as debt to equity ratio climb, the cost of equity should also increase, 
as equity investors will see much more volatility in earnings. From a measurement 
point of view, analysts who use regression betas, which reflect changes in equity risk 
on a lagged basis, may face the unusual scenario of a cost of equity that is lower than 
the pre-tax cost of debt. 
4. Terminal value. To estimate terminal value, we first estimate a growth rate that a firm 
can sustain forever, with the caveat that the growth cannot exceed the growth rate of 
the economy. At this stage of the valuation process, declining and distressed firms 
pose special challenges.  
Fist, we have to consider the possibility, which will be significant, that the firm being 
valued will not achieve a stable growth. Many distressed firms, in fact, will default 
and go out of business or be liquidated. Moreover, even if a firm is expected to survive 
and reach a steady state, the expected growth rate in perpetuity may not only be below 
the growth rate of the economy and inflation, but in some cases, it can even be even 
negative. Essentially, the firm will continue to exist but get progressively smaller over 
time, as its market shrinks.  
Second, the biggest estimation issues come from declining firms that are earning be-
low their cost of capital, with no reason for optimism about the future. In effect, the 
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most reasonable assumption to make about this firm may be that it will continue to 
earn a return on its capital that is below the cost of capital in perpetuity. This will have 
consequences for both reinvestment and the terminal value.  
Finally, the problems that we mentioned in the previous section relating to discount 
rates can represent into the terminal value computation. In other words, a distressed 
firm can have very high costs of equity which can cause terminal values to implode. 
Analysts who use a relative valuation do not solve the problems of valuing declining or dis-
tressed firms they face using intrinsic valuation. The main problem of using comparables and 
multiples are (Damodaran, 2009): 
1. Scaling variable. All multiples have to be scaled to common variables, which can be 
broadly categorized into revenues, earnings, book value or sector specific measures. 
With distressed companies, earnings and book values can become inoperative very 
quickly. The former because many firms in decline have negative earnings and the lat-
ter because repeated losses can drive the book value of equity down and into negative 
territory. We can scale value to revenues, but we are then implicitly assuming that the 
firm will be able to restore its operations and deliver positive earnings. 
2. Comparable firms. There are two possible scenarios that we can face when valuing 
declining firms. One is when we are valuing a declining firm in a business where all 
the remaining firms are healthy and growing. Since markets value declining firms very 
differently from healthy firms, the challenge in this case is determining how much of a 
discount the declining firm should trade at, relative to the values being of healthy 
firms. We face the second scenario when we are valuing a declining or distressed firm 
in a sector where many or even all of the firms share the same characteristic. In this 
case, not only our choices of what multiple to use become more limited, but we have 
also to consider how to adjust multiples for the degree of decline of the specific firm.  
3. Incorporating distress. When firms are not only in decline but are viewed as dis-
tressed, we should expect that they have an higher likelihood to trade at lower values 
(and hence at lower multiples) than firms with lower probability of distress. Unless we 
explicitly control for distress, we could conclude mistakenly, based on relative valua-
tion, that the first group of firms are undervalued and the second group overvalued. 
By now, the message should be clear. Any issues that affect intrinsic valuations also affect 
relative valuations. The symptoms of decline (negative growth rates, poor or negative mar-
gins, flat revenues) and the potential for failure, caused by too much debt and declining earn-
ings, will not disappear as issues just because we base our valuation on a revenue multiple. 
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In the following paragraphs the thesis will focus on what makes it more complex the valua-
tion of distressed firms. In particular the intention is to illustrate what are the appropriate 
methods to deal with estimation of the probability of default, direct and indirect distress costs 
and liquidation value. 
 
 
1.6.1. Probability of default 
The probability of default risk is a measure of the uncertainty about a company's ability to ful-
fill its debt and other contractual obligations. In normal economic conditions, company de-
fault is a rather rare event.  
Before an actual default, it is not possible to unambiguously distinguish between firms that 
will default and those that will not. However, certain aspects and characteristics have a direct 
effect on the firm's likelihood of default. These aspects generally include the value and risk of 
assets as well as leverage.  
A firm usually defaults when the market value of its assets is insufficient to repay its liabili-
ties. Campbell, John, Hilscher, Szilagyi (2011) used probability of default as a measure of the 
financial crisis status while Schmidt (2009) argued that an increase in the default probability 
gives rise to direct and indirect effects on the firm's equity value.  
The insolvency risk, from one side, reduces the expected value of free cash flows, from the 
other side, it increases significantly the riskiness of debt with effects on the firm's bond rating 
and higher cost of debt. In such cases, the computation of the probability of default represents 
a necessary and fundamental element in the valuation process. 
In literature there are different methodologies for the calculation of the probability of default 
which can be classified into three categories. 
1. Accounting-based measures. These are statistic models which are usually named cred-
it-scoring models, based on some financial statements ratios that are considered par-
ticularly significant to represent the financial health and risk of the company. The 
founder of this methodology is Altman, who formulated in 1968 the first Z-score mod-
el. The formula of Altman is based on five financial statements ratios which consider 
the dimensions of liquidity, profitability, leverage and solvency. Each index is multi-
plied by for a specific coefficient, empirically identified by the analyst. The result of 
this formula represents the Z-score and, on the basis of this score, the firm is classified 
in three zones: risk-free, uncertainty or insolvency. Since this model does not have 
probabilistic nature, it is very easy to apply and for this reason it is the most widely 
~ 27 ~ 
 
used in practice. Given its diffusion, the model has been modified and adjusted many 
times. The first modification was proposed by Altman in 1993. 
 
 Figure 1.2. - The two Z-score models presented by Altman (1968, 1993) 
 
Z (1968) Z' (1993) 
 
𝑋1 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 𝑋1 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
 
𝑋2 =
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 𝑋2 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
 
𝑋3 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 𝑋3 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
 
𝑋4 =
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
 𝑋4 =
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
 
 
𝑋5 =
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 𝑋5 =
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
 
The linear relationship identified by Altman in order to obtain the score is: 
𝑍 = 1.2𝑋1 + 1.4𝑋2 + 3.3𝑋3 + 0.6𝑋4 +
0.99𝑋5  
𝑍′ = 0.72𝑋1 + 0.85𝑋2 + 3.11𝑋3 +
0.42𝑋4 + 𝑋5  
 
 
Although the accuracy of the model, the absence of an explicit measure of probability 
of default makes it difficult to use it for the valuation of distressed firms. In order to 
overcome this limit Ohlson (1980) presented a development of the Altman's model 
which is called O-score model. This model determines an O-score on the basis of nine 
financial statements indicators. The obtained score is then transformed, thanks to a 
logarithmic transformation, in a value between zero and one which represent the prob-
ability of default for the firm under analysis. 
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Figure 1.3. - The indicators included in the Ohlson's model (Ohlson,1980) 
𝑂1 = 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑂6 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 
𝑂2 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 𝑂7 = 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟  
𝑂3 =
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 𝑂8 = 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑓 
𝐵
𝑉
𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 
𝑂4 =
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 𝑂9 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1
|𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡| − |𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−1|
 
𝑂5 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
2. Market-based measures. In this case, the probability of default is determined by using 
the available information in the market about the firm's stocks and bonds prices. 
A first application of this method assigns to each rating class a specific probability of 
default for a specific time horizon. The rating class is assigned by specialized agencies 
to bond issued by firms and the corresponding probability of default is calculated on 
the basis of historical insolvency rate recorded by bonds belonging to the same rating 
class. For instance, the following table by Altman (2007) shows the cumulative proba-
bilities of default for bonds belonging to different ratings classes, five and ten years af-
ter issuance. 
 
Table 1.1. - Bond Rating and Probability of Default (Altman, 2007) 
  
 
5 years 10 years
AAA 0,04% 0,07%
AA 0,44% 0,51%
A+ 0,47% 0,57%
A 0,20% 0,66%
A- 3,00% 5,00%
BBB 6,44% 7,54%
BB 11,90% 19,63%
B+ 19,25% 28,25%
B 27,50% 36,80%
B- 31,10% 42,12%
CCC 46,26% 59,02%
CC 54,15% 66,60%
C+ 65,15% 75,16%
C 72,15% 81,03%
C- 80,00% 87,16%
Rating class
Cumulative probability of 
default
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The main limit of this model, as reported by Damodaran (2006), is that the responsibil-
ity about the calculation of default probability is delegated to credit rating agencies. 
Furthermore, the rating is considered constant overtime and relates to a specific bond 
issue and not to the firm as a whole. 
The approach illustrated by Damodaran (2006), consists to calculate the probability of 
default starting from the market price of the bond issued by the firm, which is put 
equal to the present value of expected cash flow of the same bond, corrected by the 
probability of their occurrence and discounted by the risk-free interest rate. Analytical-
ly: 
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = ∑
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛(1 − 𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠)
𝑡
(1 + 𝑟𝑓)
𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1
+
𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑(1 − 𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑠)
𝑁
(1 + 𝑟𝑓)
𝑁  
 
So, by knowing the market value of the firm's bond, the coupon rate and residual time 
at maturity it is possible to determine the probability of default. Obviously, this meth-
od assumes that bond markets are efficient and firms cannot provide an early repay-
ment. 
In this way we can obtain an annual probability, ignoring the fact that the probability 
of default is greater for the first years and then it reduces progressively as the firm re-
store the normal going concern conditions. Moreover, in presence of convertible bonds 
or non-listed bonds, this method cannot be used. Another weaknesses of the model is 
that we obtain different estimates of probability of default depending on the different 
types of bonds issued by the same firm.  
Another method based on market data is the Option Pricing Theory developed by 
Black, Scholes and Merton (Black and Scholes, 1973) which likens equity to a call on 
assets with a strike price equal to the debt’s face value at maturity. From a different 
perspective, but with equal estimate results, risky debt looks like a composition of 
risk-free debt and a put option granted to shareholders by creditors to yield assets upon 
maturity to the debt’s nominal value. Under this idea, the market value of the compa-
ny’s assets fluctuates from moment to moment in a partially unpredictable manner. 
The company’s probability of default can be expressed as the probability that the value 
of assets will be lower than the face value of debt by assuming that the firm's enter-
prise value in each period follow a stationary process described by the following for-
mula (Merton, 1974): 
𝑑𝑉𝐴 = 𝑟𝐴 ∗ 𝑉𝐴 ∗ 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝐴 ∗ 𝑉𝐴 ∗ 𝑑𝑧 
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where 𝑟𝐴 is the expected return on assets, 𝐷 is the face value of debt, 𝜎𝐴 is the standard 
deviation for the value of assets and 𝑑𝑧 is the output of a standard Gaussian distribu-
tion. 
Visually, probability of default is equal to an area under the normal distribution which 
represents all negative asset yields that are large enough to lead value of assets at time 
T (VT) below the repayment value of the debt (D).  
 
Figure 1.4. - Visual rapresentation of the probability of default (Resti et al., 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shareholders have the option of handing over their company to creditors rather than 
repaying the company’s debt. They can trade VT for D when the former is lower than 
the latter. This is a put option that the company’s lenders have granted the sharehold-
ers. In particular, this is a put option on the value of the company’s assets, where the 
strike price is equal to the face value of debt (D) at maturity T.  
The value of the option (P0) can be calculated using option pricing model developed 
by Merton (1974) as follow: 
𝑃0 = 𝑉𝐴 ∗ 𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝑒
−𝑟𝑓𝑇 ∗ 𝐷 ∗ 𝑁(𝑑2) 
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 𝑃0 is the price of the option 
 𝑉𝐴 is the value of assets 
 𝐷 is the face value of debt 
 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate 
 𝑇 is the residual time to the maturity of debt 
 𝜎 is the standard deviation of the return on assets 
 N(.) is the standard normal cumulative density function and N(d) indicates the 
probability associated with a value less than or equal to d. 
The last part of the formula is the present value of the firm in case it becomes insol-
vent. The company’s probability of default can be expressed as the probability that the 
market value of the company’s assets will be less than the repayment value of debt at 
maturity. Specifically, N(d2) is the risk neutral probability that the firm will be able to 
fulfill its debt obligations because 𝑉𝐴 > 𝐷. In this case the firm will fulfill debt pay-
ments with the current value of the firm's assets that is 𝑉𝐴 = 𝑒
−𝑟𝑇 ∗ 𝐷. 
So, the probability of default for the firm can be computed as follow: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 = 𝑃(𝑉𝐴
𝑇 < 𝐷) = 1 − 𝑁(𝑑2) = 𝑁(−𝑑2) 
 
As we can see, all other things being equal, probability of default increases as: 
 The beginning market value of assets (V0) decreases 
 The nominal value of debt (D) increases 
 The volatility of the market value of assets increases (with a higher σA the distri-
bution becomes more “squashed” and the tails thicken); 
 The debt’s maturity increases. 
Limitations of Black, Scholes and Merton model (BSM model) are particularly signif-
icant when shifting from pure theory to the actual use of the model for empirical esti-
mates of probabilities of default or spreads. These problems fall into several catego-
ries. 
 The simplistic assumption of a single zero-coupon liability where principal and 
interest are repaid in a lump sum upon maturity. In real life companies have com-
plex financial structures with liabilities that have a variety of maturities and peri-
odic interest payments, as well as a number of different levels of seniority and se-
curity. Furthermore, companies can default at any time when they miss the pay-
ment of a bond coupon or do not pay interest on bank loans, regardless of the ma-
turity of their liabilities. 
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 BSM model assumes that the distribution of asset returns is a standard normal: 
such an assumption may not be realistic. 
 Some model’s inputs are not observable directly on the market, such as the market 
value of assets (V0) and the volatility of asset returns (σA). 
 The assumption of constant risk-free interest rates. This assumption has been re-
moved by various authors, such as IGm, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993), 
who have proposed a model with stochastic interest rates and bankruptcy costs. 
 BSM model focuses solely on default risk, without considering migration risk, i.e. 
the risk of a deterioration in the issuer’s credit rating. BSM model provides no in-
dication on to the likelihood that the company’s credit rating should decline, de-
spite remaining solvent.  
An extension of the BSM model had been presented by Kealhofer, McQuown e Va-
sicek and is known as KMV model. The distinctive characteristic of this model is the 
definition of default: a firm defaults as soon as the market value of assets becomes 
lower than a default point. The default point change from company to company and 
can be identified between the value of total liabilities and that of the current liabilities. 
The probability of default for each firm can be calculated on the basis of its distance to 
default which represents the distance between the expected value of assets and the de-
fault point.  
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 =
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
 
Figure 1.5. - Distance to default (Sundaram R.K., 2001) 
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Then, through a database of historical data, the distance to default is converted to a 
probability of default. The distance to default is a widely-used and popular method 
which has found successful commercial application by institutions such as Moody's 
credit rating agency. 
3. Hybrid measures. Hybrid measures for the probability of default combine in the same 
model both market information and financial statements ratios in order to improve the 
robustness and accuracy of estimates. Main credit agencies often use hybrid measures 
to determine rating class for companies under investigation. The inputs of such a mod-
els include financial and economic indicators, credit rating and stock market infor-
mation. Then, these data are processed thorough a regression analysis which produce 
some intermediate results that are first transformed in a credit score and then to rating 
classes on the basis of some specific tables.  
 
 
1.6.2. Direct and indirect distress costs 
Direct and indirect distress costs are strictly linked with the default probability and the firm's 
amount of debt. The higher is the leverage ratio for the firm, the higher is the likelihood that 
the firm faces a distress situation and incur such costs. For this reason the assessment of these 
costs is important for the valuation of firm in crisis and they represent a central element in the 
determination of an optimal capital structure.  
Direct costs of distress include legal costs, costs of appraisals, accounting and administrative 
costs. The determination of the impact of these costs on the value is relatively low and not so 
much problematic since they are measurable.  
Indirect costs of distress, instead, are due to the negative impact of distress on the relation-
ships with creditors, suppliers, customers and employees. These affect the firm's capacity to 
continue the business activity because of more expensive financing conditions, loss of credi-
bility or the necessity to liquidate assets in short term. Other indirect costs come from the dif-
ficulty situation which make it easier for management to undertake activities and investments 
that do not create value for the firm.  
The valuation process for firms in trouble should take into account direct and indirect distress 
costs by considering the degree of decline irreversibility and the level of severity of financial 
crisis. From an operative point of view, the degree of reversibility of a corporate crisis can be 
identified on the basis of the firm's history and the healthy status of other firms in the indus-
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try. A firm that in the past had been characterized by an alternation of positive and negative 
phases, which operate in a sector where most of the firms are in good status or which can ben-
efit from positive macroeconomic trends, has good possibilities to overcome the operating 
difficulties through a management change or other strategic measures. The financial distress 
can be assessed on the basis of the debt amount accumulated by the firm and the rating asso-
ciated with it.  
 
Table 1.2. - A framework for dealing with decline and distress (Damodaran, 2009) 
 No or low Distress 
(low debt, investment grade rating) 
High Distress 
(High debt commitments, low rating) 
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) 1. Value the firm with existing man-
agement and expected decline (Going 
concern value) 
2. Value the firm, assuming orderly liq-
uidation of all of its assets. 
3. Expected Value = Maximum (Going 
concern value, Orderly liquidation 
value) 
1. Start with the expected value (irre-
versible, no distress) 
2. Estimate the probability of distress and 
proceeds from forced liquidation of 
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3. Re-compute the expected value, ad-
justing for distress. 
R
ev
er
si
b
le
 
(F
ir
m
 o
u
tl
ie
r 
in
 
h
ea
lt
h
y 
se
ct
o
r)
 
1. Value the firm with existing man-
agement and expected decline. 
2. Value the firm with better manage-
ment and recovery. 
3. Expected Value = Status Quo Value 
(Probability of no management 
change) + Optimum Value (Probabil-
ity of management change) 
1. Start with the expected value (reversi-
ble, no distress) 
2. Estimate the probability of distress and 
proceeds from distress sale of firm. 
3. Re-compute the expected value, ad-
justing for distress. 
4. If equity investors run the firm, 
value the option to liquidate. 
 
 
Firms with high leverage and rating below the investment grade are more exposed to the risk 
of default. Depending on these factors, Damodaran (2009) proposes a different valuation ap-
proach, which aims to understand the peculiarities produced by each type of crisis. The possi-
ble alternatives and the valuation actions proposed for each situation are shown in the table 
1.2. 
Situations of reversible decline/low distress are characterized by the stagnation of revenues, 
fall of operating margins and signs of financial difficulties shown by covenant breach without 
explicit signals of short-term difficulties to fulfill debt payments. In this case the intervention 
to recover the previous productivity levels involve the internal reorganization and, in many 
cases, this can be carried out through a management change. To calculate the firm's value, the 
analyst should estimate the status quo value, which is the value of the firm under the actual 
conditions of productivity and control, and the optimal value, measured assuming the pres-
ence of new management with the capabilities to recover the initial phase of decline. The ex-
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pected value of the firm is equal to the average of these values, weighted by their probability 
of occurrence: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 𝑄𝑢𝑜 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (1 − 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒) +
                                     𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒)  
 
In situations of reversible decline/high distress the crisis derives mainly by capital structure 
issues due to wrong investment choices or sales growth lower than projected. Moreover, the 
decline in operating conditions creates liquidity and financing problems which may result in 
an imminent impossibility to fulfill debt obligations. The restructuring  should consider oper-
ating interventions and especially the improvement of financial structure, through reschedul-
ing plans and debt reduction strategies. From a valuation point of view, the estimation of en-
terprise value cannot ignore an estimate of the probability of default and the proceeds obtain-
able from a possible assets liquidation. 
When the operating performance is compromised and the firm faces a situation of irreversible 
decline/low distress, it could be more convenient to proceed with divestment of the firm's as-
sets. This generally occurs when the entire market in which the firm operates contracts and 
there are poor future perspectives to create value. Despite the actual disruption of value, the 
first step in the valuation process is to estimate the going concern value, i.e. the value of the 
firm in the actual operating conditions. Subsequently, we can focus on more profitable alter-
natives for the use of assets. The absence of external financial pressures makes more effective 
the liquidation process as the firm can wait the right moment and the best buyer. In case the 
proceeds obtainable from the liquidation is greater than the value obtainable from the use of 
assets, the management should divest the firm's assets, with the only exception for those busi-
nesses that are able to generate value independently. 
In the worst case, the crisis can be defined as irreversible decline/high distress. In this case 
economic and financial conditions are so deteriorated that the unique alternative is to proceed 
with a timely disintegration of the corporate system, usually through a court litigation. The 
determination of the firm's liquidation value should be made considering the weak bargaining 
power of the firm due to the insolvency situation, the number of possible buyers depending on 
the industry conditions and the poor value expected by potential buyers from the assets being 
liquidated. 
 
 
 1.6.3. Liquidation value 
There are different arguments to consider when liquidation approach is used in valuation process.  
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In theory, the liquidation value is determined by the difference between the book value of assets 
owned by a company (such as the real estate, fixtures, equipment and inventory) and the market 
value obtainable upon sale. 
It must be noted that, contrary to the normal sale of the company, intangible assets are not includ-
ed in a company's liquidation value. In general, there are two possible liquidation scenarios. In the 
case of severe financial distress, debt holders can call for forced liquidation through litigation. In 
this case, operations are immediately shut down and the company's assets are liquidated in a "fire 
sale". In this scenario the company is only able to obtain a distressed price due to the lack of bid-
ders in the auction process. In the other situation the company is not in immediate distress but the 
liquidation value is just higher than the aggregate future income or free cash flows to the firm. In 
this case the company has enough time to maximize the proceeds of its assets via an orderly liqui-
dation. Additionally, the business can still generate income while the liquidation is underway, and 
this income also needs to be taken into consideration when estimating value. Therefore, the order-
ly liquidation value is generally much higher than the distressed liquidation value (Kahl, 2002) 
(Petersen and Plenborg, 2012). 
Liquidation plays an important part in distressed companies. A company is normally liquidated 
when its assets would yield a higher value in a sale than the present value of its potential future 
earnings and cash flows. It is therefore a logical and common choice when the company is in eco-
nomic distress, i.e. the company's assets are not in the highest value in use. Nevertheless, as pre-
viously mentioned, a liquidation can also be forced through litigation by the debt holders. In gen-
eral, the value obtained through a liquidation represents the lowest end of a company's value 
range and normally represents the most unfavorable scenario for the equity holders (Brown et al., 
1994). 
Estimating the proceeds from a liquidation is very difficult because it ultimately depends on how 
the market values the assets. This in turn is dependent on the state of the economy and the asset 
specificity but also on the company's situation and the way in which the assets are liquidated. In 
any case, the loss suffered by investors in the event of default is considerable. Again, both the 
amount at risk and loss given default, is dependent on the type of investment and is ultimately de-
termined by the particular contract or obligation. In particular, while debt investments, such as 
loans, have a recovery rate between 50 to 89 per cent, equity investments have a much lower or, 
in many cases, a 0 per cent recovery rate (Afflerbach, 2014). However, assessing the different fac-
tors affecting the liquidation value is a research out of the scope of this study.  
There are several ways to derive a possible liquidation value. One of the most common ways to 
estimate the liquidation value is to use the book value of assets and to assume a discount depend-
ing on the previously mentioned factors. However, using the book value, which represents the 
amount the company invested when it was in a better situation, tends to be over-optimistic. To 
correct for this, the discount factors have to be chosen carefully. Another option is to derive the 
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liquidation value by discounting the cash flow generated by assets, but with no growth prospects. 
Although a reasonable option, this method should not be used in the scenario of a company in de-
cline since these firms tend to have negative growth rates and therefore the method would over-
value the assets.  
The choice between the two mentioned methods depends on the availability of information. The 
most practical way to estimate the distress sale proceeds is to consider them as a percentage of 
book value of assets. However, it is somewhat difficult to make a good assumption of the discount 
on book value applied. Normally, the value is derived from the experience of other distressed liq-
uidation within the industry. There is a significant amount of information available regarding dis-
tressed firms, but since every industry is different and every asset has its own characteristics, such 
information might not be applicable (Brown et al., 1994). Besides, in many cases the assets of the 
company are very industry specific and cannot be used for other business areas. Therefore, anoth-
er method based on the concept of the DCF approach can be used to value the company's assets. 
The main idea is that the asset's value is determined by the future cash flows they can generate. 
Therefore, the average EBIT in the past years should calculated in order to reflect the earning 
power of assets and it is then discounted by the cost of capital. 
The following formula can be used to calculate the value of the firm's assets: 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 × (1 − 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶
 
 
It has to be noted that no growth is assumed. This formula derives the value that a healthy firm 
would be willing to pay for the company's assets. While this approach is more accurate than just 
using the book value of assets, it does not reflect the loss in value the company might suffer be-
cause of the bad bargaining position in distress and other external factors. Depending on the firm's 
situation of the firm and the economy certain discounts should be applied. Since the amount of 
discount is dependent on the characteristics of the firm, it has to be estimated on a case by case 
basis. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Valuation models for declining and distressed firms 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Academic literature offers a wide range of studies about different valuation techniques and a 
considerable amount of articles dealing with declining, financial distress and risk of bankrupt-
cy. However, there are very few research studies that combine the two topics and explicitly 
deal with the valuation of declining and distressed companies. Some of the most notable 
works on this topic are single chapters of books on valuation or bankruptcy, by authors such 
as Damodaran (2009), Arzac (2008) and Scarberry (1996).  
While there are hundreds of approaches to valuing distressed firms, the most used by practi-
tioners are: 
1. Discounted Cash Flow model (DCF) 
2. Adjusted Present Value model (APV) 
3. Multiple or relative valuation (MV) 
4. Option Pricing Valuation (OPV) 
These approaches can yield very different estimates of value for the same asset and at the 
same point in time. Depending on the circumstances and the characteristics of assets, one 
method might be more applicable than others but they are often used to complement each oth-
er. All traditional valuation techniques can be used in a distressed company setting, but all 
have significant drawbacks. In general, all the traditional approaches face the same problem in 
a distressed scenario since they all assume that the firm will continue to exist into perpetuity. 
For example, in both DCF and MV, the mere assumption of the terminal value assumes that 
any financial distress is temporary and that the firm will not cease operations in the future. 
Nonetheless, this assumption completely neglects the risk of bankruptcy and the possibility 
that the firm might liquidate and cease to exist. While there is a chance that the firm will re-
turn to financial health, in a distressed scenario there is a significant risk that the expected fu-
ture cash flows truncate because of bankruptcy or liquidation. Ignoring this risk can severely 
overestimate the firm's value. However, including this risk in traditional valuation approaches 
can be very challenging. While a full analysis of the traditional valuation methods is beyond 
the scope of this study, the following paragraphs will briefly analyze the problems of tradi-
tional valuation techniques in a distressed company scenario and highlight possible adapta-
tions to account for the risk resulting from distress. 
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In the first paragraph we will discuss the application of the DCF model and how it can be ad-
justed to take into account the effects of distress. In particular, the focus will be on scenarios 
analysis and going concern DCF adjusted for probability of default. 
Then, the analysis will consider the APV technique. Even this method is based on discounting 
future cash flows but it differs from DCF approach because it treats separately the capital 
structure effects on value. 
Paragraph 2.4 focuses on the valuation based on the market multiples. The simplicity of this 
method has considerably increased its use, especially to support and control the results deliv-
ered by the other valuation techniques.  
Paragraph 2.5 deals with the discussion of OPV method which can be useful to justify posi-
tive stock value, even if the value of assets is lower than the nominal value of debt. An im-
portant advantage of this method is that, if it is applied to firms in crisis, it can indirectly es-
timate the probability of default and assigning a value to uncertainty and future opportunities. 
To conclude our analysis we will focus on Capital Cash Flow model and DCF method with 
Monte Carlo simulations. 
 
 
2.2. Discounted Cash Flow Model 
The intrinsic value of an asset is the fundamental, theoretically true, value of the asset. It is 
normally estimated on the basis of its cash flows, growth potential and risk. In general, Dis-
counted Cash Flow (DCF) approach aims to estimate company's value as the present value of 
estimated future cash flows discounted with an appropriate rate, called weighted average cost 
of capital (WACC). 
Valuing firm's equity by using the DCF is a process that requires four steps (Koller et al., 
2010): 
1. The valuation of the core business of the firm, which is equal to the present value of 
operating free cash flows that the firm will be able to generate in the future, discount-
ed by WACC. This value is also called the business enterprise value. 
2. The identification and valuation of non-operating assets, such as marketable securities, 
non-consolidated subsidiaries and other non-operating investments. The sum between 
the core business value and the value of non-operating assets is the enterprise value of 
the firm, which is the economic value of corporate activity. 
3. Third step involves the determination of market value of the firm's consolidated net fi-
nancial position (NFP), minority interests and other non-equity claims, such as un-
funded pension liabilities and employee stock options. 
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Practitioners often use net financial position resulting from the last financial state-
ments as an approximation of the NFP market value. However, when considering 
firms in trouble, this approximation cannot be used because the market value of debt 
can change dramatically day by day. In fact, this kind of firms are engaged in debt ne-
gotiation processes with the aim to modify contractual terms or to convert debt into 
equity. In order to value the firm's net financial position accurately, Damodaran (2009) 
suggests: 
 Update frequently the debt amount, even if this could be difficult for an external 
analyst especially when the firm conducts private negotiations with the creditors. 
 Estimate frequently the market value of debt as the probability of default can var-
ies significantly from period to period. Even if no debt instruments are traded in 
the financial market, the nominal value of debt cannot be used as a proxy of the 
market value of debt in distressed firms. 
 In the presence of convertible bonds, the option value should be excluded from 
the debt value and considered as part of equity. 
4. By subtracting the market value of debt from the business enterprise value we can ob-
tain the equity value. Analytically, equity value can be computed as follow: 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
More precisely, business enterprise value included in the preceding formula and com-
puted using the DCF method, can be illustrated as follow: 
𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = ∑
𝑂𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡
(1 + 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
+ 𝑉𝑇 
where: 
 𝑂𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡 is the operating free cash flow at time t in the explicit forecasting period 
 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 is the discount rate expressed as the weighted average cost of capital 
 𝑛 is the number of years for the explicit forecast period 
 𝑉𝑇 is the present value of terminal value, i.e. the present value of operating free 
cash flows from the period 𝑛 + 1 ahead. 
So, the firm's value is equal to the present value of future operating free cash flows in the ex-
plicit forecasting period and the terminal value which include the cash flows subsequent to 
that period. Cash flows included in DCF model are available to both shareholders and debt 
holders. 
Although DCF is a popular and widely-used method, the problem with its application lies in 
the complexity of estimating the different inputs. In fact, a firm in financial distress has some 
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or all of the following problems: negative earnings and cash flows, difficulty to meet debt 
payments and high leverage ratio. The solution to the problem depends, to a large extent, on 
how distressed the firm really is. If distress is expected to be not fatal, in the sense of pushing 
the firm into liquidation, there are various potential solutions. If, on the contrary, distress is 
likely to be terminal, finding a solution is much more difficult.  
An investor or analyst has to reliably estimate the following three aspects which are essential 
for any DCF analysis: 
1. Cash Flow Projections 
2. Discount rate 
3. Terminal Value 
Choosing appropriate inputs for DCF analysis can be difficult. A minor change in any one of 
the above variables can significantly affect the estimated value of the company. In case of de-
cline scenario this task can be even more complex. The following section will analyze each 
part of the DCF method and the complexities when applied to distressed or declining firms. 
 
 
2.2.1. Cash Flow Projections 
The first step required to estimate future cash flows consists to reorganize financial statements 
with the objective to distinguish operating from non-operating items.  
In particular, from the reorganization of Income Statement we can determine NOPLAT (Net 
Operating Profit  Less Adjusted Taxes) of the firm, i.e. the after-tax operating profit which 
does not include any gain from non-operating assets and financing expenses, such as interest. 
Whereas net income is the profit available to equity holders only, NOPLAT is the profit 
available to all investors, including debt holders. 
From the reorganization of Balance Sheet we can determine total invested capital which in-
clude net working capital, operating fixed assets and all the other operating assets and liabili-
ties. 
Once reorganizing the entire financial statements, we should proceed with an historical analy-
sis of the firm's performance: this is a fundamental step to forecast correctly future cash flows. 
Such an historical analysis enables to understand whether the firm has created value, how 
much it has grown and to compare this trend with that of competitors. More precisely, this 
analysis should focus on key value drivers, such as ROIC (Return On Invested Capital), sales 
growth rate and composition of free cash flows.  
ROIC measures operating performance of the firm and enables to stress the contribution of 
each part of the business to the entire value creation process. In any case, if ROIC is lower 
~ 43 ~ 
 
than WACC there is no value creation. The firm creates value only if return on invested capi-
tal is higher than the cost required by investors to finance the firm. 
Given the length of the explicit forecasting period, we can project the evolution of main vari-
ables included in the Income Statement and Balance Sheet. These projections should be based 
on historical data, market analysis, industrial and strategic plans made by the management. 
Particularly important in this phase is the firm's business plan, i.e. the document containing 
the strategic objectives for the future three to five years and a clear determination of key suc-
cess factors. Moreover, the business plan should indicate the amount of investments required 
to support the firm's strategy in order to obtain a positive and continuous cash flow overtime. 
In practice, the projection of future data for declining and distressed firms can face several 
difficulties because it cannot normally rely on the firm's history. However, if the restructuring 
plan makes detailed assumptions about cash flows during the transition period from distress to 
financial health, the discounted cash flow valuation may still be feasible. The valuation accu-
racy is clearly linked to the assumptions about probability to restore financial health, length of 
transition period and projections made during the transition period. In case of distressed com-
panies it is preferable to prolong the explicit forecasting period, at least to cover the entire re-
structuring plan, to evaluate the impact on value by the proposed financial and operating in-
terventions. Generally, the explicit forecasting period should be equal to the period necessary 
for the firm to reach a steady state after the implementation of restructuring plan. 
Free cash flows included in the DCF valuation can be determined as follow (Koller et al., 
2010):  
𝐹𝐶𝐹 = 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇 + 𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 − 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
 
So, to determine free cash flows, NOPLAT should be adjusted for the operating items which 
do not give rise to cash disbursement or cash receipt less the cash used for working capital 
operations and investments. 
However, it is important not to forget that in case of a distressed firm there is the risk that the 
firm will cease operations and essentially truncate the cash flows before reaching the steady 
state. Since the DCF method is designed for healthy and growing companies, it does not take 
into account this risk. Different possibilities have been presented in literature to account for 
this risk. The most widely used are the scenarios analysis and DCF model adjusted for the 
probability of default. 
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2.2.2. Cost of capital calculation 
Interest rate used to discount the firm's expected free cash flows is called weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC) and it reflects the systematic risk of the firm. WACC represents the 
opportunity cost for all the investors to invest their money in a specific business instead of 
another one. A correct and reliable calculation of WACC constitutes one of the most tricky 
steps in the application of DCF model because of its great impact on firm's enterprise value.  
WACC is the weighted average between cost of equity and cost of debt as shown in the fol-
lowing formula: 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =
𝐷
𝐷 + 𝐸
(1 − 𝑡)𝐾𝐷 +
𝐸
𝐷 + 𝐸
𝐾𝐸  
 
where: 
 
𝐷
𝐷+𝐸
 is the weight of debt on the enterprise value 
 𝑡 is the corporate tax rate 
 𝐾𝐷is the cost of debt 
 
𝐸
𝐷+𝐸
 is the weight of equity on the enterprise value 
 𝐾𝐸 is the cost of equity 
Cost of equity estimation is one of the open debates in corporate finance. It is the rate of re-
turn that shareholders expect to obtain from the company on the basis of the risk associated 
with their investment. The most commonly used method to determine cost of equity is the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Based on this model, the cost of equity is the sum be-
tween the risk-free rate and the risk-market premium multiplied by a beta coefficient which 
expresses the systematic risk of the investment. Analytically, the cost of equity formula can 
be written as follow: 
𝐾𝐸 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) 
where: 
 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free interest rate which expresses the expected return of risk-free securi-
ties. It can estimated looking at the returns of long term government bonds issued by 
risk-free countries. 
 𝛽 is the volatility coefficient which express the systematic risk of the firm 
 (𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) is the market risk premium, measured as the excess return that the investors 
require to invest in the stock market instead of risk-free securities. 
Cost of debt  can be defined as the interest rate that the firm would pay to obtain long term fi-
nancing under actual market conditions. If the firm has obtained new financing recently, we 
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can put the cost of debt equal to the financial charges associated with recent debt issue. On the 
contrary, if the debt was issued in a prior period, when the firm was characterized by better 
economic and financial conditions and lower probability of default, interest payments associ-
ated with existing debt are not an adequate measure to determine the firm's cost of debt. In 
fact, especially during crisis situations, the cost that the firm sustains to issue new debt is con-
siderably higher than the cost of existing debt.  
Koller (2010) suggests to use yield to maturity (YTM) associated with long-term bonds as a 
proxy of the cost of debt. However, as YTM is calculated considering that all the coupon 
payments are meet and the nominal amount of debt totally repaid, this approach cannot be 
used for declining and distressed companies as the probability that firm will default its debt 
payments increases the risk faced by the creditors, and thus the cost of financing. Alternative-
ly, we can determine cost of debt according to the rating class associated with the firm. This 
means that we should add to the risk-free rate a default spread, determined on the basis of the 
company's financial health. The higher the rating class of the company, the lower the spread 
will be.  
The cost of debt calculation for distressed firms requires particular precautions to avoid that 
the traditional methodologies underestimate the true value of KD. The capital structure, and 
thus the ratio between debt and equity, should be evaluated using market values and not nom-
inal ones. Moreover, estimates must reflect a target capital structure defined by management 
according to financing plans. Alternatively, it could be useful to make reference to the aver-
age capital structure of comparable firms, assuming that in the long run the firm adopts a capi-
tal structure in line with the industry.  
Using a target capital structure constant for the entire valuation period represents without 
doubts a great limitation in the valuation of companies characterized by high leverage and in-
volved in restructuring plans. In fact debt negotiations, debt or interest payments write-offs as 
well as the issue of new debt have the effect to change market value of debt year by year mak-
ing misleading the results of traditional valuation models. In such a case, the relationship be-
tween debt and equity differs significantly from the actual capital structure and should be de-
fined according to the firm's objectives in terms of debt management, restructuring plan and 
corporate communications. 
Damodaran (2009) argues that the common approach to estimate the cost of equity through 
CAPM will lead to inconsistent estimates of WACC in presence of high probability of default 
associated to the firm. 
If we estimate beta as a regression analysis, during a specific time horizon, this beta tends to 
underestimates the risk associated with the firm because the historical data do not incorporate 
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the effects of the recent crisis situation. Another reason for which beta computed in this man-
ner could be misleading is that during periods of corporate crisis share prices tend to be highly 
volatile due to the rumors about possible restructuring plans or default. For these reasons the 
regression beta can even reduce during crisis periods. 
Domadoran (2009) proposes two different approaches to overcome the above mentioned ob-
stacles and to give a more reasonable of cost of equity in a distress scenario: 
1. CAPM betas adjusted for distress. In this case beta is computed through the bottom-up 
unlevered beta, determined as the weighted average of unlevered betas for comparable 
firms in the same industry. This unlevered beta is then adjusted for capital structure to 
obtain the levered beta of the firm being valued. 
𝛽𝐿 = 𝛽𝑈 +
𝐷
𝐸
(𝛽𝑈 − 𝛽𝐷) 
 
Considering that firms in trouble have often high leverage ratios and do not realize a 
sufficient income to exploit fiscal advantages of debt, beta levered can be much higher 
than the beta obtained by a regression analysis. Leverage ratio and corporate tax rate 
should be estimated in a way such that levered beta reflects future expectations about 
possible changes on these variables. 
2. Distress Factor Models. This methodology calculates cost of equity by using an aver-
age beta derived from comparable firms which are not in trouble plus an additional 
factor, representative of the risk conditions linked to the crisis for the firm being val-
ued. 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 × 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 + 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 
 
Distress premium can be calculated either according to returns realized by stocks of 
firms in crisis or by comparing the pre-tax cost of debt of the firm with the average 
cost of debt of comparable firms in the industry. 
The conventional practice for estimating cost of debt suggests to adopt interest rates associat-
ed with corporate bonds traded on the markets. However this practice can give distorted esti-
mates when applied to declining and distressed firms as yield to maturity of these bonds is 
computed considering cash flows promised by the security (coupons and face value reim-
bursement) and not expected cash flows. For firms with high probability of default the as-
sumption that the firm will be able to meet its debt obligations is not satisfied and thus yield 
to maturity for this kind of bonds is not a correct measure for the calculation of the cost of 
debt. To solve this problem, the proposal of Damodaran (2009) is to use an interest rate based 
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on the rating associated with the firm's corporate bonds which reflects the higher probability 
of default. 
𝑃𝑟𝑒 − 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 
 
Firms which cannot issue bonds in the market, and thus do not have a rating class, can deter-
mine a synthetic estimate of their rating by using an interest coverage. 
Cost of capital calculation is fundamental to estimate the weight of debt and equity on enter-
prise value. The conventional practice of using target capital structure can lead to inaccurate 
estimates of WACC for distressed and declining firms. For this reason, the actual ratio be-
tween market values of debt and equity (usually quite high for firms facing a crisis) should be 
adjusted to more reasonable levels in line with the restructuring plan implemented by the firm. 
 
 
2.2.3. Terminal value calculation 
Terminal value represents the value of the operating cash flows after the explicit projection 
period. The estimate of terminal value is tricky because of the great incidence of the terminal 
value on the firm's total value and the absence of widely shared methodologies for its deter-
mination. Generally, terminal value should coincides with the period in which the firm reach 
its steady state, characterized by constant ROIC and growth. Terminal value formula by 
Koller et al. (2010) is based on the free cash flow projected in the first year after the explicit 
forecasting period and a perpetuity growth rate. 
The perpetuity growth rate (g) should be equal to the long term growth rate of the firm's sales 
considering that no firm can grow at a rate that is higher than the growth rate of the economy 
in the long term (Damodaran, 2011). 
Figure 2.1 summarizes the main steps of DCF methodology represented by Damodaran 
(2011). 
This approach assumes that the firm being valued operates as a going concern and its life is 
potentially infinitive. However, in presence of high probability of default this assumption is 
particularly unrealistic and ignore the possible effects of distress leading to misleading valua-
tion. Nevertheless, some analysts believe that the application of DCF method remains still 
valid for distressed firms and it is not necessary to explicitly consider the probability of de-
fault because the consequences of distress are already incorporated the model. 
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Figure 2.1. - A representation of the Discounted Cash Flow model (Damodaran, 2011) 
 
 
The arguments that support the use of traditional valuation approach in a distress scenario can 
be listed as follow (Damodaran, 2006): 
1. Valuation topic mainly relates large and listed companies with a low probability of de-
fault. However, the events occurred in the recent years demonstrate that even large 
companies considered too big to fail can fail. Moreover, the valuation process is nec-
essary and essential also for small companies with relevant growth opportunities, 
listed or non-listed. In this case the need of a company valuation is even greater given 
the more uncertainty and, consequently, the higher possibility of mistakes in the pric-
ing. 
2. The capital market access is not bonded. In presence of financial markets well devel-
oped, it is possible to assume that firms with good investment possibilities can access 
capital market for obtaining funds necessary to implement their strategies. In reality, 
this assumption has not revealed so credible, even in the open and accessible markets.  
3. Discount rate already incorporates probability of default. This statement is based on 
the idea that discount rate applied to DCF model adjusts the risk of declining and dis-
tressed firms, because risky firms have an higher cost of debt and equity. The result is 
an higher cost of capital which reduces the present value of expected cash flows. Even 
if this reasoning is true, the reduction of value resulting from an higher discount factor 
catches only partly the loss of value derived from the corporate risk. The hypothesis 
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that the firm will be able to generate perpetual cash flows remains and its contribution 
to the determination of the total corporate value is relevant. In other words, the most 
relevant effect of distress, i.e. the loss of future cash flows, is not adequately consid-
ered in the valuation. 
4. The probability of default is already included in the estimation of future cash flows. 
The expected cash flows should be computed as the average of cash flows for all the 
possible scenarios, weighted for the probability associated with each scenario. In prac-
tice, cash flows are generally determined on the basis of estimates about sales growth 
rates and operating margins made by analysts. However, professionals of valuation of-
ten tend to trace optimistic growth path and a sudden return to normal operating condi-
tions for firms with economic and financial difficulties. In addition, the approach that 
allows the determination of future cash flows on the basis of future scenarios, from the 
best to the worst hypothesis, does not represent a risk adjustment, but only a correct 
way to determine future cash flows. 
Adjusting cash flows projections to take into account the possible default of the com-
pany is particularly complex and requires an estimation of the probability of default 
for every year of projection.  
5. In the event of a default, the firm will be able to obtain expected cash flows from the 
proceeds of a liquidation. This statement supposes that the defaulted firm can be sold 
to the best acquirer at a price equal to the present value of expected cash flows. In this 
case, there is no necessity to consider distress explicitly. This assumption, however, is 
particularly unrealistic because it means that, even though the firm is in trouble, it 
maintains a bargaining power such that it will be able to ask a sale price equal to the 
fair market value. 
Given the above considerations, consequences of a distress does not affect DCF valuation on-
ly if the following conditions are met: 
1. There is no possibility of default for the firm, given the size, conditions or government 
guarantees. 
2. The ease capital market access allows the firm with good investment opportunities to 
obtain new equity or debt, even during crisis or recession periods, preventing the oc-
currence of a liquidation. 
3. It is possible to determine expected cash flows which incorporate probability of de-
fault and the discount rate is adjusted by the increased risk of the distressed firm. 
Moreover, in case of a liquidation, the proceeds of the firm's sale should be equal to 
the expected free cash flows of the firm as a going concern. 
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In the event that one or all of these conditions do not present, as in the majority of the corpo-
rate crisis situations, the traditional DCF technique will produce an estimate of value that is 
higher than intrinsic value of the firm. For this reason, we present in the following paragraphs 
a series of adjustments to the traditional DCF technique which take into consideration the 
probability of default and the possible consequences of distress in order to obtain more pre-
cise and accurate estimates of value for distressed firms. 
 
 
2.2.4. Scenarios analysis 
DCF method can be used for the valuation of distress and declining firms whether it is cor-
rectly adjusted to reflect distress effects on value. These adjustments concern the estimation 
of free cash flows and discount rate calculation. 
Damodaran (2009) specifies the necessity to incorporate in the expected cash flows, the prob-
ability the firm can cease to exist because of its crisis situation.  
Scenarios analysis considers free cash flows estimates for all the possible scenarios, from the 
most optimistic to the most pessimistic, and assigns to each one a specific likelihood. Scenar-
ios should reflect different assumptions regarding implemented strategies, macroeconomic 
environment and financing policies and should be supported by a feasibility analysis to avoid 
strategies difficult to achieve.  
This process should be repeated for every period of forecasting horizon as the probability and 
the cash flows associated with every scenario change year by year.  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 = ∑ 𝜋𝑗𝑡(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗𝑡)
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
 
where 𝜋𝑗𝑡 is the probability that the scenario j will occur at time t and 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗𝑡 is the cash 
flow achievable by the firm in the specific scenario j at the time t. 
However, the limit of this approach consists in the difficulty to determine for each forecasting 
period the numerous probabilities associated with each possible scenario as well as the cost to 
create several valuations. To overcome this limitation, Damodaran (2009) suggests to use a 
simplified form of this methodology which considers only two possible scenarios: the going 
concern and the distress scenarios. The version of Weyns et al. (2011), instead, includes three 
possible scenarios: the best, the worst and the most probable scenario. 
If we adopt the approach of Damodaran, in the first case we assume that the continuity per-
spective will not be affected and the firm will be able to restore its going concern situation. 
Instead, the distress scenario includes all possible effects which derives from an insolvency 
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condition. In this case we can consider proceeds deriving from the liquidation process or the 
sale of a part of or all the firm's assets. The expected cash flow for each year of forecasting 
will be calculated as follow: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡 = 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛,𝑡 ∗ 𝜋𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛,𝑡 + 
                                                             𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠,𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝜋𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛,𝑡) 
 
Where 𝜋𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛,𝑡 is the cumulative probability that the firm will survive until time t. In 
this case, the probabilities of default should be estimated for every year and the probability 
that the firm will survive until time t can be calculated as follow: 
𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑡 = 𝜋𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛,𝑡 = ∏(1 − 𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠,𝑛)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
where 𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠,𝑛 is the probability that the firm will result insolvent at the time t. 
The main limits of this model concerns the difficulty to correctly estimate the cumulative 
probability of default for each forecasting period and to incorporate the assumptions, often 
contradictories, of going concern and distress scenarios. 
Scenarios analysis offers a good support in presence of discrete risks, such as the approval or 
the rejection of the restructuring plan by the creditors or the possibility to obtain financing or 
not, but becomes less useful when we have to evaluate a continuous risk, such as sales or debt 
trends. In this case it would be more appropriate to use a model which makes use of a stochas-
tic simulation for the most relevant variables of value. One of these approaches is the DCF 
model with Monte Carlo simulations that will be discussed in paragraph 2.6.2. 
 
 
2.2.5. Going concern DCF adjusted for the probability of default 
An alternative to the previous DCF model concerns to separate the assumptions about going 
concern value from those which deal with the effects and consequences of distress. This sim-
plifies a lot the work of the analyst and allows to make assumptions consistent with every 
scenario overcoming one of the main limits of DCF with scenarios analysis. In such a case, 
firm's enterprise value is equal to the weighted average between the going concern value and 
the liquidation value where, weights are based on the probability that the firm will result in-
solvent during the forecasting period. 
Analytically, we can write the value of the firm as follow: 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐺𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 × (1 − 𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 × 𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 
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where 𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 is the cumulative probability that the firm will result distressed during the 
valuation period. 
The going concern value can be computed, considering only scenarios where the firm will 
survive, the ratio between debt and equity will decrease and the fiscal benefit will increase 
overtime (Damodaran, 2011). 
An alternative, even if not so precise as the previous one, is to value the firm by observing 
other firms in the industry which are in good financial conditions. In this way it is possible to 
value the firm as in healthy condition by using average operating margins and the industry 
cost of capital. The risk of this approach is to overestimate the value of the firm by assuming 
implicitly that the return to financial health is oncoming and without consequences. The mod-
el can be refined when the analyst has access of more information and more accurate data. 
Liquidation value or distress sale value can be computed by applying the method proposed by 
Dorigato e Aldrighetti (2009). Alternatevely, Damodaran (2009) suggests to introduce the fol-
lowing modifications when the external analyst does not have sufficient information: 
1. Discounting value of the firm obtained from DCF method. However, the percentage 
discount to apply is of difficult determination. 
2. Calculating value from expected cash flows without considering new investments and 
assuming that in case of liquidation the acquirer is available to pay only existing assets 
without considering the possible growth opportunities. 
3. Applying a discount on book value of assets on the basis of historical transactions re-
garding comparable firms. 
The last input required by the model is the estimate of the cumulative probability of default 
over the specific valuation period. It should be computed as follow: 
𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 1 − ∏(1 − 𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠,𝑡)
𝑛
𝑛=1
 
 
where πdistress,t is the probability that the firm will be distressed at the time t. 
The probability of default can be determined though numerous methodologies which were 
presented in paragraph 1.6.1. 
 
 
2.3. Adjusted Present Value  
The relationship between capital structure and value is a typical argument in corporate finance. 
Several studies and researches, such as Modigliani and Miller (1958), Weston (1963), Altman 
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(1984), Chen (1995) and Altman and Hotchkiss (2006) demonstrated the central role played by 
the capital structure in the determination of firm's value.  
DCF method with its adjustments requires to calculate WACC by assuming a target ratio between 
debt and equity. This approximation is quite unrealistic for firms with high leverage ratio that are 
implementing a restructuring plan. In this case the ratio between debt and equity is particularly 
uncertain and variable and its evolution cannot be excluded from valuation process. 
Adjusted Present Value (AVP) method takes explicitly into consideration the effects of the firm's 
capital structure and determine the levered value of the firm starting from its unlevered value and 
then adding the benefits and costs deriving from capital structure. 
Theory for the application of this method can be found in the teachings of Modigliani and Miller 
who showed that without transaction costs and taxes, the choice about capital structure do not in-
fluence the firm's enterprise value, under perfect capital markets condition. In presence of taxa-
tion, the use of debt allow the firm to obtain a fiscal benefit, given the possibility to deduct inter-
est payments from the taxable income. This will result in an enterprise value increase but, at the 
same time, the arising of distress costs. 
Arzac (2005) showed two important consequences from a debt increase: first, it generates a posi-
tive effect on enterprise value in the form of tax shield, which is partly offset by a greater cost of 
equity because of the higher risk of distress. Second, we should also consider direct and indirect 
costs related to distress.  
The traditional approach for the application of APV incorporates the leverage effects especially in 
their positive dimension. The unlevered value of the firm is determined on the basis of expected 
unlevered cash flows discounted at the cost of equity in absence of debt. Analysts add to this val-
ue the fiscal benefit of debt, calculated on the basis of the corporate tax rate and discounted either 
at the cost of debt or the unlevered cost of equity. The use of KD and KE depends on the riskiness 
attributable to cash flows. APV methodology gives appropriate results for the valuation of healthy 
firms but should be adequately adjusted to reflect the overall leverage effects during crisis. 
 
 
2.3.1. APV method with probability and costs of default 
Damodaran (2006) argued that in a crisis situation, the fiscal benefit of debt is significantly low or 
even absent, because EBIT is decreasing or negative without the possibility to achieve a tax 
shield. In addition, we have also to consider leverage effects on default risk as well as direct and 
indirect cost of default. So, the value of the firm using APV method can be synthesized as follow: 
𝐸𝑉 = 𝑈𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 =
∑
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑
(1+𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑢𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑)
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ∑
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
(1+𝑘𝑑)
𝑛
𝑖=1 − 𝑃𝑉(𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡)  
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where the first term represents the value of the firm financed only by equity, the second term is 
the value of tax shield on debt and the third term represents the value of the expected costs in case 
of default. 
The assessment about default costs requires an estimation of the probability of default and the 
identification of direct and indirect costs which would arise in case of default. By using the for-
mulation of Damodaran (2006) we can say: 
𝑃𝑉(𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 × 𝑃𝑉(𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) 
 
Damodaran (2006) suggests to consider the difference between the going concern value and the 
liquidation value of the firm as an estimate of default costs. Almeida e Philippon (2005) suggest 
that conventional measures for calculation of the costs of distress underestimate the true amount 
of these costs because they do not take into consideration that a corporate crisis is more accentuat-
ed during periods of recession or global market crisis. They support the idea that standard method 
for calculating the present value of costs of distress costs consists to multiply the estimates of the 
default costs with historical probability of default ignoring the effect of capitalization and dis-
counting. Other studies, such as Altman (1984), suggest to discount the product between the his-
torical probability of default of the firm and the costs associated with a risk-neutral probability. 
The use of the risk-free interest rate, according to some authors,  underestimate the amount of 
these costs and, consequently, overestimate the firm's enterprise value. To take into account the 
greater market premium reflecting the real systematic risk, Almeida e Philippon propose to com-
pute the present value of distress costs by adopting a risk-adjusted probability of default computed 
on the basis of corporate bond spreads. 
This approach is based on the evidence that costs of default arise when the corporate bonds are 
not repaid back to the investors. Moreover, asset-pricing literature shows that there is a systematic 
component in the firm's risk of default. The adjustment requires to estimate the ex-post costs of 
default and to use corporate bond credit spreads to determine the market-implied risk-adjusted 
probability of default, increasing the impact of default on enterprise value. 
This methodology requires the necessity to estimate correctly the probability of default of the firm 
and also to focus on the existence of income losses which do not enable to exploit the fiscal bene-
fit of debt. For this reason, some professionals support APV method as a useful approach to eval-
uate firms with high leverage levels but, at the same time, they do not have any problem from an 
operating point of view. Another difficulty that we can face when we apply APV method concerns 
to estimate the value of debt in the long run. This limit can be passed by assuming that the firm 
aims to achieve a target capital structure in the long run. In particular, it is preferable to assume 
that at the end of the restructuring plan is able to maintain a determined level of debt overtime. In 
this case we can combine Adjusted Present Value method with Discounted Cash Flow method to 
value the firm (Arzac, 2005). More precisely, during explicit forecasting period, when the debt 
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value is more volatile and independent from the value of the firm, we can apply the Adjusted Pre-
sent value while the terminal value is determined through the DCF formula and then discounted at 
the unlevered cost of capital in order to avoid double counting problem of debt. 
 
 
2.4. Multiple or relative valuation 
Different from the above mentioned methods is multiple valuation (MV), which is based on 
the use of some multipliers derived from market prices of firms with similar characteristics. 
Multiples are ratios between market capitalization and other economic or financial amounts 
selected from comparable firms. Value of the firm is obtained by multiplying the resulting 
multiples from comparables for the corresponding amount of the firm being valued. 
MV has reached a widespread use because of its ease application and understanding. It re-
quires less hypothesis and can be applied more quickly than models based on discounted cash 
flows. Furthermore, it permits to reflect closely market valuation.  
These factors represents the strengths and at the same time weaknesses of this approach. The 
ease application can conduct to inaccurate results which do not take into consideration varia-
bles such as the risk, growth or potential cash flows. In fact, the recourse to market data, even 
if it can create estimates of value closer to actual market prices, affects valuation because it 
depends on the market capacity to price stocks correctly. For example, MV can be misleading 
when the market is undervaluing or overvaluing comparable firms. Furthermore, MV can lead 
to inaccurate valuation because future growth potential of the firm being valued are estimated 
indirectly through market prices of comparables. Finally, MV is particularly subject to ma-
nipulations due to the lack of transparency on the underlying hypothesis and the choice of 
comparable firms which can affect the final valuation results. 
Koller (2010) suggests to use this approach in combination with other methods to verify the 
reliability of DCF valuation explaining the performance differences with respect to competi-
tors and indentifying firms that the market believes are better strategically positioned than 
others. 
According to the methodology described by Borsa Italiana (2004), relative valuation should 
be carried out considering the following phases. 
1. Sample selection. The most tricky aspect in MV is the selection of comparable firms. 
The practical impossibility to indentify an homogenous group of companies creates 
the necessity to select comparable firms in relation to the most significant attributes of 
value. Generally, professionals proceed with three levels of analysis in this phase. 
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 At the first level, analysts should analyze comparable firms which operate in the 
same industry and country of the firm being valued because they are similar in 
terms of risk and long term growth perspectives. The analysis should be conduct-
ed by using as comparison parameters both quantitative criteria, such as ROIC, 
size, turnover, asset composition and capital structure, and  qualitative factors, 
such as competitive positioning, ability to innovate and entrepreneurial formula. 
However, weaknesses in the home country make it difficult to select an accurate 
sample. For this reason, we should extend our analysis beyond the national 
boundaries.  
 An international comparison is preferable when there is developed financial mar-
kets with significant levels of liquidity and multiples are not affected by financial 
statements policies or fiscal policies of the specific countries.  
 The third level of analysis involves an inter-sector comparison, based on the ef-
fective possibility to identify firms which operate in different sectors but with the 
same risk profile and expected return. 
2. Choosing the most significant multiples. Multiples used in the valuation should be co-
herent. This means that numerator and denominator should belong to the same catego-
ry and make reference to the same elements.  
We can distinguish multiples into two categories: multiples which belong to equity 
side and those which belong to asset side.   
Equity side multiples are ratios where numerator expresses the value of firm's equity. 
The most used are: 
 P/E (Price per share/earnings per share): it is the most known multiple but it can 
lead to misleading results as P/E is affected from financial statements and fiscal 
policies as well as by debt amount. 
 P/CF (Price per share/cash flow per share): cash flow is computed as the sum of 
net income, depreciation charges and provisions. 
 P/B (Price per share/book value of equity per share): it is difficult to use when 
firms adopt different financial statements policies as shareholders' equity becomes 
not comparable. 
The numerator of asset side multiples is the firm's enterprise value. The most widely 
used asset side multiples are: 
 EV/EBIT (enterprise value/earnings before interest and taxes) 
 EV/EBITDA (enterprise value/earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization) 
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 EV/EBITA (enterprise value/earnings before interest, taxes and amortization) 
 EV/V (enterprise value/sales): it presents the same limits of the P/V multiple but it 
is often used in case of companies with negative margins or net income. 
 EV/OFCF (enterprise value/operating free cash flow) 
The use of asset side multiples lead to an estimate of the firm's value, from which we 
should deduct market value of debt to obtain value of equity. 
The best multiple is that which better reflect the capacity of the target firm to create 
value. In the valuation practice there are also some multiples which consider growth 
prospects of target firm, such as PEG ratio (the ratio between the price per share and 
the net income growth rate) or EV/EBITDAG (where the EBITDAG is the ratio be-
tween EBITDA and net income growth rate), and multiples which make reference to 
off-book items which have a very strictly relationships with the main key value driv-
ers. 
3. Calculation of selected multiples for comparable firms. Multiples are generally calcu-
lated on the basis of financial data of the current year or those expected for the next 
year. However it is possible to choose different time horizons depending on the specif-
ic firm's situation and the valuation context. 
4. Multiples calculation of the firm being valued. Multiples for every firm in the sample 
is used to determine the value, or the interval of values, of the same multiples of the 
target firm.  The mean or the median are often used for this purpose. Frequently, this 
value is calculated as a weighted average where the greater weights are applied to 
comparable firms that are considered more similar to the target firm. 
5. Application of multiples. Multiples obtained from comparable firm to the correspond-
ing economic and financial amounts of the firm being valued for the determination of 
an interval of values of the firm's equity. 
 
 
2.4.1. Application of multiples to firms in crisis 
Corporate crisis condition makes much more difficult to adopt multiple valuation. Generally, in a 
distress situation it is preferable to use asset side multiples. The most appropriate many times is 
EV/EBITDA because it focuses on operating performance of the firm and its determinants. On the 
contrary, equity side multiples are affected by capital structure of comparable firms and, for this 
reason, they are not appropriate for the valuation of firms with high leverage ratios and facing re-
structuring process. Moreover, the application of multiples to firms in crisis is possible only if the 
amounts are positive and thus this methodology can be applied only for valuation of firms that 
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face earlier stages of a crisis. The most advanced phases of corporate crisis are characterized by a 
deterioration of profits, equity and operating performance which makes it impossible the use of 
equity side multiples. 
The unique multiples which can be applied in this case are those connected with sales. However, 
these multiples, as already specified, give poor information on margins and other fundamentals of 
value. 
Damodaran (2009) proposes two MV adjustments in order to take into account distress effects. 
These adjustments, however, tend to be more approximated than those described for the DCF ap-
proach even if they improve valuation accuracy. 
The first modification implemented by Damodaran consists to include in the sample only firms in 
trouble to see how much the market is available to pay for them. In theory, this approach improve 
the valuation process but it can be applied only when the crisis hit simultaneously several firms in 
the same industry. Furthermore, by classifying firms as distressed or not distressed, the risk is to 
treat in the same way firms at different phases of the crisis path, with significant consequences in 
terms of valuation. In this case it would be preferable to amplify the sample by extending the 
analysis on the entire market and considering all the firms in crisis. The problem in this case is re-
lated to the likely presence of firms significantly different from the target firm at which the market 
assigns an higher or lower value. 
The second modification introduced by Damodaran to take into account the effects of distress in 
the relative valuation consists to determine multiples for all the firms in the sample (including the 
healthy firms) and then group them according to the bond rating of companies. In this way it is 
possible to determine multiples for each bond rating and measuring the discount rate applied by 
the market depending on the degree of crisis faced by firms. In case the firm being valued is dis-
tressed and operates in a industry which are not hit by the crisis, it is not possible to direcly use 
market data from healthy competitors. In this case, we should explicitly consider the probability 
of default of the target firm. As suggested with the DCF approach, we can determine enterprise 
value of the distressed target firm as weighted average of going concern value (in this case deter-
mined through relative valuation) and  liquidation value.  
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐺𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (1 − 𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ∗ 𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 
 
Finally, it is preferable to use forward multiples, calculated on future data instead of historical 
ones. In this way it is possible to value the long term perspective of the business by eliminating 
the non-recurring past events. Since these multiples are build up on future perspective, it is neces-
sary to take into account investments and extraordinary costs required to restructure firm's assets 
which affect future valuation results. 
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2.5. Option Pricing Valuation 
Valuation methods considered so far constitute adjustments or modifications of traditional 
valuation methods which allow analysts to determine enterprise value of the firm during the 
particular situation of corporate crisis. 
Option pricing valuation (OPV) is a valuation method based on the application of the options 
logic. In particular, this method enables to justify, under certain circumstances, the reason 
why some stocks are priced positively, even if the value of equity appears to be negative.  
The option pricing approach was initially proposed by Fisher Black and Myron Scholes 
(1973) and then subsequently developed by Merton (1974). The idea at the basis of this meth-
odology is that equity of a firm can be viewed as an option on the value of firm's assets. 
In fact, in the great part of companies equity assumes two characteristics: 
1. Shareholders can decide in every moment to liquidate firm's assets and pay back debt 
leaving the control to creditors. 
2. Shareholders enjoy the limited liability principle, so they cannot lose more money 
than those they invested in the firm. 
The combination of these two characteristics allow to assimilate equity to a call option on the 
firm's assets value with a strike price equal to the face value of debt. Alternatively, we can say 
that holding debt of a risky firm is equal to hold a risk-free debt and signing a put option on 
the firm's assets value. At the debt maturity, if the firm's value is greater than face value of 
debt, shareholders can reimburse debt to creditors and maintain the control of the firm. On the 
contrary, if the value of assets is lower than the value of debt at the maturity, shareholders will 
exercise the option to declare bankruptcy leaving out the control of the firm in the hands of 
creditors. In this case, given the limited liability principle, creditors cannot use shareholders' 
personal heritage for satisfying their credits. 
So payoffs to equity holders on liquidation can be written as follow: 
                                                                               𝑉 − 𝐷       𝑖𝑓 𝑉 > 𝐷       
                                                                      0                𝑖𝑓 𝑉 ≤ 𝐷 
 
where V is the firm's value and D is the face value of outstanding debt and other external 
claims. 
Analytically, the value of equity and debt can be written as follow: 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  𝑀𝑎𝑥 [ 𝑉 − 𝐷 ∶  0 ]  
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 =  𝑀𝑖𝑛 [ 𝑉 ;  𝐷 ]  
 
Payoff to equity on liquidation 
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Figure 3.6. - Payoff on Equity as Option on a Firm (Damodaran, 2009)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The application of option pricing methodology requires the assumption of some significant 
hypothesis: 
1. There are only two types of investors: debt holders and shareholders. 
2. There is only one issue of debt and it can be retired at the face value. 
3. The debt has a zero coupon without other special features (convertibility, put clauses, 
etc.). 
4. Enterprise value and its variance can be estimated. 
Under such an assumptions, the value of equity of the firm can be calculated thorough the 
Black-Scholes and Merton model (BSM model) as follow:  
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑆 ∗ 𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐷 ∗ 𝑒(𝑟𝑓×𝑇) ∗ 𝑁(𝑑2) 
𝑑1 =
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑆
𝐷) + (𝑟𝑓 + (
𝜎2
2 )) ∗ 𝑇
𝜎 ∗ √𝑇
 
𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎 ∗ √𝑇 
where: 
 𝑆  is the enterprise value  
 𝐷 is the face value of debt  
 𝑟𝑓  is the risk-free rate 
 𝜎2 is the variance of enterprise value  
 𝑇 is maturity of debt.  
According to Damodaran (2009) the value of the firm (S in BSM model) can be calculated 
through four different methods: 
1. As the sum of market value of stocks and bonds assuming that all debt and equity are 
traded in the market. As explained by Damodaran, this approach, while simple, is in-
Face value 
of debt 
Enterprise value 
Net Payoff 
on Equity 
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herently inconsistent because it starts with one set of market values for equity and debt 
and then, using option pricing theory, ends up with entirely different values for each.  
2. Discounting expected cash flows at the cost of capital by using DCF formula and 
keeping in mind to consider only cash flows deriving from existing investments. En-
terprise value in OPV is the firm's liquidation value that should be determined consid-
ering that potential acquirers are not available to pay for returns derived from future 
investments. 
3. Using multiples on revenues that are indicative of the capacity of healthy firms to gen-
erate revenues in a specific industry. 
4. Summing up the market value of individual assets of the firm when these assets have a 
market price. 
Enterprise value volatility for listed firms can be calculated through the following formula: 
𝜎2 = 𝑤𝐸
2𝜎𝐸
2 + 𝑤𝐷
2𝜎𝐷
2 + 2𝑤𝐸𝑤𝐷𝜌𝐸𝐷𝜎𝐸𝜎𝐷 
 
where 𝑤𝐸 and 𝑤𝐷 are the weights of equity and debt respectively, σE
2  and σD
2  is the variance of 
equity and debt respectively and ρ
ED
 is the correlation coefficient between the stock price and 
bond of the firm. In case of distressed firms, this approach can be misleading because the 
stock price and the bond price become highly volatile. So it would be preferable to use an av-
erage variance of enterprise values of other comparable firms in the industry. 
The life of the option used in BSM model must coincide with debt maturity. Many firms have 
a capital structure composed by several types of debt and with different maturities. So it is 
valuable to convert different bond issues in an equivalent zero coupon debt in such a way the 
assumptions required by the model are satisfied. The alternatives proposed by Damodaran 
consist to average durations or maturities of each bond, weighted by their face value. 
When there is more than one debt issue, the analyst can determine face value of debt (D in 
BSM model) by choosing among one of the following methods: 
1. Summing up the reimbursement amount of each bond at maturity. This approach, 
however, underestimates the true amount of debt because interest payments due to 
creditors are ignored. 
2. Adding to face value of debt the amount of coupons and other interest payments until 
the maturity. The main problem of this method is related to the different time horizon 
at which such cash flows will take place. 
3. Considering cash flows paid to debt holders as the sum of face value of debt and inter-
est payments expressed as percentage on the enterprise value  
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One of the main strengths of option pricing model is that it allows to estimate risk neutral 
probability of default which is the probability that the firm will be unable to fulfill its debt 
payments at maturity.  
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 = 1 − 𝑁(𝑑2) 
 
Another advantage of this method consists in the possibility to assign a value to the uncertain-
ty and the future opportunities. In fact, value of equity can be positive even if enterprise value 
is lower than face value of debt. This occurs because even if in case of an immediate liquida-
tion the value of equity is negative, enterprise value volatility and future debt maturity give 
the possibility that value of assets underlying the option can increase and become higher than 
the value of debt. So, equity has a time premium that makes it positive. Even in DCF valua-
tion with scenarios analysis value of equity recalls the concept of a call option. But in this 
case the positive value of equity derives from assumptions underlying each scenario and the 
probability associated with it. So, the results of traditional valuation techniques, unlike OPV, 
depends on the accuracy of projections.  
 
 
2.6. Other valuation methods 
Capital Cash Flow model  and the DCF model with Monte Carlo simulation are two additional 
valuation methods that can be used to value distressed and declining firms. These models are not 
so commonly used as the previous ones but they work well in a distress or decline scenarios.  
The main features and peculiarities of these methods are presented in the following two para-
graphs. 
 
 
2.6.1. Capital Cash Flow model 
Capital Cash Flow model (CCF model) resented by Ruback (2000) is an alternative method for 
the valuation of firms characterized by significant uncertainty underlying expected cash flows. 
CCF model uses the same assumptions underlying DCF model but includes value of tax shield on 
debt in the calculation of free cash flow. For this reason, free cash flows are discounted at pre-tax 
cost of capital. As mentioned above, WACC is affected by changes in the capital structure and 
this creates difficulties to apply DCF approach to firms with high leverage or facing restructuring 
process because capital structure can change very quickly. In these cases, capital structure and the 
corresponding WACC should be estimated for every year of projection, increasing the complexity 
of valuation.  
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CCF model is based on cash flows available to all investors, including tax shield originated by the 
deductibility of interest payments. Since fiscal deductibility of interest payments is included in the 
capital cash flow calculation, the appropriate discount rate is a before tax interest rate which rep-
resents the riskiness of assets irrespective of capital structure. The advantage of CCF model is its 
simple application, especially when projections on debt are difficult and when debt and the lever-
age ratio are subject to significant variations during the projection period. 
As shown by Ruback (2000), CCF and DCF models often give similar results but the application 
of CCF model reduce significantly the operating complexity and the possibility of errors. 
CCF approach is also known as compressed APV (Arzac, 2005), despite the different treatment of 
tax shield on debt. In the APV method, tax shield is discounted at the cost of debt, while in CCF 
methodology they are discounted at the unlevered cost of capital.  Given greater value of tax 
shield on debt, enterprise value will be higher under APV technique with respect to CCF method-
ology.  
The value of the firm calculated with the CCF methodology, will be equal to the present value of 
projected capital cash flows, discounted by the expected return rate on assets (KU) plus a terminal 
value which represents the value of cash flows ahead of the projections period. 
Capital cash flows can be calculated starting from net income or EBIT, as illustrated in the fol-
lowing figure. 
 
Figura 2.3. - Capital Cash Flow determination (Ruback, 2000).  
 
 
As net income already includes fiscal benefit of debt, it is sufficient to consider cash flow adjust-
ments (depreciations, amortizations, deferred taxes, capital expenses and change working capital 
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variations) and non-cash interest to determine the available cash flows for creditors and share-
holders. Capital cash flow is given by the sum of the available cash flow and cash interest.  
The second methodology of calculation follows the traditional approach for determining free cash 
and then includes the value of tax shield to obtain the corresponding capital cash flow. 
Terminal value is calculated by assuming that capital cash flow in the last year of projection 
grows at a constant and perpetual rate.  
Gilson, Ruback e Hotchkiss (2000) showed that empirically 79% of firms in trouble record net 
operating losses carry forward (NOLs) at the end of the projection period. These net operating 
losses can be deducted by future profits with the effect to reduce taxes. However, this advantage 
cannot be included in the terminal value formula as it can be used only for a limited time horizon. 
So, it is preferable to divide the terminal value calculation in two parts: the first which considers 
an extension projection period when there is the possibility to use the fiscal advantage of net oper-
ating losses carry forward, and the second in which terminal value is determined by using the tra-
ditional perpetual formula. 
The capital cash flow during the extension period can be computed through the following formu-
la: 
𝐶𝐶𝐹 = 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 − 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 + 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑁𝑂𝐿 
 
where: 
 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 = (𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 − 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠) ∗ 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑁𝑂𝐿 is estimated from the minimum between earnings before taxes 
(EBT) and residual NOL multiplied by the corporate tax rate. 
Capital cash flows and terminal value are discounted by using the unlevered cost of capital of the 
firm. This is a pre-tax interest rate, because the fiscal benefit of debt has been already included in 
the calculation of CCFs. The unlevered cost of capital of the firm can be calculated as follow: 
𝐾𝑈 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑢(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) 
 
where 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free interest rate, 𝛽𝑈 is the unlevered beta of the firm and (𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓)is the risk 
market premium. 
To measure the systematic risk of the company, represented by 𝛽𝑈, historical returns of firm's 
stock are generally used. In case of declining or distressed firms, 𝛽𝑈estimated in this way is use-
less as historical returns of firm's stocks become negative as the observations are closer and closer 
to financial crisis status and they differ significantly from the expected return by shareholders. 
Moreover, as the firms in distress often face restructuring process, historical performance be-
comes less relevant. 
To estimate KU we can apply the following formula (Ruback, 2000): 
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𝛽𝑈 =
𝐷
𝑉
𝛽𝐷 +
𝐸
𝑉
𝛽𝐸 
 
where 
D
V
 and 
E
V
 are respectively the weights of debt and equity on the enterprise value, βD is the be-
ta of debt and βE is the beta of equity. 
The methods of CCF and DCF, as we saw before, are based on the same assumptions and infor-
mation, so if they are correctly applied they lead to the same valuation results. Generally, Koller 
et al. (2010) consider DCF model preferable than CCF because, maintaining NOPLAT and free 
cash flows independent from capital structure allows a better valuation of operating performance. 
Ruback (2000) suggests to use the DCF model for the initial valuation of the firm, when there is 
not a detailed and well developed financial plan and when we can assume a constant capital struc-
ture. CCF method results more accurate when analysts have detailed financial information and the 
firm has a complex fiscal situation. In many situations of restructuring, leverage buyout or bank-
ruptcy the use of CCF method facilitates the valuation. 
Regarding the choice between CCF and APV method, Ruback argued that CCF is most appropri-
ate when debt is proportional to the firm's enterprise value while APV when a steady level of 
debt, independent from the firm's value, is assumed.  
The best valuation method depends on the firm's financial policies and situation. 
 
 
2.6.2. DCF model with Monte Carlo simulations 
DCF method with the adjustments illustrated in paragraphs 2.2.4. and 2.2.5 can be classified 
as deterministic because enterprise value is estimated by assigning predefined values to the 
key valuation variables, such the sales growth rate or operating margins. In reality, each of 
these variables can assume a distribution of values and the choice to consider only the ex-
pected value of the distribution can represent a significant limitation in presence of situations 
characterized by great uncertainty, as a distressed firms. One solution for this problem con-
sists to use a statistic simulation which take into account the entire probability distribution to 
reflect the degree of uncertainty for every input in the valuation model. In this way, analysts 
move from a deterministic to a stochastic model and, by applying Monte Carlo technique, 
they can determine the enterprise value of the firm. 
DCF model with Monte Carlo simulations is made up by three phases: model creation, simu-
lation e outcome interpretation. Each of these phases involve several steps that are analyzed in 
the following points. 
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1. First phase: model creation. 
 Step 1. First step consists to analyze the firm and the industry in which it operates. 
The analyst should analyze historical data and future perspectives of the firm and 
the industry with the aim to identify dynamics, specific value drivers and to select 
key variables (such as sales growth rates or operating margins) that will be trans-
formed in a stochastic form. Obviously, the greater is the number of variables ex-
pressed in stochastic form, the higher will be the level of difficulty and the time 
required for the calculation. 
 Step 2. The analyst has to choose the probability distribution or the stochastic pro-
cess which better fit the dynamics of key variables identified previously. Most 
used probability distributions and sthocastic processes are synthesized in the fol-
lowing table. 
 
Table 2.1. - Possible distribution and stochastic processes 
 
 
The choice among different distributions depends on the range of possible values 
which can be assumed by variables under analysis. For example the variable 
which describes the revenues cannot be described by a normal standard distribu-
tion as revenues cannot assume negative values. Moreover, the choice should be 
accompanied by an historical data analysis. The distribution choice will be much 
more accurate the greater is the time horizon under analysis as it incorporates 
booms and recessions with low probability but with high valuation impact. 
 Step 3. After the identification of key uncertainty factors and their stochastic form, 
the analyst should estimate parameters for all the selected distributions. Parame-
ters are usually estimated starting from historical data and then taking into account 
future corporate perspectives. Estimates should be made with accuracy and pru-
dence. During this step, analyst should establish the circumstances under which 
the firm can be considered in default in order to classify the outputs of simulations 
between the cases of default or survival. 
2. Second phase: simulation. 
Probability distribution Stochastic process
Normal distribution Geometric Brownian Motion
Exponential distribution Mean-reversion process
Geometric distribution Two-three factors model
Lognormal distribution Markov chain process
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 Step 4. Starting from the identified probability distribution and stochastic process-
es for each simulation, a value is assigned randomly to every relevant variable. In 
some cases, to increase valuation accuracy it is appropriate to introduce a correla-
tion coefficient among variables which represent interconnections. For example, 
the probability to obtain negative margins increase in presence of a low sales 
growth rate.  
 Step 5. The output obtained from simulations are included in the valuation model 
for arriving at the estimates of expected cash flows. If estimated cash flows meet 
the previously identified criteria for the hypothesis of business continuity, they are 
discounted at the cost of capital to determine the enterprise value of the firm with 
the traditional DCF methodology. On the contrary, when scenario is classified as 
default, specific valuation procedures for distress are applied.  
 Step 6. Step 4 and step 5 are repeated until a sufficient number of simulations, and 
thus potential corporate realizations, are obtained. In general, the more complex 
distributions are, the greater is the number of simulations required because they 
require the estimation of many parameters or parameters can assume a wide range 
of values. 
3. Third phase: outcome interpretation. 
 Step 7. Distribution of enterprise value of the firm is derived from going concern 
and distress values obtained with simulations. The expected value of enterprise 
value distribution is the value of assets for the firm being valued. Starting from 
these data is possible to calculate probability of default and distress effects on 
value for the firm. 
Although this methodology gives more accurate results than traditional valuation models, this 
approach is not very commonly used by analysts because of its complexity and the amount of 
information required. In fact, the choice among distributions which describes key variables 
and the estimation of parameters are particularly difficult and the results produced by the 
model are entirely based on the accuracy of these estimates. A further limit is the time re-
quired to implement simulations which, although there is the possibility to use statistic soft-
ware, is longer that other traditional valuation methodologies. 
  
~ 68 ~ 
 
  
~ 69 ~ 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 - Bialetti crisis analysis 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The objective of the thesis is to apply the most suitable models to value firms in trouble and to 
analyze the performance of such models in a real-life case setting. Bialetti case has been cho-
sen because it has the representative characteristics of a firm that progressed from entering the 
declining stage to facing financial distress. Over the course of this development the company 
faced all the major risks and challenges which makes particularly difficult to perform a valua-
tion.  
This chapter is dedicated to the financial statements analysis of the Bialetti Group in the last 
ten years. The aim of this analysis is to have a clear understanding of the current financial sit-
uation of the Group and how the restructuring process carried out by the management in the 
last years affected the Group's performance and value. 
Bialetti Industrie S.p.A. is the holding company of Bialetti Group, one of the major operators 
in international markets for the manufacturing and marketing of cookware, small appliances, 
coffee machines and capsules. The Group owns several brands with a lot of tradition and great 
fame, such as Bialetti, Aeternum, Rondine and CEM. Bialetti brand is involved in the produc-
tion and distribution of traditional coffee pots, electric coffee machines, wide range of coffee 
capsules as well as cooking tools and accessories for confectioners. Aeternum, Rondine and 
CEM brands are involved in the segment of cooking tools and kitchen accessories.  
Bialetti’s commercial structure covers all major markets and operates via the Headquarter in 
Coccaglio, in the north of Italy, and an important commercial centre in Paris (France). The 
Group is known worldwide for the high degree of innovation and quality expressed in its 
products as well as for the use of new materials and technologies. Italian know-how is applied 
all the production plants in Italy, Romania, China and Turkey, where the commercial branch 
is based.  
Bialetti Group is also engaged in the retailing activities through the subsidiary Bialetti Store 
s.r.l.. More precisely, Bialetti Store operates through single-branded shops and outlet village 
structures. On 31st December 2015, Bialetti Store counts 130 shops, of which two of them  
based in France and Spain.  
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The chapter starts with the presentation of the Group and its history from the foundation in 
1919 to 2007 when Bialetti Industrie was listed in the Italian Stock Exchange and the first 
signals of the crisis started to appear.  
Paragraph 3.3. focuses on the crisis that hit the Group since the last months of 2007. During 
this analysis the main phases of the corporate crisis will be retraced together with the main ac-
tions implemented to restore the normal going concern condition. The economic and financial 
analysis of the Group in the period 2006-2015 is reported in paragraph 3.4 where the main fi-
nancial statements amounts and ratios are compared with a benchmark competitor. 
The chapter concludes with a description of the current situation of the Group and the main 
risks which can obstruct the realization of Industrial Plan 2014-2017. These risks and uncer-
tainties represent a fundamental basis for the valuation process that will be performed in the 
subsequent chapter. 
 
 
3.2. Structure and history of Bialetti Group 
The company was born in 1919 when Alfonso Bialetti opened a workshop in Crusinallo, a 
small village in the north-west of Italy, for the production of semi-finished goods in alumini-
um. After few years the workshop turned into a studio for designing and producing finished 
items using shell moulding.  
The company reached its peak in the years before World War II, after the founder in 1933 in-
vented Moka Express. This was a revolutionary idea that transformed the art of making coffee 
into an action so simple and natural that it has become an essential rite in every Italian home. 
For almost 90 years Bialetti revolutionized the pleasure of making coffee, and thanks to its 
expertise it continued to evolve and renew its products. Still today, it is an example of experi-
ence and goodwill with products that are functional, with great technique and reliability, mod-
ern design and outstanding quality.  The mission of Bialetti Group is "To be competitive, in-
novative, and to create value not only by efficiency in developing and manufacturing new 
products, but also by continually satisfying the needs of consumers and clients." 
Nowadays the Group owns about 319 trademarks, holds 127 patents for invention, 11 utility 
models and 212 ornamental and industrial design models. It dedicates significant internal and 
external resources to research and development of new products and technologies through a 
flexible structure and a series of well-established partnerships with professionals, design insti-
tutes, universities and research centers.  
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After the death of Alfonso Bialetti in 1970, his son Renato taked over the company. However 
during Seventies, the company started to suffer the first crisis signals caused by the competi-
tion of coffee pots producers from low-cost countries.  
In 1980, Bialetti, which had 200 employees and 20 billion lire turnover, was sold to Faema. 
The new ownership started a diversification of productive activities through the launch of 
small appliances product line. 
In 1993 the company was sold again to Rondine Italia, an Italian company engaged in the 
cookware manufacturing based in Coccaglio (Brescia) and owned by Ranzoni family. 
Bialetti Industrie S.p.A was born in 1998 from the merger between Bialetti and Rondine. 
Starting from the year 2000, Bialetti started expanding through several M&A deals, such as 
the acquisition of Pres-metal Casalinghi and Gb-Guido Bergna. In 2005 , the Group taked 
over Girmi, a known Italian manufacturer of small household appliances, and CEM, a leading 
company in Turkey for the production and marketing of cooking tools. The following year 
Bialetti Industrie acquired Aeternum, one of the most known brands in the steel production. 
On 27th July 2007, Bialetti Industrie makes its entry into the Italian Stock Exchange.  
The actual structure of the Group is the following: 
 
Figure 3.1. - Structure of Bialetti Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bialetti Industrie S.p.A. 
CEM Bialetti A.S. 
Bialetti Store s.r.l. 
S.C. Bialetti Stainless Steel 
s.r.l. 
Bialetti Girmi France SA 
Bialetti Houseware Ningbo 
Bialetti Deutshland Gmbh 
Triveni Bialetti Industries 
99.9% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
93.8% 
Bialetti Store Spain SL 
Bialetti Store France EURL 
100% 
100% 
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Bialetti Industrie S.p.A. is the holding company of Bialetti Group and its ownership is com-
posed as follow: 
 Bialetti Holding s.r.l. owned and managed by Francesco Ranzoni (64.75%) 
 Free float (28.19%) 
 Diego della Valle & C. S.a.p.a. (6,94%) 
 Treasury shares (0,15%) 
The Board of Directors is composed by the following people: Francesco Ranzoni (President), 
Roberto Ranzoni,  Elena Crespi, Ciro Timpani and Antonella Negri Clementi. 
The Audit Board, instead, is composed as follow: Giampiero Capoferri (President), Diego 
Rivetti, Luciana Loda. 
To better understand what Bialetti means for Italian people, a study conducted in 2010 calcu-
lated that about 90% of Italian families have at least one Bialetti coffee pot. The milestones of 
Bialetti Group are illustrated in the figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2. - Bialetti Group milestones 
 
1919 
• Bialetti begins. Alfonso Bialetti opens a workshop in Crusinallo, Verbania, to make semi-finished goods 
in aluminium.  Driven by his entrepreneurial spirit, he turns his workshop, Alfonso Bialetti & C. Fonderia 
in Conchiglia, into a studio for designing and making finished products, ready for the market.  
1933 
• The Moka: a revolutionary invention. Alfonso Bialetti gave rise to the Moka Express. This Moka, with 
its Art Deco design, revolutionised the way coffee is made at home and, in part thanks to the ambition of 
his son Renato, the company immediately became one of the leading Italian manufacturers of coffee pots. 
1938 
• Aeternum makes its appearance. In Lumezzane (Brescia) Bortolo Bugatti, along with his children, 
founded the company that bears his name, engaging in the production of brass cutlery.  In 1954 and 1955 
the production of stainless steel cooking tools began - it was at this time that the company took on the 
name Aeternum. 
1947 
• The success of Rondine. While the Moka Express was beginning to reach foreign markets, in Coccaglio, 
in the Brescia province, Francesco Ranzoni, grandfather of the Group's current Chairman, founded a 
company that specialised in making aluminium pots: Rondine Italia. In the 1980s this company was one 
of the first in Italy to use a non-stick coating and to introduce silk-screening on its cookery products.  
1949 
• Subalpina begins manufacturing small domestic appliances. On his return from his honeymoon in the 
United States, Carlo Caldi, Mario's son, decided to get the company to specialise in reproducing small 
domestic appliances that had fascinated him and that he had bought while in North America. 
1954 
• Frullo: the first Italian blender. This company launched Frullo, the first Italian made blender, followed 
by the coffee grinder, Mokaro in 1956 and, a year later, the Girmi blender.  The latter product enjoyed 
great commercial success, so much so that its name, based on a combination of "gira" (turn) and 
"miscela" (mix), became the name in 1961 of the famous company, Girmi - La Subalpina 
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1956 
• The pressure cooker. The first Aeternum pressure cooker made its début on the Astral market.  From 
then on the brand's notoriety increased significantly, also thanks to the "Re Inox" personage, and it 
became a leader in the cookery tools sector, especially stainless steel pressure cookers.  These were also 
the years marked by the first, unforgettable advertising campaigns, and the first carousels. 
1958 
• The icon of Bialetti style. The fame of the Bialetti brand was further strengthened by means of 
significant investments in advertising on Carosello, a well-known Italian television programme, and a 
message with the image of the “Little man with a moustache” as the central character, created in the 
1950s by artist Paul Campani, which became its symbol, and that is still to be found in Bialetti 
Industrie's mark that is applied to all products that are part of the Bialetti brand.  
1971 
• Girmi S.p.A. is formed. Girmi – La Subalpina S.p.A. took the name Girmi S.p.A, quickly becoming 
the leading brand in Italy in the small domestic appliance sector - besides blenders and coffee grinders, 
it makes irons, electric ovens, ice cream makers, coffee machines, and toasters that are cutting-edge 
technologically and are loved by the people for their design and innovativeness. 
1993 
• Rondine acquires Bialetti. Bialetti and Rondine were companies with different histories but the same 
drive for quality and innovation, to the point of inducing the current Chairman, Francesco Ranzoni, to 
buy a representative share of Alfonso Bialetti & C's entire equity from Faema. This was a unique 
entrepreneurial move that, in just a few years, has given rise to a host of successes, all covered by the 
famous "Little man with a moustache". 
2003 
• Bialetti Industrie is founded. After acquiring Presmetalcasalinghi in 2000 and Gb-Guido Bregna in 
2001, the leading manufacturer of steel coffee pots and home accessories, the current Bialetti Industrie 
S.p.A. was founded. In 2003 the expansion continued with absorption of the Brevetti Bialetti company 
and creation of the parent company, Bialetti Holding, which now distributes the Bialetti, Rondine, 
Girmi, Aeternum and CEM brands.  
2005 
• Girmi and CEM join the Group. To be ever more competitive in the small domestic appliance market 
led to the acquisition of another famous brand, Girmi, whose origins hark back to Omegna in 1919, just 
like Bialetti. In the same year, Bialetti Group acquired CEM, a company that makes and markets non-
stick aluminium cooking implements, and a brand that is well-known and has a great tradition in 
Turkey. 
2006 
• The Group acquires Aeternum. Bialetti Industrie expanded further by acquiring Aeternum, the 
famous leading Italian brand of steel products in the cooking implements and pressure cooker sector. 
2007 
• Bialetti Industrie quoted on the Stock Exchange. On 27th July Bialetti Industrie became a quoted 
company on the Italian Stock Exchange.  
2015 
• Bialetti Industrie sells Girmi to Trevidea. Girmi is sold to Trevidea when the Bialeti Group decides to 
focus primarily on the core business of the products of coffee's world.   
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3.3. Bialetti's crisis 
Although probably influenced by other reasons, Bialetti decline is first attributable to the 
company's failure to capture changes in the customers' needs and to adapt its products and dis-
tribution. In other words, Bialetti is the traditional example of how changing industry condi-
tions and the emerging of substitute products can push a company into the declining stage of 
industry life cycle. Although initially hesitant, the management introduced several turnaround 
strategies aimed at repositioning the company in order to focus on retail channel and premium 
products. 
However, these restructuring measures were not initially sufficient to boost falling sales and 
the Group recognized net income losses from 2008 to 2013. A positive net income of about € 
1.0 million occurred only in 2012.  
On  27th October 2011 Bialetti was included in the CONSOB Black List. All companies in-
cluded in this list have the obligation to inform the market with a monthly report about the 
evolution of the business and net financial position. 
Before starting to analyze the economic and financial Bialetti's conditions for an appropriate 
valuation, there is the need to clearly understanding the main steps of its corporate crisis. This 
is a fundamental part of the valuation process because it is very difficult to make precise as-
sumptions about the future without knowing the history and peculiarities of the company. 
Events that characterized the last decade of the Group can be reorganized in three different 
phases: 
1. Crisis and downsizing (2008-2011). In this period the crisis became more and more 
evident because of the difficult macroeconomic scenario which significantly affect the 
customers' demand. 
2. Relaunch (2011-2014). In this phase the management of the Group started several in-
terventions with the objective to boost revenues, reduce operating costs and improve 
the financial conditions of the Group. 
3. Development (2014-2015). In this phase the relaunch interventions started to produce 
the expected results and the new business model allows the company to restore the 
normal going concern condition. 
 
 
3.3.1. Downsizing phase 
First signals of crisis was perceived by the Group in the last quarter of 2007. At the end of 
2007 the Group recorded a consolidated net income of € 4.1 million and a more than five per 
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cent revenue growth. However, beside these positive results, the industry competition started 
increasing and sales realized abroad recorded a significant fall, especially in Western Europe 
and North America. Probably management underestimated these negative signals and it did 
not intervene appropriately to face the global financial crisis that hit the consumption in the 
following years. 
Together with the negative macroeconomic scenario, wrong management choices worsened 
the Group conditions. In fact, during 2007 and 2008 the company decided to make significant 
investments to increase the total productive capacity of operations by realizing a new produc-
tive plant in Mumbai (India). However, a more conservative strategy would be most appropri-
ate in a scenario characterized by weak consumption levels and increasing price competition. 
In 2008 the Group recorded significant income loss of about € 23.5 million and a turnaround 
decrease of about 5 per cent. Despite these negative results, the Group proceeded the con-
struction of new plant in Mumbai with the expectation of a sales improvement in the follow-
ing years. This investment contributed to a net financial position deterioration from € 90.9 
million in 2007 to €114.5 million in 2008. 
In the same year the Group started a productive and organization restructuring. In particular, 
the Group implemented outsourcing strategies for lower value added activities such as the as-
sembly of coffee pots and the logistics of finished goods inventory.  
The restructuring process also involved a significant personnel reduction. More precisely, to-
tal labor force of 903 employees in 2007 was reduced by 10 per cent during 2008.  
In 2009 global recession characterized by a dramatic fall of consumption inevitably affected 
Bialetti's performance. 
The Group recorded a negative income of € 9.8 million with a turnaround decrease of about 8 
per cent with respect to the previous year.  
On 9th february 2009, Bialetti Holding s.r.l., Bialetti Industrie S.p.A, Bialetti Store s.r.l. 
signed the first standstill agreement with creditor banks representing more than 90% of the 
consolidated net financial position. The main terms of the standstill agreement are: 
 Confirmation of short and long term credit lines until 30th April 2010. 
 Suspension of all the principal amount payments with a maturity less than 30th April 
2010. 
In exchange of the stanstill agreement, creditor banks asked to Bialetti Holding s.r.l. to ap-
prove a capital increase of at least € 8.0 million. In the same agreement the parties agreed to 
fix some covenants that, if not met, determine the termination of the contract. 
On 30th June 2009, Bialetti's Board of Directors approved the Industrial Plan 2009-2011 for 
the relaunch of the Group. At the same date Bialetti Holding communicates to the market the 
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intention to provide new finance to Bialetti Industrie through a capital increase of € 8.0 mil-
lion. 
During 2009, the restructuring and simplification process, started in the previous year, contin-
ued: 
1. The new plant in Mumbai was shut down at the end of 2009 after the assessment that 
the Group's productive capacity was excessive with respect to demand level during re-
cession. From an economic point of view, this wrong initiative costs to the Group 
about € 5.7 million. 
2. Many productive activities were outsourced to external suppliers in order to increase 
the focus on the remaining core business activities. 
3. Productive and administrative employees were reduced both in Bialetti Industrie and 
Girmi. The number of employees decreasedd from 903 in 2008 to 813 in 2009 at the 
Group level. 
At the end of 2010, consolidated sales amount to € 184.5 million with a decrease of 5 per cent 
with respect to the previous year. Moreover, another great income loss of about € 18.5 million 
resulted from Consolidated Income Statement of that year. The net result was significantly af-
fected by non-recurring and extraordinary items for an amount of € 10,0 million originated by 
the simplification and rationalization interventions. 
On 27th April 2010, Bialetti Holding provided the entire cash consideration of € 8 million 
necessary to increase Bialetti Industrie capital as agreed with creditor banks in the standstill 
agreement. In May 2010, the Group also agreed with the creditor banks to extend the force of 
the standstill agreement until 31st December 2011 under the condition to respect the follow-
ing covenant: NFP/EBITDA lower than or equal to 6.  
However, on 31st December 2010, the Group recorded a negative EBITDA for about € 2.7 
million. This caused the covenant breach and the beginning of a new negotiation phase with 
banks to maintain the liquidity necessary to finalize the restructuring process. 
Board of Directors decided on 7th April 2010 to close the historical plant in Omegna. This 
decision was taken after the consideration of a significant fall of traditional coffee pots de-
mand which represented the historical business of the Group (-26 per cent in 2009-2010) be-
cause of the competition of new producers from low-cost countries. Coffee pots business was  
no longer viable for Bialetti as it required to sustain a great amount of fixed and indirect costs 
that could not be recovered by the actual sales level. 
On 13th December 2010, Bialetti's management decided to perform a merger between the 
subsidiaries Girmi and Sic. This merge allowed to concentrate all the Italian activities of the 
Group (with the only exception of the distribution and retail activities performed by Bialetti 
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Store) creating in Bialetti Industrie a unique management and organizational structure for all 
brands of the Group and, at the same time, achieving significant administrative costs saving. 
During April 2011 the Group presented to creditor banks the restructuring plan 2011-2015. 
This restructuring plan can be identified in Italian law as certificate plan ex art. 67 terzo 
comma Legge Fallimentare and represents one of the possible legal options in Italy during a 
corporate crisis. Certificate plan has two objectives: reduce debt position under an appropriate 
level sustainable by the firm and restore the firm's capacity to create value. This legal instru-
ment can be employed in corporate crisis situations where the going concern perspectives is 
still present and achievable through an appropriate firm restructuring without the intervention 
of the Court. 
Restructuring plan 2011-2015 can be synthesized in the following points: 
1. Extension of the Standstill Agreement which is about to expire on 31st December 
2011. 
2. Suspension of principal amount payments of mortgages with maturity between 1st 
April 2011 and 31st March 2013. 
3. New financing for € 3.9 million to pay the short-term contractual obligations. Girmi 
and Aeternum brands was used as collaterals for this operation. 
4. The conversion of trade payables for an amount of € 1.1 million of Bialetti Holding 
towards Bialetti Industrie in a future commitment to increase capital of Bialetti Indus-
trie. 
5. The respect of two covenants: NFP/equity and NFP/EBITDA lower than 6 and 11.3, 
respectively.  
The restructuring plan approved by the Board in April 2011 can be considered the end of the 
downsizing phase and the beginning of the following relaunch phase. Restructuring interven-
tions carried out by the Group between 2008 and 2011 are synthesized in the figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3. - Restructuring interventions made by the Group between 2008-2011  
 
 
 
3.3.2. Relaunch phase 
Restructuring plan presented to banks in order to obtain credit lines confirmation in 2011 
specified also the main operating interventions through which the management intended to re-
launch its business. More precisely, Bialetti strategy was based on the following points: 
1. New Brand positioning. Given the price competition in household market, top man-
agement decided to reposition the brand Bialetti in the premium segment to improve 
profitability and restore the normal going concern conditions. This was achieved by 
strengthening Bialetti's position in the coffee business (coffee capsules, electric ma-
chines and coffee pots) by exploiting the historical strength of the brand in Italy. This 
was possible by adopting a continuing focus on innovation and design for existing and 
new products.  
2. New distribution strategy. Since 2008, Bialetti's management attempted to change dis-
tribution strategy by increasing the focus on branded shops instead of large-scale retail 
distribution. This objective was achieved through the creation, in 2008, of the subsidi-
ary Bialetti Store s.r.l. owned at 100 per cent by Bialetti Industrie. Bialetti Store car-
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ries out commercial activities for all the Group's products and it is responsible for 
opening new single-branded shops and stores inside shopping malls. 
Through this distribution strategy, Bialetti's attempted to increase margins and the cos-
tumers' availability to pay in order to reduce price competition.  
The new business model became successful in 2011 when Bialetti Store recorded for 
the first time a positive income result. From 2008 to 2013 Bialetti Store opened 59 
shops in Italy, one in France and another one in Spain. 
3. Reorganization and simplification of product portfolio. Another important objective of 
Industrial Plan 2011-2015 was the reorganization of product portfolio. This objective 
strategy comes from both the necessity to reduce net working capital and to eliminate 
some product lines that was no longer profitable because of the change of customers 
needs. Simplification of product portfolio allowed the Group to focus on core business 
activities and reduce management complexity. As a consequence, inventory, expressed 
in revenue days, reduced from 105 in 2008 to 80 days in 2013.  
In 2011 the Group recorded an income loss of € 2.8 million, significantly lower than that rec-
orded in 2010. Sales, instead, decreased reaching €173.9 million at the end of 2011.  In the 
same year, management of the Group decided to devote productive plant in Coccaglio to the 
production of coffee business activities. Two years later, even the subsidiary Bialetti Stainstell 
(Romania) converted production from pots to coffee machines. 
Despite the above mentioned interventions, the Group faced new difficulties in 2012 when 
sales from cookware segment fall dramatically (-25 per cent in a year), even if in the same 
year sales of coffee machines and capsules increased by 6.6 per cent.  
Negative results in 2012 created the necessity to renegotiate the terms of restructuring plan 
with banks because the Group was unable to respect covenants agreed in the certificate plan. 
For the occasion, Bialetti presented another Industrial Plan (2013-2017) which revised fore-
casts and objectives no longer achievable. In the same period Bialetti Holding approved an-
other capital increase of € 15.0 million achievable in 5 years to cover losses occurred in pre-
ceding years. At the end of 2012 Bialetti Holding provided € 9.08 million cash to increase eq-
uity of Bialetti Industrie. 
On 6th June 2013, the Group communicated to the market that another standstill agreement 
was reached with creditor banks. This agreement, called Wiever, confirmed short-term credit 
lines to the Group in exchange of the shareholders' commitment to increase equity capital of 
the holding company for an amunt of € 25.0 million in the next 5 years.  
Biennium 2012-2013 represents the re-launch phase of the Group during which investments 
required to change the business model were realized. 
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The relaunch involves three areas of interventions (revenues, costs, invested capital and capi-
tal structure) and they can be synthesized by the following figure. 
 
Figure 3.4.: The main relaunch interventions 
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At the end of 2013 the Group recorded a positive net income for € 4.1 million with an 
EBITDA margin that grew more than 2 per cent comparing with the previous year. Moreover, 
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tents: 
1. Increasing focus on the Bialetti brand, the main driver of growth for the Group 
2. Development of retail channel with the opening of new single-branded shops in Italy 
and abroad 
3. Confirmation of short and long term credit lines with the suspension of principal 
amount payments of mortgages until the end of the agreement 
4. New financial covenants: NFP/equity lower than 30.0 and NFP/EBITDA lower than 
6.2 
5. Capital increase of € 25.0 million in the next five years 
Revenues 
Product lines 
semplification 
New distribution 
strategy with more 
focus on retail 
channels 
Strengthening of 
the brand Bialetti 
in the Coffee 
Business 
Costs 
Structural costs 
reduction 
Outsourcing 
strategies 
Interest expense 
reduction 
Invested Capital 
More efficient Net 
Working Capital 
management 
Disposal of assets 
that do not 
represent the core 
business of the 
Group 
Financial 
Structure 
Share capital 
increase for 
€25.0 milion in 
five years 
Reduction of the 
debt exposure 
thorugh the 
generation of cash 
from operations 
~ 81 ~ 
 
During 2014 Bialetti Store opened 28 new shops which contributed for a revenue growth of 
about 38.5 per cent on a yearly basis. Net income relized by Bialetti Store during the same 
year was € 0.6 million after an income loss of € 0.3 million in 2013. These results represented 
the turning point for Bialetti Group that decided to change business model from traditional 
production activities to an increasing focus on retailing activities. 
Marketing campaigns devoted to strengthen Bialetti brand in the coffe business gave the first 
results in 2014 when revenues from coffe world business unit grew from € 75.8 million to € 
83.6 million (+ 10.3 per cent in a year).  
The following charts summarize the evolution of shops opened by the Group and revenues 
from Coffee World business unit in the period 2007-2015. 
 
Figure 3.5. The main drivers of Bialetti's growth 
 
 
At the end of 2014 the Group realized a positive net income of € 4.1 million. The last time the 
Group realized a positive income of more than € 1.0 million was in 2007. This confirmed the 
success of restructuring plan and the new business strategy. EBITDA margin increased by 3.3 
per cent with respect to 2013 thanks to restructuring process which permits to reduce operat-
ing costs from € 154 million in 2013 to € 145 million in 2014. The evolution of operating 
costs and their incidence on sales from 2007 to 2015 can be illustrated by the figure 3.6. 
 
Figure 3.6. - Evolution of operating costs and their incidence on sales 
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In January 2015 the Board of Directors of Bialetti Industrie S.p.A. approved the capital in-
crease for an amount of € 14.5 million in compliance with the certificate plan agreed the pre-
vious year. 
In a view of simplification and reorganization, at the end of 2015 Bialetti signed a preliminary 
agreement for the sale of the Girmi brand to Trevidea s.r.l. for an amount of € 4.5 million. 
This agreement however was subject to the bank's consent who could benefit from right of 
pledge on this brand for the financing granted to Bialetti in 2011. 
The positive results of the Group in 2014 were confirmed in 2015.  EBITDA margin remained 
stable at 10 per cent and net financial position improved by € 2.5 million.  
In 2015, revenues grew by 6.9% at consolidated level thanks to the very positive performance 
of Bialetti Store s.r.l. which was able to increase sales by 44% in a year and to realize a net 
income of € 2.7 million against € 0.6 million in 2014. At the end of the year, single-brand 
shops opened in Italy, France and Spain by Bialetti Store were 130. 
It is also important to remark that all the financial covenants specified in the certificate plan 
were met at the end of 2015.  This represent a very important condition to maintain the neces-
sary liquidity to run the business. 
In first six months of 2016 the Group realized a performance in line with expectations. How-
ever, even if these positive results should be taken into account, it is important not to underes-
timate the uncertainty that the firm is still facing during the valuation process. For this reason 
in the following paragraph a detailed economic and financial analysis is carried out focusing 
on the main value drivers which can affect Bialetti's intrinsic valuation.  
 
 
 3.4. Economic and financial analysis 
In this paragraph financial amounts and ratios that better represent past performance of Bialet-
ti Group will be analyzed. The time horizon considered in our analysis is the last decade. This 
permits to have a clear understanding of the corporate evolution before and after the crisis. 
Moreover, in the appendix of the present chapter we have extensively reported Balance Sheet, 
Income Statement and Cash Flow statement of the Group appropriately reorganized for valua-
tion purposes. In appendix are also reported the approach used to compute the rating class of 
the Group and the most significant financial ratios. 
In order to better indentify factors responsible of the Group's financial and economic crisis, 
the analysis has been enriched by the comparison with a benchmark competitor: De Longhi 
Group. The Group’s unique traits make it difficult to identify fully comparable companies. 
~ 83 ~ 
 
However,  De Longhi represents Bialetti's most similar comparable company, since they have 
similar positioning in the household and coffee business. 
Before entering in detail of economic and financial data, it is useful to see at Bialetti's stock 
price evolution because it represents a proxy of the value created by the firm overtime. 
 
Figure 3.7. - Bialetti Industrie S.p.A. stock price evolution (source: Yahoo Finance) 
 
 
As we can see from the graph, the evolution of market price is particularly negative since Bi-
aletti's quotation in July 2007. Most of the value was lost in biennium 2008-2009 when the 
firm started to suffer the global financial crisis and a greater competition of foreign competi-
tors. 
If we compare the Bialetti's stock price evolution in the last 6 years with that of De Longhi 
and EURO STOXX 600 Household Goods Index we can obtain a chart like the following one. 
 
Figure 3.8. - Market prices evolution in the period 2010-2016 expressed on 100 basis points 
(source: Yahoo Finance) 
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As we can see, if we standardize the stock price of the three securities at 1st January 2010, we 
can see very well that the performance of Bialetti has been very poor compared with De 
Longhi and even with the rest of household industry. This is a very important signal that sug-
gests Bialetti's corporate crisis is more internal than external. 
We can start considering the evolution of sales during the time period of our analysis.  
 
Figure 3.9. - Consolidated sales 2007-2015 
 
 
Sales CAGR in the period 2007-2015 is -2.1 per cent. The first fall in revenues was recorded 
in 2008 with an annual decrease of 4.8%. Overall, consolidated sales decreased from € 220.7 
million in 2007 to € 172.4 million in 2015. 
 
Figure 3.10. - Sales growth rates comparison 
 
 
5,9% 
-4,8% 
-7,6% 
-5,0% 
-5,7% 
-6,8% 
-1,9% 
1,4% 
6,9% 
-10,0%
-8,0%
-6,0%
-4,0%
-2,0%
0,0%
2,0%
4,0%
6,0%
8,0%
0
50
100
150
200
250
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Consolidated sales (in € million) Growth rate
-10,0%
-5,0%
0,0%
5,0%
10,0%
15,0%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Bialetti De Longhi
~ 85 ~ 
 
When we compare Bialetti's sales growth rates with those of competitors (De Longhi) the 
trend appears much more clear. As we can see from figure 4.10., during years 2008, 2009 and 
2010 global financial crisis hit the consumption level and customers' willingness to pay be-
cause both firms recorded decreasing and negative sales growth rates. However, after 2010, 
the path is different for the two companies: Bialetti was unable to recover sales as De Longhi 
did. This is probably due to the fact that the great part of Bialetti's sales are realized in Italy, 
where the financial crisis was particularly deep. De Longhi, instead, realizes a greater part of 
turnover abroad, where the economic conditions improved first than Italy. 
 
Figure 3.11. - EBITDA and EBITDA margin 2007-2015 
 
 
Figure 3.12. - EBITDA margin comparison 
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tion which passed from € 26.6 million in 2007 to € 20.2 million in 2015 as illustrate in the fol-
lowing figure. 
The most significant EBITDA decrease occurred in 2008. In that year EBITDA was negative 
for about € 1.8 million. The main cause of poor margins are attributable the decrease of sales 
volume, increasing weight of distribution channels with low margins and greater incidence of 
fixed costs relating with the opening of new branded shops. After an initial recovery in 2009, 
EBITDA margin remained negative even in 2010. It returned into positive territory only in 
2011 and then it started to increase year by year. Different was the evolution of De Longhi 
EBITDA margin which remained quite stable during years of the crisis and then started to in-
crease progressively. This demonstrates a greater ability of De Longhi Group to reduce struc-
tural costs and get a more flexible cost structure during years of the crisis. 
The same path is visible by looking at the evolution of net income in the years 2006-2015.  
 
3.13. - Net income 2006-2015 
 
 
3.14. - Net margin comparison 
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From 2008 to 2013, Bialetti's net margin remained substantially negative while De Longhi 
showed a positive and increasing trend which ended with a net margin of 8 per cent in 2015. 
To worsen Bialetti's poor performance contributed also interest expense, that in the period 
2005-2008 went from € 4.1 million to € 12.1 million. After that, standstill agreement conclud-
ed with creditor banks in 2009 allowed the company to maintain an interest expense of about 
€ 5-6  million from 2009 to 2015 with an average cost of debt of about 5.5 per cent. 
Bialetti's total invested capital started to decrease in 2008. The decreasing trend continued un-
til 2012 when the restructuring process finished and the relaunch phase started.  
 
Figure 3.15. Invested Capital (including goodwill and similar intangibles) 2006-2015 
 
 
Figure 3.16. - Invested Capital on sales comparison 
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the ratio settled at about 55%. De Longhi, instead, is much more flexible because its ratio is 
about 41.5% in 2015.   
Structural rigidity makes it difficult and slow capital adjustments after sales fluctuations. For 
this reason, Bialetti Group needed structural changes to recover from the crisis.  
If we move our attention to net working capital evolution, we see that it progressively reduced 
from € 66.2 million in 2006 to € 55.3 million in 2015. The decrease on net working capital is 
mainly due to sales slowdown and reduction of other operating assets and liabilities, which 
include tax receivables, tax payables, accruals, deferrals and other operating receivables. 
 
Figure 3.17. - Net working capital 2006-2015 
 
 
Figure 3.18. - Net working capital comparison 
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2006 to 86 days in 2015. By contrast, the increase of trade payables was much more steady. 
This is an evident symptom of loss of bargaining power that firm suffered during corporate 
crisis. Rationalization and simplification interventions combined with a careful working capi-
tal management should help the company to find the right equilibrium on commercial cycle. 
EBITDA on interest expense is one of the most important ratios used to evaluate the compa-
ny's ability to pay interest expense and generate profits. The evolution of this ratio for firms 
under analysis is reported in the following figure. 
 
 
Figure 3.19. - EBITDA/Interest expense comparison 
 
 
When this ratio becomes lower than 1, it means that the firm is forced to obtain new financing 
to pay interest expense. Figure 4.19 shows that, before global crisis, the situation was very 
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the following years, the situation evolved differently because De Longhi was able to improve 
its EBITDA overtime while Bialetti encountered greater difficulties to pay interest expenses. 
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In order to have an overall picture of the firm's capacity to generate cash flows, in the follow-
ing graph are reported the main Cash Flow Statement intermediate results from 2006 to 2015. 
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Figure 3.20. - Cash Flow Statement results 2006-2015 
 
 
The following charts, instead, illustrates Bialetti Group's capital structure evolution in the last 
decade. 
 
Figure 3.21. - Capital structure evolution 2006-2015 
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Bialetti's capital structure changed considerably during the period under analysis. In particu-
lar, from 2008, the worsening economic conditions and the beginning of restructuring inter-
ventions lead to progressive erosion of equity and a corresponding increase of NFP/equity ra-
tio. Net financial position reached its peak in 2008 with an amount of € 119 million. After 
that, the standstill agreement and the restructuring interventions helped the company to stabi-
lize NFP at about € 90 million in the period 2011-2015. NFP reduction occurred between 
2009 and 2011 is due to the disposal of non-operating and the marginality improvement 
which increased the Group's ability to generate cash. 
NFP/EBITDA is a very useful indicator which can be adopted to assess the company ability 
to meet debt obligations. 
 
Figure 3.23. - NFP/EBITDA comparison 
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was able to recover its operating performance very quickly. Bialetti, instead, suffered a deep 
restructuring process which maintained its operating performance negative until 2010. Only in 
the following years the effects of restructuring process and certificate plan permit to improve 
operating performance year by year. 
 
 
Figure 3.24. - ROIC comparison 
 
 
The overall performance of the Group was positive in 2006 (ROE equal to 14.2%) and 2007 
(ROE equal to 11.7%) but it decreased dramatically in the following year and remained nega-
tive until 2011. 
 
Figure 3.25. - ROE comparison 
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gressively until arriving at 17.7% in 2015. Instead, Bialetti's ROE returned to a positive terri-
tory only in 2012.  
In 2014 and 2015 Bialetti's ROE is respectively 118% and 43%. This values are greatly influ-
enced by equity erosion occurred between 2008 and 2011. The capital increase expected in 
2016 will bring again the ratio to more realistic values. 
 
 
3.6. Risks and uncertainties 
The Group operates in a global industry which is historically cyclical because it depends on 
the global tendency of economy. In recent years, Bialetti heavily suffered the economic slow-
down which lead to decreasing demand and strong reduction of consumption level. Further-
more, the market in which the Group operates is highly competitive. Indeed, the success of 
Bialetti Group in the next years will depend on its ability to maintain and increase market 
share in Italy and expand into international market. Macroeconomic variables which can sig-
nificantly affect economic and financial situation of the Group are: national GDP evolution, 
consumer and business confidence evolution, interest rates evolution, raw materials costs and 
unemployment rate in those countries where the Group operates. 
Furthermore, we should not forget that the Group is going to a critical corporate restructuring 
and the failure to meet targets specified in the strategic plan 2014-2017 could jeopardize busi-
ness continuity. The main uncertainties and risks which can compromise the Group's business 
continuity in the next years can be listed as follow: 
1. The respect of clauses specified in the certificate plan of December 2014. Among 
these clauses the most important are the realization of the capital increase in compli-
ance with the terms and conditions agreed with banks as well as the respect of finan-
cial covenants.  
2. The results of interventions specified in the certificate plan 2014-2017 and the 
achievement of planned objectives. In fact, general conditions of the economy could 
change the assumptions underlying the strategic plan and determining significant gaps 
between actual economic and financial indicators and those expected.  
3. Risks linked to exchange rates and interest rates fluctuations due to the geographic dis-
tribution of the Group's activities. In particular the Group is particularly exposed, from 
exports side, to fluctuations of US dollar and GB pound against euro, while from im-
ports side, it is exposed to fluctuations of Turkish lira, Brazilian real and Chinese Yu-
an against Euro. The effect of sudden exchange rates fluctuations could have signifi-
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cant negative effects on the income results since at the end of 2015 the Group has no 
specific derivative instruments to hedge exchange rate risk. 
4. Risks linked to the relationships with employees and suppliers, regulated by several 
laws and collective labor agreements, which could influence the flexibility of the 
Group. Trade union protests caused by personnel reduction or other cost control 
measures can produce negative effects for corporate business. Moreover, strict rela-
tionships with suppliers and firms external to the Group can create problems connect-
ed with operations continuity of these suppliers. 
5. Risks related to the fluctuations of raw materials purchase prices. Bialetti purchases 
raw materials and semi-finished goods through a centralized procurement system. This 
allows the Group to ensure cost targets are met. Purchases are managed through con-
tractual plans to exploit favorable market conditions, especially for aluminum. Costs 
of raw materials and consumables have the highest incidence on Bialetti’s Income 
Statement. In the period 2005-2015, raw materials costs weighed between 40 and 45 
per cent on net revenues. So, a sudden fluctuation in raw materials purchase prices 
could significantly affect the economic results of the Group considering that on 31st 
December 2015 there is no specific derivative contract to hedge the purchase price risk 
for aluminum or other metals. 
6. Risks connected with management of the Group, on which depends the realization of 
strategic plan. In fact, Bialetti's operating and financial condition may create difficul-
ties to attract and retain qualified human resources compromising the Group's future 
perspectives. 
7. Risks relating international markets conditions. Bialetti is exposed to economic and 
political conditions of countries in which it operates, the realization of imports/exports 
restrictive policies and different fiscal regimes.  
8. Risks connected with environmental policies. 
9. Risks connected with economic results of subsidiaries and associates. 
10. Risks connected with the capacity to offer innovative and competitive products in 
terms of price and quality. 
All these risks and uncertainties create difficulties to provide an accurate picture of the sce-
nario the Group can face in the next future. However, in the next chapter appropriate valua-
tion methods are applied to take into account volatile conditions and future uncertainties of 
Bialetti Group. 
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Appendix 3.1. - Reorganized Balance Sheet (Invested Capital) 
 
*Working cash on revenues equal to 1% 
2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Reorganized Balance-Sheet (Invested Capital)
Working cash* 1.724 1.612 1.590 1.621 1.739 1.845 1.942 2.102 2.207 2.084 1.890
Trade receivables 60.401 67.472 60.024 62.147 56.651 69.807 67.109 72.009 81.984 73.319 73.758
Inventories 39.151 34.337 35.088 34.883 45.483 52.548 41.406 60.604 56.227 43.281 44.727
Trade payables (40.127) (44.859) (34.164) (36.191) (40.442) (53.225) (44.445) (50.308) (55.204) (44.589) (45.232)
Trade working capital 61.149 58.562 62.538 62.460 63.431 70.975 66.012 84.407 85.214 74.095 75.143
Other operating current assets 8.744 9.248 6.368 5.058 6.750 5.188 8.865 12.469 12.455 5.690 6.988
Other operating current liabilities (14.496) (13.016) (11.936) (17.362) (20.474) (12.505) (9.420) (13.547) (9.827) (13.524) (9.077)
Other current assets and liabilities (5.752) (3.768) (5.568) (12.304) (13.724) (7.317) (555) (1.078) 2.628 (7.834) (2.089)
Net working capital 55.397 54.794 56.970 50.156 49.707 63.658 65.457 83.329 87.842 66.261 73.054
Tangible assets 21.978 21.725 20.602 21.868 19.360 25.682 29.748 35.519 28.214 27.153 66.494
Operating intangibles 5.485 2.982 2.350 2.505 2.612 3.953 5.975 8.300 10.701 5.437 4.509
Total operating fixed capital 27.463 24.707 22.952 24.373 21.972 29.635 35.723 43.819 38.915 32.590 71.003
Operating receivables and other non-current assets 3.755 2.985 2.598 1.983 2.704 2.776 4.259 203 259 2.706 11.733
Operating deferred-tax assets/(liabilities) 4.157 3.590 3.054 2.258 2.574 1.708 1.323 347 2.579 (297) (7.815)
Operating non-current liabilities (7.596) (8.581) (11.652) (7.161) (660) (770) (1.597) (2.349) (2.888) (7.142) (8.273)
Operating provisions (186) (191) (167) (160) (343) (3.719) (593) (710) (407) (362) (265)
Total other non-current operating assets and liabilities 130 (2.197) (6.167) (3.080) 4.275 (5) 3.392 (2.509) (457) (5.095) (4.620)
Invested capital excluding goodwill and similar intangibles 82.990 77.304 73.755 71.449 75.954 93.288 104.572 124.639 126.300 93.756 139.437
Goodwill and similar intangibles 10.960 11.431 11.679 12.750 13.243 15.320 15.623 16.787 19.675 20.482 19.324
Deferred tax asset/(liabilities) on similar intangibles 404 539 494 422 299 164 127 94 47 16 33
Goodwill and other similar intangibles 11.364 11.970 12.173 13.172 13.542 15.484 15.750 16.881 19.722 20.498 19.357
Invested capital including goodwill and similar intangibles 94.354 89.274 85.928 84.621 89.496 108.772 120.322 141.520 146.022 114.254 158.794
Non-operating current assets 1.291 1.461 0 395 907 0 300 0 52 400 536
Non-operating deferred-tax assets/(liabilities) 1.938 1.970 4.109 5.434 3.111 1.753 1.335 2.524 851 3.059 283
Non-operating assets 3.120 2.930 2.633 3.097 4.871 1.425 1.424 3.137 3.505 4.531 4.396
Non-operating assets and liabilities 6.349 6.361 6.742 8.926 8.889 3.178 3.059 5.661 4.408 7.990 5.215
TOTAL FUNDS INVESTED 100.703 95.635 92.670 93.547 98.385 111.950 123.381 147.181 150.430 122.244 164.009
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Appendix 3.2. - Reorganized Balance Sheet (Source of financing) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Reorganized Balance-Sheet (Source of Financing)
Excess cash 6.896 8.001 2.453 6.334 1.243 1.311 1.148 1.281 4.603 2.781 2.247
Long-term borrowings 79.194 79.615 91.027 92.509 93.954 102.117 85.091 100.514 74.577 82.078 101.160
Short-term borrowings 12.107 15.389 306 697 880 1.076 15.499 15.230 20.854 19.849 38.570
Net financial position 84.405 87.003 88.880 86.872 93.591 101.882 99.442 114.463 90.828 99.146 137.483
Provision for employee benefit 3.132 2.877 2.441 2.438 2.595 2.955 3.850 4.648 4.927 7.340 7.346
Non-operating provisions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Debt equivalents 3.132 2.877 2.441 2.438 2.595 2.955 3.850 4.648 4.927 7.340 7.346
Net financial position and debt equivalents 87.537 89.880 91.321 89.310 96.186 104.837 103.292 119.111 95.755 106.486 144.829
Minority interests (44) 29 47 91 141 222 389 545 233 0 0
Shareholders' equity 13.210 5.726 1.302 4.146 2.058 6.891 19.700 27.525 54.442 15.758 19.180
Total equity 13.166 5.755 1.349 4.237 2.199 7.113 20.089 28.070 54.675 15.758 19.180
TOTAL SOURCE OF FINANCING 100.703 95.635 92.670 93.547 98.385 111.950 123.381 147.181 150.430 122.244 164.009
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Appendix 3.3. - Reorganized Income Statement 
 
 
 
Appendix 3.4. - NOPLAT calculation 
 
 
2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Reorganized Income Statement
Revenues 172.354 161.243 159.024 162.132 173.949 184.513 194.204 210.206 220.724 208.408 189.044
Other income 2.417 2.895 2.048 2.697 2.222 456 1.611 515 867 576 1.519
Raw materials, consumables and goods (70.688) (64.360) (67.915) (62.610) (67.970) (92.981) (77.181) (92.548) (100.769) (97.427) (93.870)
Other operating costs (10.738) (13.413) (11.843) (21.128) (17.834) 410 (22.735) (9.157) 3.129 (5.465) (2.230)
Operating cost (personnel and D&A excluded) (44.289) (42.710) (43.422) (46.685) (53.591) (62.100) (56.509) (74.852) (70.709) (59.192) (60.345)
Personnel expenses (28.849) (25.443) (23.550) (22.401) (25.941) (32.960) (28.176) (35.987) (26.603) (22.842) (20.719)
EBITDA 20.207 18.212 14.342 12.005 10.835 (2.662) 11.214 (1.823) 26.639 24.058 13.399
Depreciation (1.953) (1.509) (1.433) (2.141) (2.849) (5.872) (6.893) (6.954) (6.141) (7.252) (6.732)
Amortization of operating intangibles (1.322) (907) (709) (670) (739) (1.180) (1.837) (1.436) (1.208) (558) (448)
Total D&A (3.275) (2.416) (2.142) (2.811) (3.588) (7.052) (8.730) (8.390) (7.349) (7.810) (7.180)
EBITA 16.932 15.796 12.200 9.194 7.247 (9.714) 2.484 (10.213) 19.290 16.248 6.219
Amortization of assets similar to goodwill (2.641) (3.477) (3.526) (3.412) (3.746) (4.573) (4.802) (2.904) (2.220) (2.103) (1.920)
EBIT 14.291 12.319 8.674 5.782 3.501 (14.287) (2.318) (13.117) 17.070 14.145 4.299
Non-recurring and extraordinary items 133 103 2 1.090 946 248 341 59 154 101 47
Interest income (expense) from investments (623) (410) (713) (45) (1.790) (607) 6 (837) (1.095) (624) 1.155
Exchange rate (losses) gains (1.548) 58 (2.412) 17 (1.652) 598 949 (2.935) (1.978) (1.130) 1.280
Interest (expense) income (5.386) (4.990) (4.685) (5.165) (4.817) (4.674) (6.360) (9.160) (6.324) (7.058) (5.405)
Net financial result (6.934) (4.932) (7.097) (5.148) (6.469) (4.076) (5.411) (12.095) (8.302) (8.188) (4.125)
EBT 6.867 7.080 866 1.679 (3.812) (18.722) (7.382) (25.990) 7.827 5.434 1.376
Taxes (2.848) (2.945) (1.649) (732) 911 11 (2.748) 2.399 (3.725) (2.953) (1.317)
Group Net Income 4.019 4.135 (783) 947 (2.901) (18.711) (10.130) (23.591) 4.102 2.481 59
Minority result 64 11 37 44 60 54 265 99 0 0 0
NET INCOME 4.083 4.146 (746) 991 (2.841) (18.657) (9.865) (23.492) 4.102 2.481 59
2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
NOPLAT calculation
EBITA 16.932 15.796 12.200 9.194 7.247 (9.714) 2.484 (10.213) 19.290 16.248 6.219
Operating taxes (5.738) (5.489) (4.931) (2.891) (2.309) (2.659) (5.635) (2.083) (7.001) (6.029) (2.677)
NOPLAT 11.194 10.307 7.269 6.303 4.938 (12.373) (3.151) (12.296) 12.290 10.219 3.542
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Appendix 3.5. - Operating taxes calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Operating taxes calculation
EBT 6.867,0 7.080,0 866,0 1.679,0 (3.812,0) (18.722,0) (7.382,0) (25.990,0) 7.827,0 5.434,0 1.376,0
Income taxes (2.848,0) (2.945,0) (1.649,0) (732,0) 911,0 11,0 (2.748,0) 2.399,0 (3.725,0) (2.953,0) (1.317,0)
Actual (blended global) tax rate 41,5% 41,6% 190,4% 43,6% -23,9% -0,1% -37,2% -9,2% 47,6% 54,3% 95,7%
Adjustments:
Amortization of assets similar to goodwill (2.641,2) (3.477,0) (3.525,6) (3.411,7) (3.746,1) (4.573,0) (4.802,3) (2.904,1) (2.220,4) (2.102,8) (1.920,0)
Estimated tax rate 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3
Taxes 829,3 1.091,8 1.107,0 1.071,3 1.176,3 1.435,9 1.507,9 911,9 697,2 660,3 602,9
Non-recurring and extraordinary items 133,0 103,0 2,0 1.090,0 946,0 248,0 341,0 59,0 154,0 101,0 47,0
Estimated tax rate 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3
Taxes (41,8) (32,3) (0,6) (342,3) (297,0) (77,9) (107,1) (18,5) (48,4) (31,7) (14,8)
Interest income (expense) from investments (623,0) (410,0) (713,0) (45,0) (1.790,0) (607,0) 6,0 (837,0) (1.095,0) (624,0) 1.155,0
Estimated tax rate 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3
Taxes 195,6 128,7 223,9 14,1 562,1 190,6 (1,9) 262,8 343,8 195,9 (362,7)
Net financial result (6.934,0) (4.932,0) (7.097,0) (5.148,0) (6.469,0) (4.076,0) (5.411,0) (12.095,0) (8.302,0) (8.188,0) (4.125,0)
Estimated tax rate 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3
Taxes 1.906,9 1.356,3 1.951,7 1.415,7 1.779,0 1.120,9 1.488,0 3.326,1 2.283,1 2.251,7 1.134,4
Estimated taxes on EBITA (5.738,0) (5.489,5) (4.931,0) (2.890,8) (2.309,3) (2.658,6) (5.635,0) (2.083,3) (7.000,7) (6.029,2) (2.676,8)
EBITA 16.932,2 15.796,0 12.199,6 9.193,7 7.247,1 (9.714,0) 2.484,3 (10.212,9) 19.290,4 16.247,8 6.219,0
Estimated tax rate on EBITA 33,9% 34,8% 40,4% 31,4% 31,9% -27,4% 226,8% -20,4% 36,3% 37,1% 43,0%
Taxes on EBITA (5.738,0) (5.489,5) (4.931,0) (2.890,8) (2.309,3) (2.658,6) (5.635,0) (2.083,3) (7.000,7) (6.029,2) (2.676,8)
Adjustments on taxes 2.890,0 2.544,5 3.282,0 2.158,8 3.220,3 2.669,6 2.887,0 4.482,3 3.275,7 3.076,2 1.359,8
Taxes on EBT (2.848,0) (2.945,0) (1.649,0) (732,0) 911,0 11,0 (2.748,0) 2.399,0 (3.725,0) (2.953,0) (1.317,0)
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Appendix 3.6. - Cash Flow Statement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
Free Cash Flow calculation
NOPLAT 11.194 10.307 7.269 6.303 4.938 (12.373) (3.151) (12.296) 12.290 10.219
Amortization of operating intangibles 1.322 907 709 670 739 1.180 1.837 1.436 1.208 558
Depreciation 1.953 1.509 1.433 2.141 2.849 5.872 6.893 6.954 6.141 7.252
Gross cash flow 14.469 12.723 9.411 9.114 8.526 (5.321) 5.579 (3.906) 19.638 18.029
Change in operating working capital (602) 2.176 (6.814) (449) 13.951 1.799 17.872 4.513 (21.581) 6.793
Net capital expenditures (6.031) (4.171) (721) (5.212) 4.075 (964) (634) (13.294) (13.674) 30.603
Change in other operating assets and liabilities (2.327) (3.970) 3.087 7.355 (4.280) 3.396 (5.901) 2.052 (4.638) 475
Gross investment (8.960) (5.965) (4.448) 1.694 13.746 4.231 11.337 (6.729) (39.892) 37.871
Free cash flow before goodwill and similar intangibles 5.509 6.757 4.963 10.808 22.272 (1.089) 16.916 (10.635) (20.254) 55.900
Investments in goodwill and other intangibles (2.035) (3.274) (2.527) (3.042) (1.804) (4.306) (3.671) (63) (1.445) (3.243)
Free cash flow after goodwill and similar intangibles 3.474 3.483 2.436 7.766 20.467 (5.396) 13.245 (10.698) (21.699) 52.656
Investments in non-operating assets 12 381 2.184 (37) (5.711) (119) 2.602 (1.253) 3.582 (2.775)
Non-recurring extraordinary items 133 103 2 1.090 946 248 341 59 154 101
Interest income (expense) from investments (623) (410) (713) (45) (1.790) (607) 6 (837) (1.095) (624)
Non-operating taxes 2.890 2.544 3.282 2.159 3.220 2.670 2.887 4.482 3.276 3.076
Non-operating cash flow 2.412 2.618 4.755 3.167 (3.335) 2.192 5.836 2.451 5.917 (222)
Cash available to investors 5.886 6.102 7.191 10.933 17.133 (3.204) 19.081 (8.247) (15.782) 52.434
Net financial result (6.934) (4.932) (7.097) (5.148) (6.469) (4.076) (5.411) (12.095) (8.302) (8.188)
Change in debt equivalents 255 436 3 (157) (360) (895) (798) (279) (2.413) (6)
Change in minority interests (9) (7) (7) (6) (21) (113) 109 411 233 0
Change in shareholders' equity 3.401 278 (2.098) 1.097 (1.992) 5.848 2.040 (3.425) 34.582 (5.903)
Decrease (increase) in net financial position 2.599 1.877 (2.008) 6.719 8.291 (2.440) 15.021 (23.635) 8.318 38.337
Beginning net financial position 87.003 88.880 86.872 93.591 101.882 99.442 114.463 90.828 99.146 137.483
Ending net financial position 84.405 87.003 88.880 86.872 93.591 101.882 99.442 114.463 90.828 99.146
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Appendix 3.7. - Ratio Analysis 
 
2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Financial ratio
Profitability
ROE 43,1% 118,0% -27,4% 31,9% -63,5% -140,3% -41,8% -57,3% 11,7% 14,2% 0,3%
ROIC 12,2% 11,8% 8,5% 7,2% 5,0% -10,8% -2,4% -8,6% 9,4% 7,5% 2,2%
Premium over book capital 1,15 1,16 1,17 1,18 1,17 1,16 1,14 1,15 1,18 1,17 1,14
ROIC without goodwill 14,0% 13,6% 10,0% 8,6% 5,8% -12,5% -2,7% -9,8% 11,2% 8,8% 2,5%
Pretax ROIC 21,1% 20,9% 16,8% 12,5% 8,6% -9,8% 2,2% -8,1% 17,5% 13,9% 4,5%
Operating margin (ROS) 9,8% 9,8% 7,7% 5,7% 4,2% -5,3% 1,3% -4,9% 8,7% 7,8% 3,3%
Revenues/invested capital 2,15 2,13 2,19 2,20 2,06 1,87 1,69 1,68 2,01 1,79 1,36
Net working capital/revenues 32,0% 34,7% 33,7% 30,8% 32,6% 35,0% 38,3% 40,7% 34,9% 33,4% 38,6%
Operating fixed assets/revenues 15,1% 14,8% 14,9% 14,3% 14,8% 17,7% 20,5% 19,7% 16,2% 24,9% 37,6%
Growth rates
Revenues 6,9% 1,4% -1,9% -6,8% -5,7% -5,0% -7,6% -4,8% 5,9% -2,1%
EBITDA 11,0% 27,0% 19,5% 10,8% -507,0% -123,7% -715,1% -106,8% 10,7% 79,6%
EBITA 7,2% 29,5% 32,7% 26,9% -174,6% -491,0% -124,3% -152,9% 18,7% 161,3%
NOPLAT 8,6% 41,8% 15,3% 27,6% -139,9% 292,7% -74,4% -200,1% 20,3% 188,5%
IC 5,7% 3,9% 1,5% -5,4% -17,7% -9,6% -15,0% -3,1% 27,8% -28,0%
IC excluding goodwill 7,4% 4,8% 3,2% -5,9% -18,6% -10,8% -16,1% -1,3% 34,7% -32,8%
Net working capital 1,1% -3,8% 13,6% 0,9% -21,9% -2,7% -21,4% -5,1% 32,6% -9,3%
Operating fixed capital 11,2% 7,6% -5,8% 10,9% -25,9% -17,0% -18,5% 12,6% 19,4% -54,1%
Working Capital Management (Days in revenues)
Working Cash 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Receivables 128 153 138 140 119 138 126 125 136 128 142
Inventories 83 78 81 79 95 104 78 105 93 76 86
Suppliers 85 102 78 81 85 105 84 87 91 78 87
Other current assets and liabilities 12 9 13 28 29 14 1 2 -4 14 4
Net working capital 117 124 131 113 104 126 123 145 145 116 141
Financial Structure
NFP/Equity 6,6 15,6 67,7 21,1 43,7 14,7 5,1 4,2 1,8 6,8 7,6
NFP/EBITA 5,2 5,7 7,5 9,7 13,3 -10,8 41,6 -11,7 5,0 6,6 23,3
NFP/EBITDA 4,3 4,9 6,4 7,4 8,9 -39,4 9,2 -65,3 3,6 4,4 10,8
Coverage
EBIT/interest 2,7 2,5 1,9 1,1 0,7 -3,1 -0,4 -1,4 2,7 2,0 0,8
EBITA/interest 3,1 3,2 2,6 1,8 1,5 -2,1 0,4 -1,1 3,1 2,3 1,2
EBITDA/interest 3,8 3,6 3,1 2,3 2,2 -0,6 1,8 -0,2 4,2 3,4 2,5
Cash available for investors/NFP 1,9 2,1 2,9 4,5 6,6 -1,1 5,0 -1,8 -3,2 7,1
FCF from operation/NFP 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,09 0,21 -0,05 0,13 -0,09 -0,23 0,49
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Appendix 3.8. - Key financial ratios and rating 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
from to Rating from to Rating from to Rating
0,0 0,4 AAA 12,5 100,0 AAA 1,55 10,00 AAA
0,4 1,0 AA 9,5 12,5 AA 0,43 1,55 AA
1,0 1,5 A 4,5 9,5 A 0,31 0,43 A
1,5 2,3 BBB 4,0 4,5 BBB 0,14 0,31 BBB
2,3 3,0 BB 3,0 4,0 BB 0,08 0,14 BB
3,0 5,4 B 2,0 3,0 B 0,02 0,08 B
5,4 7,0 C 1,0 2,0 C 0,01 0,02 C
7,0 10,0 CC 0,5 1,0 CC 0,005 0,01 CC
10,0 100,0 CCC 0,0 0,5 CCC 0,00 0,005 CCC
Debt/EBITDA EBITA/Interest expense FCF/Debt
Year
Ratio Rating Score Rating Score Rating Score Rating Score Rating Score Rating Score Rating Score Rating Score Rating Score Rating Score
Debt/EBITDA B 4,00         B 4,00         C 4,75         CC 5,25         CC 5,25         C 4,75        CC 5,25        CCC 5,75        B 4,00              B 4,00        
EBITA/Interest expense BB 3,00         BB 3,00         B 4,00         C 4,75         C 4,75         CCC 5,75        CCC 5,75        CCC 5,75        BBB 2,00              B 4,00        
FCF/Debt B 4,00         B 4,00         B 4,00         BB 3,00         BBB 2,00         CCC 5,75        BB 3,00        CCC 5,75        CCC 5,75              AA 0,75        
Weighted score
Rating Class
2006
5,75
CCC
3,63
B
3,46
BB
4,54
C
5,25
CC
5,04
CC
20092015 2014 2013 2008 20072012 2011 2010
3,67
B
3,67
B
4,38
B
4,71
C
from to Rating
0,00 0,50 AAA 0,25
0,50 1,00 AA 0,75
1,00 1,50 A 1,25
1,50 2,50 BBB 2,00
2,50 3,50 BB 3,00
3,50 4,50 B 4,00
4,50 5,00 C 4,75
5,00 5,50 CC 5,25
5,50 6,00 CCC 5,75
Synthetic 
score
Score
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Appendix 3.9. - Comparison with benchmark competitor (De Longhi Group) 
 
 
 
2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
Reorganized Balance-Sheet (Invested Capital)
Working cash* 18.668 17.045 16.068 15.060 14.062 12.599 13.793 15.036 14.629 13.347
Trade receivables 372.072 366.159 335.233 381.233 349.490 387.937 351.879 367.180 377.982 348.014
Inventories 323.420 317.763 283.415 273.758 277.984 288.012 257.084 320.464 335.194 323.733
Trade payables (383.346) (382.545) (345.666) (351.731) (330.766) (374.184) (291.073) (286.177) (333.669) (327.088)
Trade working capital 330.814 318.422 289.050 318.320 310.770 314.364 331.683 416.503 394.136 358.006
Other operating current assets 58.480 100.777 70.011 61.191 69.794 40.903 47.759 56.219 71.963 41.156
Other operating current liabilities (104.277) (110.721) (98.161) (105.606) (97.538) (103.568) (87.326) (83.145) (79.927) (77.065)
Other current assets and liabilities (45.797) (9.944) (28.150) (44.415) (27.744) (62.665) (39.567) (26.926) (7.964) (35.909)
Net working capital 285.017 308.478 260.900 273.905 283.026 251.699 292.116 389.577 386.172 322.097
Tangible assets 197.983 189.904 171.428 158.584 109.051 186.431 177.609 178.488 202.573 213.522
Operating intangibles 230.098 232.710 234.873 239.011 134.234 180.573 183.348 185.746 189.027 190.479
Total operating fixed capital 428.081 422.614 406.301 397.595 243.285 367.004 360.957 364.234 391.600 404.001
Operating receivables and other non-current assets 2.901 2.509 2.538 2.346 3.387 1.512 1.894 1.623 39.262 41.661
Operating deferred-tax assets/(liabilities) 17.329 22.359 28.011 34.179 23.131 14.078 12.756 20.652 15.623 20.871
Operating provisions (50.266) (46.032) (53.113) (52.845) (61.536) (46.880) (37.717) (35.668) (31.330) (28.227)
Total other non-current operating assets and liabilities (30.036) (21.164) (22.564) (16.320) (35.018) (31.290) (23.067) (13.393) 23.555 34.305
Invested capital excluding goodwill and similar intangibles 683.062 709.928 644.637 655.180 491.293 587.413 630.006 740.418 801.327 760.403
Goodwill and similar intangibles 92.400 92.400 92.400 92.089 41.591 228.042 231.318 228.716 232.410 223.679
Goodwill and other similar intangibles 92.400 92.400 92.400 92.089 41.591 228.042 231.318 228.716 232.410 223.679
Invested capital including goodwill and similar intangibles 775.462 802.328 737.037 747.269 532.884 815.455 861.324 969.134 1.033.737 984.082
Non-operating assets 11.341 6.958 2.809 846 278.644 797 772 5.909 13.892 11.317
Non-operating assets and liabilities 11.341 6.958 2.809 846 278.644 797 772 5.909 13.892 11.317
TOTAL FUNDS INVESTED 786.803 809.286 739.846 748.115 811.528 816.252 862.096 975.043 1.047.629 995.399
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2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
Reorganized Balance-Sheet (Source of Financing)
Excess cash (339.243) (371.485) (254.674) (228.935) (181.660) (180.916) (110.161) (94.126) (92.739) (99.605)
Long-term borrowings 118.248 123.311 180.432 206.260 53.452 107.934 113.094 161.289 171.870 209.648
Short-term borrowings 71.498 232.000 115.495 115.333 60.957 102.755 141.973 215.103 302.099 222.742
Net financial position (149.497) (16.174) 41.253 92.658 (67.251) 29.773 144.906 282.266 381.230 332.785
Provision for employee benefit 30.443 39.313 28.650 24.913 15.502 25.907 28.667 30.502 35.721 42.009
Debt equivalents 30.443 39.313 28.650 24.913 15.502 25.907 28.667 30.502 35.721 42.009
Net financial position and debt equivalents (119.054) 23.139 69.903 117.571 (51.749) 55.680 173.573 312.768 416.951 374.794
Minority interests 2.973 2.910 2.530 2.178 4.237 1.651 1.678 2.346 5.458 5.037
Shareholders' equity 902.883 783.237 667.413 628.366 859.040 758.921 686.845 659.929 625.220 615.568
Total equity 905.856 786.147 669.943 630.544 863.277 760.572 688.523 662.275 630.678 620.605
TOTAL SOURCE OF FINANCING 786.803 809.286 739.846 748.115 811.528 816.252 862.096 975.043 1.047.629 995.399
2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
Reorganized Income Statement
Revenues 1.866.750 1.704.479 1.606.763 1.506.039 1.406.152 1.259.902 1.379.323 1.503.598 1.462.920 1.334.690
Other income 24.348 22.205 25.870 24.066 23.247 21.494 24.744 29.809 27.976 28.285
Changes in inventories 579 29.763 24.641 4.164 35.185 21.511 (69.584) (3.891) 31.626 (4.666)
Raw materials, consumables and goods (829.148) (786.286) (730.457) (693.799) (675.075) (606.512) (627.695) (786.599) (799.322) (709.085)
Other operating costs (26.508) (14.695) (26.086) (25.625) (22.081) (26.297) (30.361) (22.424) (25.242) (9.695)
Operating cost (personnel and D&A excluded) (522.151) (489.547) (466.252) (409.686) (403.799) (361.364) (359.788) (389.666) (372.886) (349.325)
Personnel expenses (228.707) (207.003) (194.644) (179.635) (160.211) (142.113) (186.733) (190.347) (179.717) (164.633)
EBITDA 285.163 258.916 239.835 225.524 203.418 166.621 129.906 140.480 145.355 125.571
Total D&A (38.882) (34.771) (33.323) (23.955) (16.767) (16.101) (23.828) (37.882) (29.031) (27.413)
EBITA 246.281 224.145 206.512 201.569 186.651 150.520 106.078 102.598 116.324 98.158
Amortization of assets similar to goodwill (13.608) (12.047) (11.543) (11.635) (14.163) (15.051) (13.640) (13.807) (12.635) (13.204)
EBIT 232.673 212.098 194.969 189.934 172.488 135.469 92.438 88.791 103.689 84.954
Non-recurring and extraordinary items 0 643 0 (971) (3.913) (5.185) 0 22.461 3 24.980
Interest (expense) income (33.551) (41.705) (37.876) (34.373) (33.688) (23.896) (35.263) (52.607) (51.300) (48.612)
EBT 199.122 171.036 157.093 154.590 134.887 106.388 57.175 58.645 52.392 61.322
Taxes (49.323) (43.812) (39.602) (35.728) (44.360) (31.287) (24.394) (18.256) (21.140) (20.876)
Group Net Income 149.799 127.224 117.491 118.862 90.527 75.101 32.781 40.389 31.252 40.446
Minority result (266) (692) (570) (472) (279) (186) (424) (229) (688) (670)
NET INCOME 149.533 126.532 116.921 118.390 90.248 74.915 32.357 40.160 30.564 39.776
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2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007
Free Cash Flow calculation
NOPLAT 168.949 153.763 141.667 138.276 128.043 103.257 72.770 70.382 79.798
Total D&A 38.882 34.771 33.323 23.955 16.767 16.101 23.828 37.882 29.031
Gross cash flow 207.831 188.534 174.990 162.231 144.810 119.358 96.598 108.264 108.829
Change in operating working capital 23.461 (47.578) 13.006 9.120 (31.327) 40.417 97.461 (3.405) (64.075)
Net capital expenditures (44.349) (51.084) (42.029) (178.265) 106.952 (22.148) (20.551) (10.516) (16.630)
Change in other operating assets and liabilities 8.872 (1.400) 6.244 (18.698) 3.728 8.223 9.674 36.948 10.750
Gross investment (12.016) (100.062) (22.779) (187.843) 79.354 26.492 86.584 23.027 (69.955)
Free cash flow before goodwill and similar intangibles 195.815 88.472 152.211 (25.612) 224.163 145.850 183.181 131.291 38.874
Investments in goodwill and other intangibles (13.608) (12.047) (11.854) (62.133) 172.288 (11.775) (16.242) (10.113) (21.366)
Free cash flow after goodwill and similar intangibles 182.207 76.425 140.357 (87.745) 396.451 134.075 166.939 121.178 17.508
Investments in non-operating assets (4.383) (4.149) (1.963) 277.798 (277.847) (25) 5.137 7.983 (2.575)
Non-recurring extraordinary items 0 643 0 (971) (3.913) (5.185) 0 22.461 3
Non-operating taxes 28.009 26.570 25.243 27.565 14.248 15.976 8.914 13.960 15.386
Non-operating cash flow 23.626 23.064 23.280 304.392 (267.512) 10.766 14.051 44.404 12.814
Cash available to investors 205.833 99.489 163.637 216.647 128.940 144.841 180.991 165.582 30.322
Net financial result (33.551) (41.705) (37.876) (34.373) (33.688) (23.896) (35.263) (52.607) (51.300)
Change in debt equivalents (8.870) 10.663 3.737 9.411 (10.405) (2.760) (1.835) (5.219) (6.288)
Change in minority interests (203) (312) (218) (2.531) 2.307 (213) (1.092) (3.341) (267)
Change in shareholders' equity (29.887) (10.708) (77.874) (349.064) 9.871 (2.839) (5.441) (5.451) (20.912)
Decrease (increase) in net financial position 133.322 57.427 51.406 (159.910) 97.025 115.133 137.360 98.964 (48.445)
Beginning net financial position (16.174) 41.253 92.658 (67.251) 29.773 144.906 282.266 381.230 332.785
Ending net financial position (149.497) (16.174) 41.253 92.658 (67.251) 29.773 144.906 282.266 381.230
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2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
Financial ratio
Profitability
ROE 17,7% 17,4% 18,0% 15,9% 11,2% 10,4% 4,8% 6,2% 4,9% 6,5%
ROIC 21,4% 20,0% 19,1% 21,6% 19,0% 12,3% 8,0% 7,0% 7,9% 6,8%
Premium over book capital 1,14 1,13 1,14 1,14 1,08 1,39 1,37 1,31 1,29 1,29
ROIC without goodwill 24,3% 22,7% 21,8% 24,1% 23,7% 17,0% 10,6% 9,1% 10,2% 8,9%
Pretax ROIC 35,4% 33,1% 31,8% 35,2% 34,6% 24,7% 15,5% 13,3% 14,9% 12,9%
Operating margin (ROS) 13,2% 13,2% 12,9% 13,4% 13,3% 11,9% 7,7% 6,8% 8,0% 7,4%
Revenues/invested capital 2,68 2,52 2,47 2,63 2,61 2,07 2,01 1,95 1,87 1,76
Net working capital/revenues 15,3% 18,1% 16,2% 18,2% 20,1% 20,0% 21,2% 25,9% 26,4% 24,1%
Operating fixed assets/revenues 22,9% 24,8% 25,3% 26,4% 17,3% 29,1% 26,2% 24,2% 26,8% 30,3%
Growth rates
Revenues 9,5% 6,1% 6,7% 7,1% 11,6% -8,7% -8,3% 2,8% 9,6%
EBITDA 10,1% 8,0% 6,3% 10,9% 22,1% 28,3% -7,5% -3,4% 15,8%
EBITA 9,9% 8,5% 2,5% 8,0% 24,0% 41,9% 3,4% -11,8% 18,5%
NOPLAT 9,9% 8,5% 2,5% 8,0% 24,0% 41,9% 3,4% -11,8% 18,5%
IC -3,3% 8,9% -1,4% 40,2% -34,7% -5,3% -11,1% -6,2% 5,0%
IC excluding goodwill -3,8% 10,1% -1,6% 33,4% -16,4% -6,8% -14,9% -7,6% 5,4%
Net working capital -7,6% 18,2% -4,7% -3,2% 12,4% -13,8% -25,0% 0,9% 19,9%
Operating fixed capital 1,3% 4,0% 2,2% 63,4% -33,7% 1,7% -0,9% -7,0% -3,1%
Working Capital Management (Days in revenues)
Working Cash 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Receivables 73 78 76 92 91 112 93 89 94 95
Inventories 63 68 64 66 72 83 68 78 84 89
Suppliers 75 82 79 85 86 108 77 69 83 89
Other current assets and liabilities 9 2 6 11 7 18 10 7 2 10
Net working capital 56 66 59 66 73 73 77 95 96 88
Financial Structure
NFP/Equity -0,1 0,0 0,1 0,2 -0,1 0,1 0,3 0,5 0,7 0,6
NFP/EBITA -0,6 -0,1 0,2 0,5 -0,4 0,2 1,4 2,8 3,3 3,4
NFP/EBITDA -0,5 -0,1 0,2 0,4 -0,3 0,2 1,1 2,0 2,6 2,7
Coverage
EBIT/interest 6,9 5,1 5,1 5,5 5,1 5,7 2,6 1,7 2,0 1,7
EBITA/interest 7,3 5,4 5,5 5,9 5,5 6,3 3,0 2,0 2,3 2,0
EBITDA/interest 8,5 6,2 6,3 6,6 6,0 7,0 3,7 2,7 2,8 2,6
Cash available for investors/NFP -1,4 -6,2 4,0 2,3 -1,9 4,9 1,2 0,6 0,1 0,0
FCF from operation/NFP -1,22 -4,73 3,40 -0,95 -5,90 4,50 1,15 0,43 0,05 0,00
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CHAPTER 4 - Valuation of Bialetti Group 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The final chapter of the thesis is dedicated to the valuation of Bialetti Group which represents 
an example of firm in trouble.  
As previously mentioned, valuation of a firm in crisis requires particular accuracy and the use 
of specific adjustments in order to capture the distress effects on firm's value. 
Considering Bialetti Group's crisis analyzed in chapter 3 and the main interventions specified 
in the restructuring plan 2014-2017, the following paragraphs will present some of the possi-
ble scenarios the Group can face in the next future. We considered as reference scenario (or 
base scenario) that is based on management expectations included in the strategic plan. De-
spite the base scenario, a best and a worst scenarios have been considered to include in the 
free cash flows projections the uncertainty about the crisis evolution. Assumptions for each 
scenario about economic and financial projections in the period 2016-2020 are described in 
paragraph 4.2. 
Paragraph 4.3 focuses on the valuation of the Group by applying the Adjusted Present Value 
(APV) method in the explicit forecasting period and the traditional Discounted Cash Flow 
(DCF) formulation for continuing value. APV methodology allows to better reflect capital 
structure dynamics of a firms in trouble. The discount rate used in the model is the unlevered 
cost of capital (KU), determined using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) technique. 
This choice permits to avoid the difficulty of estimating a dynamic WACC that change every 
year according to the debt to equity ratio, determined at market values. In the continuing value 
calculation a fixed and target capital structure is assumed, so in this case a fixed WACC can 
be applied. However, even this choice is not exempt of complications which will be analyzed 
and partially solved in the following. 
To improve our valuation estimates, beside the DCF valuation, Option Pricing Valuation 
(OPV) will be applied. From the applied model it is possible to obtain the probability of de-
fault for the firm being valued that is a fundamental input of DCF model adjusted for proba-
bility of default that will be discussed in paragraph 4.5. This model can be used to improve 
overall valuation accuracy as it permits to limit the use of new paradigms and personal judg-
ments. 
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 In paragraph 4.6, it will be presented the Monte Carlo technique applied to the DCF model.  
This is a useful model to control the uncertainty underlying critical value drivers such as sales 
growth rate and raw materials costs. Moreover, this method allows to determine the entire 
probability distribution of the firm's enterprise value. 
Finally, we conclude the thesis with a series of considerations about the results obtained and 
the main criticisms underlying the valuation process applied. 
  
 
4.2. Valuation parameters 
In the previous chapter we saw that Bialetti's strategy for the next years will be based on the 
development of coffee business and the network of single-branded shops. These value drivers, 
together with significant structural cost reduction from restructuring, should allow the Group 
to obtain a performance improvement and the achievement of financial and economic stabil-
ity. However the firm's evolution is influenced by several risks and uncertainties that could 
compromise the recovery and business continuity. Even in presence of uncertainties (with par-
ticular reference to the capital increase and the results of restructuring interventions), we ex-
pect that the Group will continue to operate in the future. For this reason we adopted in our 
valuation framework the going concern prerequisite. 
In order to take into account the risks associated with the crisis situation and the relevant un-
certainties about the future, the valuation is carried out through a scenarios analysis  
The creation of a reference scenario (base case) is based on the management indications in-
cluded in Bialetti's certificate plan. Then, by modifying assumptions on main operating varia-
bles and considering some uncertainty profiles and conditions the firm could face in the fu-
ture, a best and a worst scenarios were identified. 
Enterprise value, debt value and equity value of the firm were identified for each scenario. Fi-
nally, by assigning a specific probability to each scenario we determined the firm's expected 
value. 
31st December 2015 is the date at which our valuation makes reference. Since complete fi-
nancial statements data for year 2016 are not available, this year has been considered as ex-
pected, even though we made our assumptions considering intermediate results presented by 
the company on 30th June 2016.  
The time interval considered for the explicit forecasting period is five years. We expect in 
2020 the firm will restore normal going concern conditions and reach a steady state. 
Assumptions about main variables on which the valuation is based have been particularly 
complex given the impossibility to obtained detailed data from industrial plan, for which only 
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guidelines were published. Moreover, given the crisis situation, the company is not adequately 
covered by financial analysts. From our researches, the unique recent financial report was 
published by Twice Research on 3rd May 2016.  
Finally, the restructuring process is based on a business model change concerning distribution 
strategy and markets. This makes it difficult to use historical performance for future projec-
tions. Our effort concerns to translate in quantitative amounts the qualitative guidelines indi-
cated by the management, taking into consideration the adjustments of traditional valuation 
techniques illustrated in chapter 2. 
 
 
4.3. Scenarios analysis 
Base scenario makes reference to going concern perspective draft in the certificate plan 2014-
2017. Reorganization strategy is based on coffee business development and the retail channels 
extension thanks to the communication investments aimed to strengthen Bialetti brand. This 
strategy will be supported by a careful cost reduction policy. Furthermore, financial strength-
ening will be pursued by a capital increase and standstill agreement signed with creditor 
banks until 2017. 
Sales growth rate underlying base case is negative in the first year of projections and then it 
starts to increase until reaching 5.3% in 2020. Negative sales growth rate in 2016 is due to the 
sale agreement reached by Bialetti for the sale of Girmi brand and patent at the end of 2016. 
Management communicated that Girmi brand was sold for an amount of € 4.5 million in April 
2016.  Moreover, we assumed that coffee business will grow at an higher rate than cookware 
business given the company's new business model. In our sales projections the coffee world 
sales pass from 51.5% in 2016 to 53.5% in 2020.   
The following table illustrates the assumptions on sales growth rates in the base scenario. 
 
Table 4.1. - Sales growth rates assumptions underlying base case 
 
2015 A 2016 E 2017E 2018 E 2019 E 2020 E
Cookware 6,8% 1,0% 2,0% 2,0% 3,0% 3,0%
Grimi PED 58,4% - - - - -
Total House World 12,8% -9,9% -4,1% 2,0% 3,0% 3,0%
Moka & Coffeemakers 7,9% 4,0% 5,0% 6,0% 7,0% 8,0%
Espresso -10,8% -5,0% 0,0% 2,0% 4,0% 5,0%
Total Coffe World 1,4% 1,3% 3,6% 4,9% 6,2% 7,2%
Total revenues 6,9% -4,4% -0,1% 3,6% 4,8% 5,3%
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EBITDA margin is expected to improve overtime as the firm will benefit from reorganization 
and restructuring interventions and sales increase more than operating costs. Based on our as-
sumptions, EBITDA margin will decrease from 11.7 per cent to 9.3 per cent between 2015 
and 2016. This is mainly due to the revenues slowdown expected in 2016 and the marketing 
expenses incurred to promote Bialetti brand in the coffee market. From 2017 EBITDA margin 
is expected to improve until reaching 11.8 per cent in 2020. 
Depreciation and amortization is expected to vary proportionally with total operating fixed 
capital. We assumed that the amortization rate on total operating fixed capital is 13 per cent 
for every year of projections (in line with company's history). 
Operating taxes amount to approximately 29.5 per cent of EBITA.  
Amortization of goodwill and similar intangibles are assumed constant as in 2015 because 
there is no intention for Bialetti of new acquisitions. 
Forecast Balance Sheet was built up considering that net working capital will increase over-
time during projection period according to sales evolution. However, we assumed that net 
working capital policies undertaken by management with the aim to increase inventory rota-
tion and reduce trade receivables days. Resources optimization and planning allowed the 
company to reduce trade working capital incidence on sales from 36.1 per cent in 2016 to 
34.4 per cent in 2020. 
The increase of total operating fixed capital is mainly due to investments necessary for the re-
alization of new single-brand stores.  
Best scenario, or best case, is based on more optimistic assumptions on sales growth rates. In 
particular we assumed that, after revenues slowdown in 2016, due to the sale of Girmi brand, 
sales will start to recover faster than in the base case.  
EBITDA is assumed to increase from € 16.5 million in 2016 until € 23.4 million in the last 
year of projections thanks to the success of new business model. Finally, working capital pol-
icies permit to reduce TWC/sales ratio from 35.8 per cent in 2016 to 33.6 per cent in 2020. 
In worst scenario the recovery of sales is much more flatter. EBITDA is expected to improve 
from € 15.3 million in 2016 to €17.8 million in 2020. A negative path is also visible from the 
evolution of the trade working capital incidence on sales which increase from 36.3 per cent in 
2016 to 40.2 per cent in 2020. 
Table 4.2  illustrates the economic and financial assumptions used for the analysis of the three 
scenarios. 
Finally, for continuing value (CV) calculation we assumed a 1.0 per cent perpetual growth 
rate (g) in base scenario, equal to expected inflation rate in Euro zone. Growth rate used in 
best scenario is 1.5 per cent while in worst scenario no growth was assumed.  
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Forecast Income Statement, Balance Sheet and Cash Flow Statement for each of the consid-
ered scenarios are reported in appendix 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. 
 
Table 4.2. - Main assumptions underlying the three scenarios 
 
 
 
4.4. Bialetti Group valuation: APV technique in mixed version 
In this paragraph Bialetti's value will be determined by using the Adjusted Present Value 
method in mixed version. In this case, APV technique is used for the estimation of firm's 
economic value during the explicit forecasting period. While, traditional DCF/WACC ap-
proach is used for the estimation of continuing value. This methodology was considered the 
most coherent for Bialetti case because it reflects the dynamic characteristics of capital struc-
ture typical in the firms in crisis. 
As mentioned above, the problem of using DCF approach with WACC as discount rate con-
cerns the estimation of the market ratio between debt and equity. In, fact, the conventional 
practice to assume a target capital structure for the entire forecasting period is not applicable 
because of the high volatility of projected debt/equity ratio.  
Furthermore, circularity of the model is another important issue of traditional DCF/WACC 
approach. In fact, equity value is an important input of WACC calculation which affect at 
the same time the enterprise value of the firm and thus indirectly its equity value.  
2015A 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E
Base scenario
Sales growth 6,9% -4,4% -0,1% 3,6% 4,8% 5,3%
EBITDA margin 11,7% 9,3% 10,7% 11,5% 11,6% 11,8%
NWC/sales 32,1% 33,0% 32,5% 32,3% 31,9% 31,8%
CAPEX/sales 4,8% 6,0% 6,0% 5,5% 5,5% 5,0%
Best scenario
Sales growth 6,9% -4,1% 0,3% 4,3% 6,2% 7,9%
EBITDA margin 11,7% 10,0% 11,5% 11,8% 12,2% 12,5%
NWC/sales 32,1% 32,8% 32,2% 31,8% 31,4% 31,1%
CAPEX/sales 4,8% 6,0% 6,0% 5,5% 5,5% 5,0%
Worst scenario
Sales growth 6,9% -4,5% -0,5% 1,4% 0,7% 0,5%
EBITDA margin 11,7% 9,1% 9,7% 10,3% 10,3% 10,4%
NWC/sales 32,1% 33,4% 34,2% 35,0% 36,2% 37,3%
CAPEX/sales 4,8% 6,0% 6,0% 5,5% 5,5% 5,0%
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Estimation of the market value of debt is another important issue the analyst should not un-
derestimate in the valuation of firms in trouble. For healthy firms nominal and market value 
of debt tend to coincide because there is an high probability the firm will be able to fulfill its 
debt payments and pay back money to debt holders. However, for firms in crisis there is a 
significant probability the firm will result insolvent at debt maturity or part of debt could be 
converted in equity during restructuring process. For this reason, market value of debt can be 
significantly lower than its face value making complex WACC determination. 
In addition, Bialetti's debt is manly represented by financing provided by banks in different 
forms and the value of this instruments cannot be observed directly in the market.  
To solve all these problems simultaneously we decided to discount expected free cash flows 
at a rate different than WACC. Discount rate applied in APV technique is the unlevered cost 
of capital which can be estimated from market information of comparable firms. 
In a scenarios analysis, expected free cash flows are estimated for each scenario. This allows 
to incorporate in the fim's value the uncertainty concerning different sales growth rates, 
EBITDA margin and all the other variables discussed in the previous paragraph. 
Free cash flows associated to each scenario are reported in the following tables. 
 
Table 4.3. Free cash flows calculation (base case) 
 
 
Table 4.4. Free cash flows calculation (best case) 
 
 
Table 4.5. - Free cash flows calculation (worst case) 
 
 
€/000 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
NOPLAT 8.281 9.370 10.260 10.580 11.309
Change in IC excl. goodwill and s.i.  (5.347)  (4.533)  (5.893)  (6.040)  (6.000)
Change in goodwill and similar int. 0 0 0 0 0
Free cash flow 2.934 4.837 4.367 4.540 5.309
€/000 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
NOPLAT 9.136 10.328 10.804 11.730 12.056
Change in IC excl. goodwill and s.i.  (5.143)  (4.829)  (5.958)  (7.144)  (7.547)
Change in goodwill and similar int. 0 0 0 0 0
Free cash flow 3.993 5.498 4.846 4.586 4.509
€/000 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
NOPLAT 8.299 8.312 8.679 8.373 8.256
Change in IC excl. goodwill and s.i.  (7.291)  (6.711)  (6.441)  (6.026)  (4.631)
Change in goodwill and similar int. 0 0 0 0 0
Free cash flow 1.008 1.601 2.238 2.347 3.625
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As we can observe, free cash flow of year 2020 is lower under the best case than in base 
case. This is due to the fact we assumed in 5 per cent capex on total sales in all the three sce-
narios. Since expected sales in the best scenario are higher than those expected under the 
base scenario, capital expenses will reduce cash flows. However, these capital expenses are 
related with the opening of new stores that justify an higher continuing value in the best sce-
nario. 
 
 
4.4.1. Unlevered cost of capital calculation 
APV method consists to determine the levered value of the firm as the sum between its un-
levered value (the firm's value in absence of debt) and the fiscal benefit of debt. 
The unlevered value of the firm is determined by discounting free cash flows at the un-
levered cost of capital (KU). 
To obtain KU, CAPM formula can be employed: 
𝐾𝑈 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝐶𝑅𝑃 + 𝛽𝑈 ∗ 𝑀𝑅𝑃 
 
where 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 𝐶𝑅𝑃 is the country risk premium, 𝛽𝑈 is the firm's unlevered be-
ta and 𝑀𝑅𝑃 is the market risk premium. 
In this study, risk-free rate was assumed equal to 1.51%, which corresponds to the return of 
Interest Rate Swap (IRS) with 10 years maturity in Euro area. We added to risk-free rate a 
country risk premium estimated by using Credit Default Swap (CDS) for each country in 
which the Group operates weighted for the percentage of sales realized by Bialetti Group in 
2015. 
Table 4.6 illustrates the CRP calculation applied to Bialetti case. 
 
Table 4.6. - Country risk premium calculation 
 
 
Market risk premium (MRP) was assumed equal to 6 per cent, in line with historical evolution 
and expected estimates of this rate (Damodaran, 2005) 
Country CRP % of sales
CRP 
weighted
Italy 1,90% 70,94% 1,35%
Europe 2,15% 23,44% 0,50%
North America 1,60% 2,20% 0,04%
Other countries 2,41% 3,42% 0,08%
Total 100,0% 1,97%
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Before proceeding with unlevered beta determination, it is necessary to introduce the con-
cept of beta debt. In fact, to determine Bialetti's unlevered beta it is first necessary to deter-
mine beta debt (𝛽𝐷). 
𝛽𝐷 is a parameter that often it is not considered in practice of cost of capital calculation. It 
expresses the risk related to the firm's debt and it is assumed in most cases equal to zero. In 
case of healthy firms this assumption is realistic and ignoring the beta debt do not signifi-
cantly affect the estimation results. However, for highly leveraged firms, as firms in trouble, 
𝛽𝐷 cannot be ignored because the risk of default is incorporated in the cost of debt. 
Determining this component is not easy because many firms, like Bialetti, do not have bonds 
listed in financial market from which it is possible to estimate debt historical systematic risk. 
For this reason, in Bialetti case, 𝛽𝐷 was determined considering firm's rating class illustrated 
in Appendix 3.8.  
The following table illustrates reasonable beta debt associated to each rating class. 
 
Table 4.7. - Rating class and 𝛽𝐷 (Pratt et al., 2010) 
 
 
To determine Bialetti's unlevered beta a bottom-up approach was applied. This consists to 
averaging unlevered beta obtained from a sample of comparable companies.  
The firms included in the reference sample are: 
 De Longhi S.p.A. 
 SEB 
 Leifheit AG  
 Arcelik AS  
 Midea Group Co Ltd 
 Newell Brands Inc. 
 Helen of Troy Ltd. 
 Mastrad SA 
Rating class Beta Debt
AAA 0,05
AA 0,07
A 0,10
BBB 0,14
BB 0,28
B 0,40
CCC 0,60
CC 0,80
C 1,00
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 Gruppo Beghelli 
 Cembre SpA 
 Biesse SpA 
 Sabaf SpA 
 Elica S.p.A 
All these firms operate in the cookware and coffee business and represent the best compara-
bles of Bialetti.  
Average or median unlevered beta computed from the sample permits to determine systemat-
ic risk of the business irrespective of capital structure.  
Unlevered beta determined for each comparable company was computed by using the fol-
lowing formula: 
𝛽𝑈 =
𝛽𝐿 + 𝛽𝐷 ∗
𝐷
𝐸
1 +
𝐷
𝐸
 
 
where 𝛽𝐿 is the levered beta of each firm in the sample, 𝛽𝐷 is beta debt calculated using the 
above mentioned approach and 
𝐷
𝐸
 is the market debt to equity ratio. 
Calculations were made by considering 5 years average D/E ratio in order to avoid including 
temporary fluctuations. Levered beta was obtained from Reuters.com, a service provider 
which determines firm's beta as regression of historical returns of the firm's stock against 
S&P 500 idex, used as proxy of the market. 
Appendix 4.4 illustrates the calculations of unlevered beta for each firm in the sample. Bi-
aletti's bottom-up unlevered beta is 0.79. By applying all the above mentioned data, KU can 
be determined as follow:  
𝐾𝑈 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝐶𝑅𝑃 + 𝛽𝑈 ∗ 𝑀𝑅𝑃 = 8.25% 
 
 
4.4.2. Explicit forecasting period valuation 
The estimation of Bialetti's unlevered cost capital permits to determine firm's during explicit 
forecasting period. By taking previously estimated free cash flows for the three scenarios and 
discounting them by unlevered cost of capital we can determine the firm's business enter-
prise value (BEV) for the period 2016-2020. 
Tax shield valuation requires to discount fiscal benefits of debt at a rate equal to the un-
levered cost of capital if we assume that fiscal benefits have the same risk of business opera-
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tions. The following tables illustrate Bialetti's valuation in the three scenarios during explicit 
forecasting period. 
 
Table 4.8. - APV valuation 2016-2020 (base case) 
 
 
Table 4.9. - APV valuation 2016-2020 (best case) 
 
 
Table 4.10. - APV valuation 2016-2020 (worst case) 
 
 
 
€/000 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Free cash flow 2.934 4.837 4.367 4.540 5.309
Ku 8,25% 8,25% 8,25% 8,25% 8,25%
Discount Factor 0,92 0,85 0,79 0,73 0,67
Present value of FCF 2.710 4.128 3.443 3.307 3.572
Unlevered value 17.160
Interest expense 4.633 4.559 4.437 4.319 4.256
Tax shield (t=27,5%) 1.274 1.254 1.220 1.188 1.170
PV(Tax shield) 1.177 1.070 962 865 787
Present value of TS 4.861
BEV 2016-2020 22.021
€/000 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Free cash flow 3.993 5.498 4.846 4.586 4.509
Ku 8,25% 8,25% 8,25% 8,25% 8,25%
Discount Factor 0,92 0,85 0,79 0,73 0,67
Present value of FCF 3.689 4.692 3.820 3.340 3.034
Unlevered value 18.575
Interest expense 4.603 4.478 4.321 4.182 4.115
Tax shield (t=27,5%) 1.266 1.231 1.188 1.150 1.132
PV(Tax shield) 1.169 1.051 937 838 761
Present value of TS 4.756
BEV 2016-2020 23.331
€/000 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Free cash flow 1.008 1.601 2.238 2.347 3.625
Ku 8,25% 8,25% 8,25% 8,25% 8,25%
Discount Factor 0,92 0,85 0,79 0,73 0,67
Present value of FCF 931 1.366 1.765 1.709 2.439
Unlevered value 8.210
Interest expense 4.687 4.760 4.799 4.819 4.827
Tax shield (t=27,5%) 1.289 1.309 1.320 1.325 1.327
PV(Tax shield) 1.191 1.117 1.040 965 893
Present value of TS 5.207
BEV 2016-2020 13.417
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4.4.3. WACC calculation 
Continuing value calculation requires the application of DCF model in its traditional version. 
In this case we assume the firm will reach a steady state and WACC remains stable because 
the firm aims to reach a target capital structure after the forecasting period. 
Under these assumptions, continuing value can be determined as follow: 
𝐶𝑉 =
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑉
(𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔)
 
 
where 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑉 is the normalized free cash flow the first year after the explicit forecasting pe-
riod, 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 is the firm's weighted average cost of capital and 𝑔 is the free cash flows 
growth rate. 
The normalized free cash flow in the year 2021 is calculated as follow: 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑉 = 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇2020 ∗ (1 + 𝑔) + {[𝐼𝐶2020 ∗ (1 + 𝑔)] − (𝐼𝐶2020)} 
 
Weighted average cost of capital is: 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝐾𝐸 ∗
𝐸
𝐷 + 𝐸
+ 𝐾𝐷(1 − 𝑡) ∗
𝐷
𝐷 + 𝐸
 
 
Since the company is expected to return to financial health after explicit forecasting period, 
we assumed that current relatively high debt to equity ratio will improve and converge with 
the industry average of 26.7 per cent (Appendix 4.4.). As a consequence: 
𝐸
𝐷+𝐸
= 78.92% and 
𝐷
𝐷+𝐸
= 21.08%. 
In presence of risky debt, i.e. when 𝛽𝐷 is different than 0 (as in Bialetti case), debt holders do 
not accept to earn risk-free rate but they requires a premium to remunerate the risk that the 
firm will be unable to fulfill its debt payments. For this reason cost of debt can be deter-
mined as:  
𝐾𝐷 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 
 
where default spread is the spread which compensate investors from the company's risk of 
default. Default Spread on debt is often determined according to the rating class of the firm 
and the following table can be used to compute 𝐾𝐷 after a rating analysis. 
Since Bialetti is expected to converge to the average capital structure in the industry, we can 
reasonably assume that it will also reach the average rating class in the industry which is 
BBB. According to the table 4.11, a BBB rating class corresponds to a default spread of 
2.50%. This means that Bialetti's cost of debt is: 
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𝐾𝐷 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 4,01% 
 
Table 4.11. - Rating class and default spread (Pratt et al., 2010) 
 
 
The last input we need for WACC calculation is the firm's cost of equity (𝐾𝐸). Starting from 
unlevered beta, we can determine cost of equity as follow: 
𝛽𝐿 = 𝛽𝑈 +
𝐷
𝐸
(𝛽𝑈 − 𝛽𝐷) = 0,97 
𝐾𝐸 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝐶𝑅𝑃 + 𝛽𝐿 ∗ 𝑀𝑅𝑃 = 9.30% 
 
Finally, table 4.12 summarizes all calculations made to estimate WACC in the continuing 
value formula. 
 
Table 4.12. - WACC calculations 
 
 
Rating class Default spread
AAA 0,40%
AA 0,70%
A 1,00%
BBB 2,50%
BB 4,50%
B 6,50%
CCC 8,75%
CC 9,50%
C 10,50%
Risk free rate 1,5%
Country risk premium 2,0%
Equity risk premium (ERP) 6,0%
Unlevered beta 0,79       
Beta debt 0,14       
Debt/Equity (D/E) 27,0%
Beta equity 0,97       
Unlevered cost of capital 8,3%
Cost of equity 9,3%
Debt spread 2,5%
Cost of debt 4,0%
Debt tax rate 27,5%
KD (1 - t) 2,9%
E/EV 78,9%
D/EV 21,1%
WACC 8,0%
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4.4.4 Business enterprise value calculation 
Given free cash flow in the first year follwing explicit forecasting period, the growth rate g 
and WACC we can estimate the continuing value through the following formula: 
𝐶𝑉 =
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑉
(𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔)
 
 
The following table reports the continuing value for each considered scenario. 
 
Table 4.13 - Continuing value calculation 
 
 
The total business enterprise value (BEV) of Bialetti Group is given by the sum of the busi-
ness enterprise value computed during explicit forecasting period and continuing value cal-
culated through DCF formula.  
The following table summarizes the business enterprise value associated to each scenario 
and the relating probability. 
 
Table 4.14. - BEV summary 
 
 
 
4.4.5. From business enterprise value to equity value 
Once estimated BEV, some steps are needed before determining firm's equity value. Equity 
value is the value of the firm available to shareholders. It can be obtained by using the fol-
lowing formula. 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝐵𝐸𝑉 + 𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
€/000 Base case Best case Worst case
NOPLAT 11.422 12.237 8.256
Change in IC  (1.108)  (1.704) 0
Free cash flow 10.314 10.533 8.256
g 1,00% 1,50% 0,00%
Continuing value 148.401 163.295 107.470
€/000 BEV Probability Weighted BEV
Base case 121.869 50% 60.934
Best case 133.199 25% 33.300
Worst case 85.725 25% 21.431
Expected BEV 100% 115.666
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Moving from enterprise value to equity value is not straightforward because estimation of 
market value of debt is quite critical for firms in trouble. From the inputs needed to go from 
BEV to equity value, the determination of the value of debt is the most critical.  
As specified by Buttignon (2014), face value of the distressed firms' NFP cannot be used as a 
proxy of economic value of debt because there is a substantial risk of default. Various proce-
dures can be applied to value the firm's risky debt. The most widely used approaches are:  
1. DCF model, which estimates economic value of debt by discounting cash flows to 
debt (FCD) expected by the plan at a market cost of debt (obtained considering FCD 
timing and risk).  
2. A model based on Black, Scholes and Merton (BSM) theory which considers risky 
debt as a composition of risk-free debt and a put option granted to shareholders by 
creditors to yield assets upon maturity to the debt’s nominal value. 
The two approaches can be used in a complementary manner to check consistency of appli-
cation.  
The starting point of DCF method is the determination of free cash flows to debt (FCD), as 
provided in the plan. For simplicity, in Bialetti case, the entire debt was considered into a 
single category. Debt value is then computed by discounting FCD at a market rate of return. 
The following table shows the main steps for calculating the economic value of the debt of 
Bialetti by applying the DCF approach 
 
Table 4.15. - Debt value (DCF model) 
 
 
€/000 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
EBIT 14.291         9.215       10.773       12.049       12.511       14.667       
Int. Expense (revised at the market cost of debt) 8.731       8.116         8.075         8.030         6.162         
EBIT/Int. Expense 1,06         1,33           1,49           1,56           2,38           
Rating class CC CCC CCC CCC B
Credit or default spread 9,5% 8,8% 8,8% 8,8% 6,5%
Risk-free rate 0,5% 0,7% 0,9% 1,1% 1,3%
Market cost of debt 10,0% 9,5% 9,7% 9,9% 7,8%
Reorganized debt (nominal value) 87.537         87.076 84.690 82.670 80.384 77.616
Interest expense from plan 6.934           4.633 4.559 4.437 4.319 4.256
Debt variation from plan 460 2.387 2.020 2.286 2.768
Free cash flow to debt (FCD) from plan 5.093 6.945 6.457 6.604 7.024
Discount factor 0,91 0,83 0,76 0,69 0,69
Present value of annual FCD 4.630       5.798         4.898         4.536         4.825         
Present value of FCD (total) 24.687         
Debt value at the end of projection period 53.316         77.616       
Market value of debt 78.003         
Nominal value 87.537         
Shareholder's value of reorganization plan 9.534           
Discount on nominal value of debt 10,9%
~ 121 ~ 
 
The FCD have to be discounted at the debt's fair market cost (rate of return), which may not 
correspond to the cost agreed with creditors and included in the restructuring plan. Indeed, it 
is typical in distressed firms to negotiate with creditors favorable conditions to restore the 
normal going concern condition. However this gives rise the problem to quantify the market 
cost of debt. 
The proposal of Buttignon (2014), is to proceed with an iterative calculation (using a spread-
sheet) along the following lines: 
1. Start from the operating income (EBIT) forecast in the restructuring plan. 
2. Estimate the financial expenses using market cost of debt. 
3. Calculate the debt coverage ratio EBIT/Interest expenses. 
4. Forecast the debt rating class, based on the previously calculated coverage ratio, and 
the corresponding credit default spread (see Appendix 4.5). 
5. Estimate the market cost of debt as the sum of risk-free rate plus the credit default 
spread. 
6. Compute financial expenses, multiplying the debt being restructured by the market 
cost of debt. 
Given the estimate of the market cost of debt, we can calculate the value of debt, discontinu-
ing at this rate the FCD forecasted in the plan. 
Debt value at the end of forecasting period is assumed to be equal to nominal value. This 
holds if the company recovers its normal operating conditions at the end of the reorganiza-
tion plan, including the capacity to remunerate creditors at a fair market return.  
The difference between debt value, estimated using DCF, and the corresponding face value 
at the valuation date is the sacrifice asked of creditors to facilitate business continuity and, at 
the same time, the shareholder value of the debt from restructuring plan.  
DCF model for estimating the value of the risky debt is easier to apply, anchored to the cash 
flows expected from the plan (FCD), but estimating the market cost of debt can be particu-
larly difficult. Alternatively, or complementarily, we can apply a model based on the options 
pricing theory. 
In the BSM model, debt is conceived as a combination of risk-free debt (remunerated at the 
risk-free rate) and a put option granted to shareholders by creditors to divest assets (EV) at 
the nominal value of debt. This put option exploits the situation in which, at the debt’s ma-
turity, if EV is lower than face value of debt (D), shareholders can leave the company to 
creditors, who will suffer a loss equal to EV minus D.  
In distressed companies, the conditions granted to shareholders by creditors, as part of a re-
structuring plan, can give rise to a put option value (which is negative for creditors but posi-
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tive for shareholders). This is due to the fact that in a distress situation, creditors find them-
selves ex post in a different position from that anticipated ex ante when the credit was grant-
ed and they are willing to sacrifice their value if they estimate the value of debt deriving 
from the firm as a going-concern as higher than for other feasible alternatives (liquidation 
under bankruptcy included).  
Application of BSM model to Bialetti case is shown in the following table. 
 
Table 4.16. - Debt value (BSM model) 
 
 
Table 4.17. - Risk free debt and duration* 
 
 
EV (previously estimated via DCF model) is the underlying asset of the put option. Under 
the BSM model, the debt is treated as a zero-coupon bond (that can be refunded and remu-
nerated upon maturity). Reworking is necessary to adapt it to the typical case of debt under 
periodic remuneration and reimbursement. One possible (simplified) solution is to capitalize 
debt face value at the projected cost of debt (assumed equal to 5.5 per cent in our projec-
tions). 
With these elements, assuming a measure of volatility for underlying assets, it is possible to 
apply BSM model. EV volatility is the most critical variable in BSM model, which can be 
Enterprise value (S) 128.218
Risk-free debt value* 103.872
Debt Duration (T)* 4,43
Risk-free rate 1,2%
Debt nominal value at maturity (K) 114.407
EV volatility 39,9%
d1 0,619
d2 -0,220
N(d1) 0,732
N(d2) 0,413
Equity value 49.113
Debt value 79.105
Put value of debt 24.767
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5
FCD 5.093 6.945 6.457 6.604 84.640
Risk-free rate 0,5% 0,7% 0,9% 1,1% 1,3%
Discount factor 1,00 0,99 0,97 0,96 0,94
Present value of FCD 5.068 6.849 6.286 6.322 79.347
Risk-free debt value 103.872
Cumulative FCD 5.068 13.698 18.858 25.287 396.734
Sum of cumulative FCD 459.646
Duration 4,43
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estimated on the basis of comparable listed companies or by running simulations with Monte 
Carlo technique or similar.  
In Bialetti case, enterprise value volatility was assumed equal to 39.9 per cent as estimated 
by Damodaran at the beginning of 2016 for household industry.  
Economic value of debt obtained with BSM model can be compared to that estimated with 
DCF model. In our example, given all the calculation assumptions, the two perspectives tend 
to converge to the same value. For this reason we assume that the market value of debt for 
Bialetti (in base scenario) is equal to € 78.6 million, which is the average value of debt ob-
tained with DCF and BSM models. It is clear that, in the other cases, the two values may not 
coincide due to the numerous assumptions underlying the application of two methods (par-
ticularly the rating and market cost of debt in DCF, as well as EV volatility in BSM model). 
The comparison between the two perspectives is useful to enrich the valuation framework 
and arrive at a summary opinion. 
Once estimated the BEV and D, it is possible to quantify net capital value (E). For simplici-
ty, we assume that the value of non-operating assets is given by their face value at the valua-
tion date. The sum between BEV and non-operating assets is the firm's enterprise value 
(EV). 
In absence of minority interests, equity value is simply the difference between EV and D. If 
there are minority shareholders in the firm's subsidiaries, the value of minorities will be de-
ducted from the calculation of equity.  
At this point, it is possible to resume the scenario analysis. EV, D and E in all the alternative 
scenarios are shown in the following table. 
 
Table 4.18. - Scenarios analysis summary 
 
 
Operating assumptions for each scenario were introduced previously (Table 4.2) and the val-
uation model, not reproduced here, is the same followed for the base case. By assigning  a 
probability of occurrence to each scenario we can determine the expected value of equity for 
Bialetti Industrie S.p.A. 
€/000 Base case (50%) Best case (25%) Worst case (25%)
Business Enterprise Value 121.869 133.199 85.725
Non-operating assets 6.349 6.349 6.349
Total Enterprise Value 128.218 139.548 92.074
Debt Value 78.554 81.567 67.866
Minorities  (44)  (44)  (44)
Equity Value 49.708 58.025 24.252
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Table 4.19. - Expected values from scenarios analysis 
 
 
In our case the expected value of equity appears in line with the average market capitaliza-
tion of Bialetti in the last year. This is a demonstration that scenario analysis is a good tool 
for assessing the uncertainty underlying future operations of a firm in trouble.  
 
 
4.5. Bialetti Group Valuation: Option Pricing valuation approach 
Another feasible option to value declining and distressed firms in addition to APV/DCF val-
uation is the Option Pricing Valuation (OPV). OPV allows to estimate the potential of Bi-
aletti Group from the success of  restructuring process and the recovery of general economic 
conditions. This methodology permits to assign a value to uncertainty and future opportuni-
ties, so the equity value can be positive even though enterprise value is lower than face value 
of debt. Moreover, OPV method permits to calculate the probability of default of the Group 
which will be used in the following paragraph to apply the DCF method adjusted for the 
probability of default. 
Inputs required for the implementation of OPV method are: 
1. Enterprise value of the firm (S). S is assumed to be equal to the sum of Bialetti's 
market capitalization, market value of debt and the minorities. The average market 
capitalization of Bialetti in the last six months of 2015 was about € 42,8 million 
while the value of minorities at the end of 2015 was € -44 thousands. By using these 
two inputs, we implement a recursive model in a spreadsheet which will compute 
both market value of debt and enterprise value of Bialetti. In this case, EV is not an 
input of the model but a variable that is derived from the same model. 
2. Enterprise value volatility (𝜎𝐴). As already illustrated in the previous paragraph, en-
terprise value volatility can be considered equal to 39.9% as estimated by Damodaran 
for the industry of household products. However, since this variable affects signifi-
cantly valuation results, we made a sensitivity analysis to appreciate values variations 
depending on the EV volatility. 
Business Enterprise Value 115.666
Non-operating assets 6.349
Total Enterprise Value 122.015
Debt Value 76.635
Minorities  (44)
Equity Value 45.423
Number of shares outstanding 108.060
Value per share 0,42
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3. Time horizon (T). T is equal to the duration of the firm's zero coupon debt, which was 
estimated in table 4.17 equal to 4,4 years. 
4. Risk-free rate (𝑟𝑓). Risk-free rate was fixed in a prudential logic equal to 1,21 per 
cent, which is the return of Euro Interest Rate Swap 5 years. In this case we did not 
include Country Risk Premium  because it is implicitly adsorbed by EV volatility. 
5. Strike price (K). Strike price of the option was assumed equal to face value of debt (€ 
87,5 million) capitalized at the projected cost of debt (equal to 5.5 per cent). In this 
way, interest expenses are assumed to be paid at maturity and Bialetti's debt is con-
sidered a zero coupon debt as required by OPV approach. So, the strike price (K) is 
assumed equal to € 118.0 million. 
By applying the BSM formula we can determine Bialetti's EV by imposing that equity value 
(the call option) must be equal to the sum of the firm's market capitalization of Bialetti on 
31st Decemeber 2015 and the value of minorities. At the same time, by subtracting equity 
value and minorities to enterprise value, we can also obtain market value of debt. 
Analytically we have: 
𝐸𝑉 = 𝐷 + 𝐸 + 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
where: 
𝐸 + 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 = 𝐸𝑉 ∗ 𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐾 ∗ 𝑒(−𝑟𝑓∗𝑇) ∗ 𝑁(𝑑2) = 42.8 − 0.04 = € 42.8 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑑1 =
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑆
𝐷) + (𝑟𝑓 + (
𝜎2
2 )) ∗ 𝑇
𝜎 ∗ √𝑇
 
𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎 ∗ √𝑇 
 
To find the solution of this model a spreadsheet is necessary because of the iterative calcula-
tions. By using solver tool we can indirectly find the solution of BSM model. Market value 
of debt resulting from the Option Pricing approach is € 78.6 million. This means that market 
discounts crisis situation and restructuring efforts implemented by Bialetti by applying a dis-
count rate of 10.3% on the Net financial Position resulting at the end of 2015. This is the sac-
rifice asked of creditors to facilitate business continuity and, at the same time, it is the share-
holder value of the debt restructuring plan. 
Enterprise value of the Group amounts to € 121.3 million. Debt to equity ratio obtained us-
ing market values is 1.84, while E/EV is 35.3 per cent and D/EV is 64.7 per cent. 
N(d1) is equal to 0.70 while N(d2) is equal to 0.37. Having these information we can directly 
obtained the risk-free probability of default for Bialetti Group which is: 
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𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 = 1 − 𝑁(𝑑2) = 62.63% 
 
So, this means the market estimates that the value of Bialetti's assets will be lower than face 
value of debt with a probability of 62.67% in the next 5 years. 
The following table shows EV and D computed through OPV method obtained by changing 
asset volatility and assuming that the equity value remains constant at € 42.8 million. 
 
Table 4.20. - Sensitivity analysis on OPV 
 
 
 
4.6. Bialetti Group Valuation: DCF model adjusted for probability of default 
OPV method allowed to estimate probability of default from market data. This is a funda-
mental information when firm’s value is estimated by using a model that explicitly considers 
the effects and consequences of bankruptcy, as the DCF method adjusted for probability of 
default. As already specified in chapter 2, this simplifies a lot the work of analyst because it 
permits to avoid making assumptions for every overcoming scenario.  
In such a case, the firm’s enterprise value is equal to the weighted average between the going 
concern value and the estimated liquidation value where weights are determined on the basis 
of probability of default. The model can be summarized as follow. 
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐺𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ∗ (1 − 𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠) + 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ∗ 𝜋𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 
 
The going concern value assumes that Bialetti's restructuring efforts will be successful and 
that the firm will return to financial health in the future. In order avoid making further as-
sumptions, we consider that going concern value is obtained from DCF model of most prob-
able scenario analysis which is € 121.9 million as illustrated in paragraph 4.3.4.  
Liquidation value (or distress sale value) is estimated on the basis of expected proceeds in an 
event of a distress sale. However, distress sale proceeds are significantly more depressed that 
those which can be obtained from an orderly sale.  
There are several ways to estimate Bialetti’s liquidation value but the earning-power-of-
assets approach is the most suitable to our case. This is mainly due to the industry in which 
Bialetti operates and the history of the firm which could be highly interesting for other stra-
tegic investors. 
Asset volatility 30.0% 35.0% 39.9% 45.0% 50.0%
EV 134.131 127.640 121.315 114.922 108.938
D 91.367 84.876 78.551 72.158 66.174
E 42.764 42.764 42.764 42.764 42.764
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The earning power of the existing assets is estimated considering the average firm’s EBIT 
over the last 3 years, which in Bialetti case is roughly $11.8 million. Assuming an industry 
tax rate of 30 per cent and a healthy industry cost of capital of 7.95% (as estimated in para-
graph 4.3.3), the distress sale proceeds can be estimated through the following formula. 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇2013−2015 × (1 − 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶
= € 103.6 million 
 
In order to derive Bialetti’s liquidation value, cash balance of € 8.6 million has to be added 
to arrive at a total liquidation value of € 112.2 million. This would represent a discount on 
book value of assets of 34%. 
The probability of default at the end of 2015, determined by applying OPV approach to mar-
ket data, is 62.63%.  
Finally, Bialetti Group valuation obtained by using DCF method adjusted for probability of 
default can be performed as follow: 
𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 121.9 ∗ (1 − 62.63%) + 112.2 ∗ 62.63% = € 115.8 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 
To obtain firm’s equity, we add to BEV the value of non-operating assets and we deduct the 
market value of debt (obtained through OPV valuation approach) and minorities. The fol-
lowing table summarizes all the calculations performed to value Bialetti Group by applying 
DCF approach adjusted for the probability of default. 
 
Table 4.21. – Bialetti Group valuation: DCF adjusted for probability of default 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Liquidation value 112.177
Book value of assets 170.043
Discount on Book value 34,03%
Going concern value 121.869
Probability of default 62,63%
Business Enterprise Value 115.799
Non-operating assets 6.349
Enterprise value 122.148
Value of debt 78.551
Minorities  (44)
Value of equity 43.641       
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4.7. Bialetti Group Valuation: Monte Carlo tecnique applied to DCF methodology 
All the methods illustrated so far attempt to introduce different adjustments in order to take 
into account the uncertainty underlying future economic perspectives of the Group. Howev-
er, no of these methods permits to adequately represent in the firm’s enterprise value the 
possible overcoming scenarios that could occur in the future.  
In fact, given the firm’s uncertainty, each of the key value drivers can assume a wide range 
of values and the choice to consider only a fixed value of an hypothetic distribution can rep-
resent a significant limitation in the valuation process. 
One solution to the problem consists to use a stochastic model repeated numerous times in 
order to reveal the uncertainty about the most critical value drivers and to estimate the prob-
ability distribution of the firm’s business enterprise value. Monte Carlo approach permits to 
achieve this purpose.  
To maintain the model relatively simple, we decided to introduce only two uncertainty vari-
ables for Bialetti: the first describes the distribution of sales growth rates and the second 
considers the percentage incidence of raw materials costs on sales. This choice is based on 
the awareness that these two variables are those that mostly affect valuation results. Clearly, 
other assumptions can be transformed in a stochastic form but their underlying uncertainty 
are not so significant. They could have the only effect to increase the level of difficulty and 
the time required for calculations. For this reason all other assumptions were maintained 
fixed as illustrated in the table 4.2. for the base case in scenarios analysis. 
After identifying the two critical variables in terms of uncertainty, the second step is to 
choose the probability distribution or the stochastic process which better fit the dynamics of 
indentified variables. For simplicity we assumed that both variables are normally distributed. 
This choice is due to the fact that normal distribution depends on two parameters that can be 
easily estimated from past data of the firm. It is sufficient to estimate mean and standard de-
viation of sales growth rates and raw materials costs to obtain the two probabilities distribu-
tions necessary for applying Monte Carlo technique. 
Looking at past data, mean and standard deviation for sales growth rates and raw materials 
costs expressed as percentage incidence on sales can be easily computed. Average sales 
growth rate of Bialetti Group, estimated for each forecasting period, is 2.9 per cent and the 
corresponding standard deviation is 5.75 per cent. The mean of the distribution was obtained 
by averaging the sales growth rates from explicit forecasting period hypnotized in the base 
case scenario. Standard deviation, instead, was determined by considering sales growth rates 
volatility in the past five years. 
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Figure 4.1. – Sales growth rate distribution for each forecasting period 
 
 
The average historical incidence of raw material costs on sales is 42.3 per cent. Similarly, 
standard deviation of the distribution was fixed at 3.6 per cent from historical financial 
statements data.  
 
Figure 4.2. – Distribution of raw materials costs expressed as incidence of sales 
 
 
At this point, through a spreadsheet, a random value is extracted from normal distribution for 
both relevant variables. To compute firm’s BEV, we applied the APV technique in mixed 
version as illustrated in paragraph 4.3.2. Continuing value was determined using the tradi-
tional DCF/WACC approach with a perpetual growth rate of 1 per cent and WACC deter-
mined by assuming that the current debt to equity ratio will improve and converge with the 
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industry average of 27 per cent. In this way, the Business Enterprise value for a single simu-
lation is obtained. 
We repeated this simulation for 1.000 times using data a spreadsheet. In general, the more 
complex distributions are, the greater is the number of simulations required. This because 
more complex distributions require to estimate many parameters that can determine a wide 
range of values. 
The following figure illustrates the distribution probability of business enterprise value ob-
tained with 1.000 simulations. 
 
Figure 4.3. Bialetti’s BEV distribution 
 
 
Expected value of business enterprise value is € 117.1 million with a volatility of about 41.7 
per cent, which is approximately the same estimated by Damodaran for household industry 
and that we used in the OPV model. 
Other statistics about the BEV distribution of Bialetti obtained with a Monte Carlo simula-
tion are reported in the following table. 
 
Table 4.22. – Statistics about Bialetti’s BEV distribution 
 
-32.536  18.974  70.484  121.994  173.504  225.014
Expected BEV 117.126
Mean 116.923
Relative SD 41,70%
Minimum  (96.400)
Maximum 301.167
1st quartile 82.507
3rd quartile 148.227
Skweness 1,8
Curtosis 3,28
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Starting from the expected value of BEV distribution, the firm’s equity value can be calcu-
lated. For simplicity, market value of debt is assumed to be equal € 76.6 million, i.e. ex-
pected market value of debt obtained in the scenarios analysis. 
 
Table 4.23. – Bialetti Group valuation with DCF model applied to Monte Carlo technique 
 
 
 
4.8. Conclusions 
The goal of the thesis has been to identify the limitations of traditional valuation techniques 
for declining and distressed companies.  
After analyzing corporate crisis topic in chapter 2, in the following chapter the analysis 
about predominant valuation techniques yielded that traditional methods face major prob-
lems when applied to companies in declining or distress situations. Reasons for this are 
linked to the conditions that firms in decline or distress face and cannot be fully captured by 
traditional valuation methods. In addition, these methods completely ignore one of the major 
risks distressed firms face, i.e. the risk of default. 
After analyzing corporate crisis topic and presenting a series of possible approaches that can 
be applied for the valuation of firms in trouble, we focused our analysis on a case applica-
tion: the crisis status and the restructuring process of Bialetti Group.  
The Group started to suffer the first crisis signals at the end of 2007. Wrong management 
choices, high industry competition and changes of the customer's needs significantly com-
promised the economic and financial condition of the Group. Despite restructuring interven-
tions put in place since 2008, the recovery was difficult and in the period 2008-2013 the 
Group recognized recurring significant income losses. The crisis status is clearly visible also 
from an analysis of the main economic and financial results with other competitors, in par-
ticular De Longhi Group. 
Strategic plan 2013-2017 is based on a business model with a particular focus on retailing 
distribution and the relaunch of Bialetti brand in the coffee business. 
Bialetti Group valuation was performed by considering the main guidelines included in the 
industrial plan 2013-2017. The use of several valuation methods permits to overcome the 
Expected BEV 117.126
Non-operating assets 6.349
Enterprise Value 123.475
Debt Value 76.635
Minorities  (44)
Equity Value 46.884
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limits that characterized each single method and determine a range of values for the enter-
prise value, debt value and equity value of the Group. 
A summary of the valuation results obtained with the methods illustrated above is presented 
in the following table. 
 
Table 4.24. - Bialetti Group valuation summary (€/000) 
 
 
Given the inputs and assumptions, we can reasonably conclude that the total enterprise value 
of Bialetti, including non-operating assets, amounts to approximately € 122.2 million at the 
end of 2015. The market value of debt, considering the distress conditions of the Group, can 
be estimated at approximately € 77.6 million with a percentage discount of 11.3 per cent on 
face value. So, we can conclude that the intrinsic value of Bialetti Industrie S.p.A is about € 
44.6 million. When we divide this value for the number of shares outstanding at 31st De-
cember 2016 (108 million shares), we obtain a value per share of € 0.41. The market price of 
Bialetti at the end of 2015 was € 0.39 per share. This result suggests that the implemented 
valuation process addresses quite well the default risk and other characteristics of distressed 
firms such as Bialetti Group. 
Anyway, the findings of such thesis could be analyzed and any possible distortion identified. 
In particular, it would be interesting to analyze the impact of the assumptions made in the 
models in order to find out if it is reasonable to ignore certain facts. The impact of the use of 
a single type of debt in the model is worth further investigation. Furthermore, a sensibility 
analysis of the various input variables could be performed in order to assess the impact and 
importance of the different inputs.  
Finally, these models do not represent universal methods to be used in all distressed situa-
tions scenarios but the choice should be consider the availability and accuracy of the input 
data and a careful analysis of the company's situation. 
Valuation method EV D E+minorities
Scenarios analysis 122.015 76.635 45.379
OPV model 121.315 78.551 42.764
DCF adjusted for PD 122.148 78.551 43.597
Monte Carlo approach 123.475 76.635 46.840
Average values 122.238 77.593 44.645
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Appendix 4.1. – Projections - Base scenario (€/000) 
 
 
 
 
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Projected Balance Sheet (Total invested capital)
Working cash* 1.724 1.648 1.646 1.705 1.786 1.881
Trade receivables 60.401 58.683 58.182 60.259 62.633 65.978
Inventories 39.151 37.467 36.984 38.304 39.635 41.752
Trade payable (40.127) (38.370) (38.337) (40.173) (42.082) (44.845)
Trade working capital 61.149 59.428 58.475 60.095 61.973 64.767
Other current assets (5.752) (5.000) (5.000) (5.000) (5.000) (5.000)
Net working capital 55.397 54.428 53.475 55.095 56.973 59.767
Total operating fixed capital 27.463 33.779 39.265 43.538 47.701 50.907
Total other non-current operating assets and liabilities 130 130 130 130 130 130
Invested capital excluding goodwill and similar intangibles 82.990 88.337 92.870 98.763 104.804 110.804
Goodwill and other similar intangibles 11.364 8.864 6.364 3.864 1.364 0
Invested capital including goodwill and similar intangibles 94.354 97.201 99.234 102.627 106.168 110.804
Non-operating assets and liabilities 6.349 6.300 6.300 6.300 6.300 6.300
Total funds invested 100.703 103.501 105.534 108.927 112.468 117.104
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Projected Balance Sheet (Source of financing)
Net financial position 84.405 84.076 81.690 79.670 77.384 74.616
Debt equivalents 3.132 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000
Net financial position and debt equivalents 87.537 87.076 84.690 82.670 80.384 77.616
Minority interests (44) (44) (44) (44) (44) (44)
Shareholders' equity 13.210 16.469 20.888 26.301 32.127 39.532
Total equity 13.166 16.425 20.844 26.257 32.083 39.488
Total sources of financing 100.703 103.501 105.534 108.927 112.468 117.104
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2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Forecast Income Statement
Revenues 172.354 164.765 164.623 170.500 178.602 188.141
Other income 2.417 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000
Raw materials, consumables and goods (70.688) (69.201) (68.813) (70.928) (74.120) (77.514)
Other operating costs (10.738) (11.185) (10.777) (11.161) (11.692) (12.316)
Operating cost (personnel and D&A excluded) (44.289) (46.134) (44.448) (46.035) (48.223) (50.798)
Personnel expenses (28.849) (24.959) (24.922) (24.722) (25.897) (27.281)
EBITDA 20.207 15.285 17.664 19.653 20.671 22.232
Depreciation (1.953) (2.129) (2.619) (3.044) (3.375) (3.698)
Amortization of operating intangibles (1.322) (1.441) (1.772) (2.060) (2.285) (2.503)
Total D&A (3.275) (3.570) (4.391) (5.104) (5.660) (6.201)
EBITA 16.932 11.715 13.273 14.549 15.011 16.031
Amortization of assets similar to goodwill (2.641) (2.500) (2.500) (2.500) (2.500) (1.364)
EBIT 14.291 9.215 10.773 12.049 12.511 14.667
Non-recurring and extraordinary items 133 0 0 0 0 0
Interest income (expense) from investments (623) 0 0 0 0 0
Exchange rate (losses) gains (1.548) 0 0 0 0 0
Interest (expense) income (5.386) (4.633) (4.559) (4.437) (4.319) (4.256)
Net financial result (6.934) (4.633) (4.559) (4.437) (4.319) (4.256)
EBT 6.867 4.582 6.214 7.611 8.192 10.411
Taxes (2.848) (1.375) (1.864) (2.283) (2.458) (3.123)
Group Net Income 4.019 3.207 4.350 5.328 5.734 7.288
Minority result 64 51 70 85 92 117
Net Income 4.083 3.259 4.420 5.413 5.826 7.404
NOPLAT Calculation
EBITA 16.932 11.715 13.273 14.549 15.011 16.031
Operating taxes (5.738) (3.434) (3.903) (4.289) (4.430) (4.722)
NOPLAT 11.194 8.281 9.370 10.260 10.580 11.309
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CASH FLOW STATEMENT Forecast
NOPLAT 11.194 8.281 9.370 10.260 10.580 11.309
Amortization of operating intangibles 1.322 1.441 1.772 2.060 2.285 2.503
Depreciation 1.953 2.129 2.619 3.044 3.375 3.698
Gross cash flow 14.469 11.852 13.761 15.364 16.240 17.510
Change in operating working capital (602) 968 953 (1.620) (1.877) (2.794)
Net capital expenditures (6.031) (9.886) (9.877) (9.377) (9.823) (9.407)
Change in other operating assets and liabilities (2.327) 0 0 0 0 0
Gross investment (8.960) (8.917) (8.924) (10.998) (11.700) (12.202)
Free cash flow before goodwill and similar intangibles 5.509 2.934 4.837 4.367 4.540 5.309
Investments in goodwill and other intangibles (2.035) 0 0 0 0 0
Free cash flow after goodwill and similar intangibles 3.474 2.934 4.837 4.367 4.540 5.309
Investments in non-operating assets 12 49 0 0 0 0
Non-recurring and extraordinary items 133 0 0 0 0 0
Interest income (expense) from investments (623) 0 0 0 0 0
Non-operating taxes 2.890 2.059 2.039 2.005 1.973 1.599
Non-operating cash flow 2.412 2.108 2.039 2.005 1.973 1.599
Cash available to investors 5.886 5.042 6.876 6.372 6.513 6.907
Net financial result (6.934) (4.633) (4.559) (4.437) (4.319) (4.256)
Change in debt equivalents 255 (132) 0 0 0 0
Change in minority interests (9) 51 70 85 92 117
Change in shareholders' equity 3.401 0 0 0 0 0
Decrease (increase) in net financial position 2.599 328 2.387 2.020 2.286 2.768
Beginning net financial position 87.003 84.405 84.076 81.690 79.670 77.384
Ending net financial position 84.405 84.076 81.690 79.670 77.384 74.616
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Appendix 4.2. - Projections – Best scenario (€/000) 
 
 
 
 
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Projected Balance Sheet (Total invested capital)
Working cash* 1.724 1.654 1.659 1.730 1.837 1.983
Trade receivables 60.401 58.894 58.621 60.664 63.935 68.466
Inventories 39.151 37.149 36.809 37.915 39.770 42.384
Trade payable (40.127) (38.508) (38.626) (40.285) (42.791) (46.188)
Trade working capital 61.149 59.189 58.462 60.024 62.752 66.646
Other current assets (5.752) (5.000) (5.000) (5.000) (5.000) (5.000)
Net working capital 55.397 54.189 53.462 55.024 57.752 61.646
Total operating fixed capital 27.463 33.814 39.370 43.766 48.183 51.836
Total other non-current operating assets and liabilities 130 130 130 130 130 130
Invested capital excluding goodwill and similar intangibles 82.990 88.133 92.962 98.920 106.065 113.612
Goodwill and other similar intangibles 11.364 8.864 6.364 3.864 1.364 0
Invested capital including goodwill and similar intangibles 94.354 96.997 99.326 102.784 107.429 113.612
Non-operating assets and liabilities 6.349 6.300 6.300 6.300 6.300 6.300
Total funds invested 100.703 103.297 105.626 109.084 113.729 119.912
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Projected Balance Sheet (Source of financing)
Net financial position 84.405 82.982 79.859 77.266 74.816 72.732
Debt equivalents 3.132 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000
Net financial position and debt equivalents 87.537 85.982 82.859 80.266 77.816 75.732
Minority interests (44) (44) (44) (44) (44) (44)
Shareholders' equity 13.210 17.359 22.811 28.863 35.957 44.224
Total equity 13.166 17.315 22.767 28.819 35.913 44.180
Total sources of financing 100.703 103.297 105.626 109.084 113.729 119.912
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2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Forecast Income Statement
Revenues 172.354 165.357 165.866 172.987 183.749 198.335
Other income 2.417 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000
Raw materials, consumables and goods (70.688) (69.946) (69.332) (72.135) (76.256) (81.912)
Other operating costs (10.738) (10.302) (10.334) (10.777) (11.448) (12.357)
Operating cost (personnel and D&A excluded) (44.289) (42.491) (42.622) (44.452) (47.217) (50.965)
Personnel expenses (28.849) (28.111) (26.539) (27.174) (28.481) (31.734)
EBITDA 20.207 16.507 19.040 20.448 22.347 23.367
Depreciation (1.953) (2.129) (2.622) (3.052) (3.393) (3.736)
Amortization of operating intangibles (1.322) (1.441) (1.774) (2.066) (2.296) (2.528)
Total D&A (3.275) (3.570) (4.396) (5.118) (5.690) (6.264)
EBITA 16.932 12.937 14.644 15.330 16.657 17.103
Amortization of assets similar to goodwill (2.641) (2.500) (2.500) (2.500) (2.500) (1.364)
EBIT 14.291 10.437 12.144 12.830 14.157 15.740
Non-recurring and extraordinary items 133 0 0 0 0 0
Interest income (expense) from investments (623) 0 0 0 0 0
Exchange rate (losses) gains (1.548) 0 0 0 0 0
Interest (expense) income (5.386) (4.603) (4.478) (4.321) (4.182) (4.115)
Net financial result (6.934) (4.603) (4.478) (4.321) (4.182) (4.115)
EBT 6.867 5.834 7.666 8.509 9.975 11.625
Taxes (2.848) (1.750) (2.300) (2.553) (2.993) (3.487)
Group Net Income 4.019 4.084 5.366 5.956 6.983 8.137
Minority result 64 65 86 95 112 130
Net Income 4.083 4.149 5.452 6.052 7.094 8.267
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
NOPLAT Calculation
EBITA 16.932 12.937 14.644 15.330 16.657 17.103
Operating taxes (5.738) (3.801) (4.316) (4.526) (4.928) (5.047)
NOPLAT 11.194 9.136 10.328 10.804 11.730 12.056
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2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
CASH FLOW STATEMENT Forecast
NOPLAT 11.194 9.136 10.328 10.804 11.730 12.056
Amortization of operating intangibles 1.322 1.441 1.774 2.066 2.296 2.528
Depreciation 1.953 2.129 2.622 3.052 3.393 3.736
Gross cash flow 14.469 12.706 14.724 15.922 17.419 18.320
Change in operating working capital (602) 1.208 727 (1.562) (2.728) (3.894)
Net capital expenditures (6.031) (9.921) (9.952) (9.514) (10.106) (9.917)
Change in other operating assets and liabilities (2.327) 0 0 0 0 0
Gross investment (8.960) (8.713) (9.225) (11.076) (12.834) (13.811)
Free cash flow before goodwill and similar intangibles 5.509 3.993 5.498 4.846 4.586 4.509
Investments in goodwill and other intangibles (2.035) 0 0 0 0 0
Free cash flow after goodwill and similar intangibles 3.474 3.993 5.498 4.846 4.586 4.509
Investments in non-operating assets 12 49 0 0 0 0
Non-recurring and extraordinary items 133 0 0 0 0 0
Interest income (expense) from investments (623) 0 0 0 0 0
Non-operating taxes 2.890 2.051 2.016 1.973 1.935 1.560
Non-operating cash flow 2.412 2.100 2.016 1.973 1.935 1.560
Cash available to investors 5.886 6.093 7.515 6.819 6.521 6.069
Net financial result (6.934) (4.603) (4.478) (4.321) (4.182) (4.115)
Change in debt equivalents 255 (132) 0 0 0 0
Change in minority interests (9) 65 86 95 112 130
Change in shareholders' equity 3.401 0 0 0 0 0
Decrease (increase) in net financial position 2.599 1.423 3.122 2.593 2.450 2.084
Beginning net financial position 87.003 84.405 82.982 79.859 77.266 74.816
Ending net financial position 84.405 82.982 79.859 77.266 74.816 72.732
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Appendix 4.3. - Projections – Worst Scenario (€/000) 
 
 
 
 
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Projected Balance Sheet (Total invested capital)
Working cash* 1.724 1.683 1.675 1.698 1.710 1.718
Trade receivables 60.401 60.400 60.567 61.867 62.762 63.547
Inventories 39.151 37.807 38.542 39.539 40.749 42.364
Trade payable (40.127) (38.730) (38.542) (38.608) (38.407) (38.599)
Trade working capital 61.149 61.160 62.241 64.495 66.814 69.030
Other current assets (5.752) (5.000) (5.000) (5.000) (5.000) (5.000)
Net working capital 55.397 56.160 57.241 59.495 61.814 64.030
Total operating fixed capital 27.463 33.990 39.620 43.808 47.515 49.929
Total other non-current operating assets and liabilities 130 130 130 130 130 130
Invested capital excluding goodwill and similar intangibles82.990 90.281 96.991 103.432 109.459 114.089
Goodwill and other similar intangibles 11.364 8.864 6.364 3.864 1.364 0
Invested capital including goodwill and similar intangibles94.354 99.144 103.355 107.296 110.823 114.089
Non-operating assets and liabilities 6.349 6.300 6.300 6.300 6.300 6.300
Total funds invested 100.703 105.444 109.655 113.596 117.123 120.389
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Projected Balance Sheet (Source of financing)
Net financial position 84.405 86.042 87.057 87.457 87.769 87.154
Debt equivalents 3.132 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000
Net financial position and debt equivalents 87.537 89.042 90.057 90.457 90.769 90.154
Minority interests (44) (44) (44) (44) (44) (44)
Shareholders' equity 13.210 16.447 19.642 23.183 26.398 30.279
Total equity 13.166 16.403 19.598 23.139 26.354 30.235
Total sources of financing 100.703 105.444 109.655 113.596 117.123 120.389
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2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Forecast Income Statement
Revenues 172.354 168.289 167.476 169.784 170.956 171.811
Other income 2.417 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 2.000
Raw materials, consumables and goods (70.688) (67.734) (67.407) (68.336) (68.808) (69.152)
Other operating costs (10.738) (11.442) (11.369) (11.485) (11.564) (11.580)
Operating cost (personnel and D&A excluded) (44.289) (47.195) (46.893) (47.370) (47.697) (47.764)
Personnel expenses (28.849) (28.609) (27.634) (27.165) (27.353) (27.490)
EBITDA 20.207 15.308 16.173 17.428 17.534 17.825
Depreciation (1.953) (2.129) (2.635) (3.072) (3.396) (3.684)
Amortization of operating intangibles (1.322) (1.441) (1.784) (2.079) (2.299) (2.493)
Total D&A (3.275) (3.570) (4.419) (5.151) (5.695) (6.177)
EBITA 16.932 11.738 11.754 12.277 11.839 11.648
Amortization of assets similar to goodwill (2.641) (2.500) (2.500) (2.500) (2.500) (1.364)
EBIT 14.291 9.238 9.254 9.777 9.339 10.285
Non-recurring and extraordinary items 133 0 0 0 0 0
Interest income (expense) from investments (623) 0 0 0 0 0
Exchange rate (losses) gains (1.548) 0 0 0 0 0
Interest (expense) income (5.386) (4.687) (4.760) (4.799) (4.819) (4.827)
Net financial result (6.934) (4.687) (4.760) (4.799) (4.819) (4.827)
EBT 6.867 4.551 4.494 4.978 4.521 5.457
Taxes (2.848) (1.365) (1.348) (1.493) (1.356) (1.637)
Group Net Income 4.019 3.186 3.146 3.485 3.164 3.820
Minority result 64 51 50 56 51 61
Net Income 4.083 3.237 3.196 3.540 3.215 3.881
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
NOPLAT Calculation
EBITA 16.932 11.738 11.754 12.277 11.839 11.648
Operating taxes (5.738) (3.439) (3.442) (3.598) (3.466) (3.393)
NOPLAT 11.194 8.299 8.312 8.679 8.373 8.256
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2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
CASH FLOW STATEMENT Forecast
NOPLAT 11.194 8.299 8.312 8.679 8.373 8.256
Amortization of operating intangibles 1.322 1.441 1.784 2.079 2.299 2.493
Depreciation 1.953 2.129 2.635 3.072 3.396 3.684
Gross cash flow 14.469 11.869 12.730 13.830 14.068 14.432
Change in operating working capital (602) (764) (1.081) (2.253) (2.319) (2.217)
Net capital expenditures (6.031) (10.097) (10.049) (9.338) (9.403) (8.591)
Change in other operating assets and liabilities (2.327) 0 0 0 0 0
Gross investment (8.960) (10.861) (11.130) (11.592) (11.721) (10.807)
Free cash flow before goodwill and similar intangibles 5.509 1.008 1.601 2.238 2.347 3.625
Investments in goodwill and other intangibles (2.035) 0 0 0 0 0
Free cash flow after goodwill and similar intangibles 3.474 1.008 1.601 2.238 2.347 3.625
Investments in non-operating assets 12 49 0 0 0 0
Non-recurring and extraordinary items 133 0 0 0 0 0
Interest income (expense) from investments (623) 0 0 0 0 0
Non-operating taxes 2.890 2.074 2.094 2.105 2.110 1.756
Non-operating cash flow 2.412 2.123 2.094 2.105 2.110 1.756
Cash available to investors 5.886 3.131 3.695 4.343 4.457 5.381
Net financial result (6.934) (4.687) (4.760) (4.799) (4.819) (4.827)
Change in debt equivalents 255 (132) 0 0 0 0
Change in minority interests (9) 51 50 56 51 61
Change in shareholders' equity 3.401 0 0 0 0 0
Decrease (increase) in net financial position 2.599 (1.637) (1.015) (401) (311) 615
Beginning net financial position 87.003 84.405 86.042 87.057 87.457 87.769
Ending net financial position 84.405 86.042 87.057 87.457 87.769 87.154
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Appendix 4.4. - Unlevered beta calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beta coefficient estimation
€/million MKT CAP NFP D/E β Levered β
Unlevered β debt Rating
De Longhi S.p.A. 3.226           (189) -5,9% 0,60 0,63 0,10 A
SEB 6.005           316             5,3% 0,70 0,67 0,14 BBB
Leifheit AG 257              (68) -26,5% 0,60 0,78 0,10 A
Arcelik AS 14.068         3.270          23,2% 1,00 0,86 0,28 BB
Midea Group Co Ltd 25.328         9.228          36,4% 0,80 0,62 0,14 BBB
Newell Brands Inc. 24.139         9.998          41,4% 1,20 0,89 0,14 BBB
Helen of Troy Ltd. 2.377           620             26,1% 1,10 0,89 0,10 A
Mastrad SA 5,81             3                 59,0% 1,05 0,81 0,40 B
Gruppo Beghelli 76                79               103,9% 1,30 1,05 0,80 C-CCC
Cembre SpA 223              18               8,0% 0,45 0,44 0,28 BB
Biesse SpA 354              1                 0,1% 1,10 1,10 0,10 A
Sabaf SpA 101              32               31,6% 0,46 0,45 0,40 B
Elica S.p.A 119              53               44,5% 0,90 0,87 0,80 A
Avg 5.868           1.797          26,7% 0,87 0,77 0,29 BBB
Median 1.365           66               26,4% 0,88 0,79 0,21 BBB
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Appendix 4.5. – Interest coverage and rating class 
 
From to
12,5 100000,0 AAA 0,40%
7,5 9,5 AA 0,70%
6,0 7,5 A+ 0,85%
5,0 6,0 A 1,00%
4,5 5,0 A- 1,30%
4,0 4,5 BBB 2,50%
3,5 4,0 BB+ 3,00%
3,0 3,5 BB 4,00%
2,5 3,0 B+ 5,50%
2,0 2,5 B 6,50%
1,5 2,0 B- 7,25%
1,3 1,5 CCC 8,75%
0,8 1,3 CC 9,50%
0,5 0,8 C 10,50%
-1000,0 0,5 D 12,00%
EBIT/Int. Expense
Rating Spread
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